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I will upload 1 file which is the article and a screenshot which is a sample of how you should write the paper. students will write one-page single-spaced response paper on different assigned readings from the course. The purpose of the response paper is for you to engage in an in-depth examination of an academic article by summarizing and assessing its contribution. Each response paper will: 1. Identify the central thesis of the article 2. Summarize key arguments or concepts 3. Assess one strength and one weakness of the article 4. Pose two discussion questions

International Studies Quarterly (2018) 0, 1–11Why Is There No Reactionary International Theory?THEORY NOTEJ OSEPH MA CKA YAustralian National UniversityANDC HRISTOPHER DAVID LAR OCHEUniversity of TorontoWhy is there no reactionary international theory? International relations has long drawn on a range of traditions in politicalthought. However, no current, or even recent, major school of international-relations theory embraces reactionary doctrine.This is more surprising than some might assume. Reaction was once common in the field and is now increasingly common inworld politics. In this note, we define reaction and show that no active and influential school of international-relations theoryfalls within its ideological domain. Nonetheless, reactionary ideas once deeply shaped the field. We identify two distinct kindsof reactionary international politics and illustrate them empirically. We argue that the current lack of reactionary internationalrelations undermines the field’s ability to make sense both of its own history and of reactionary practice. Finally, we offer somepreliminary thoughts about why reactionary ideas hold little sway in contemporary international-relations theory.Why is there no reactionary international theory?1 Contemporary international-relations scholarship draws on multipleintellectual traditions: liberal, status-quo realist, radical, andcritical, to name only a few. However, the discipline lacks anexplicitly reactionary school—one that rejects the present infavor of the past. The systematic and sometimes radical nostalgia of reactionary politics is almost entirely absent fromthe contemporary field. This absence is striking because reaction itself has a long history in political thought and practice. Indeed, as recent historiography of the field implies,reaction played an important part in academic internationalrelations at its inception.2 We call on scholars to re-examinereactionary politics—both in the discipline and in historymore broadly—and thereby better understand and addressthese persistent and consequential phenomena.We write not as reactionaries ourselves but as concernedmembers of the discipline. We do not claim understandingreactionary world politics requires expressly reactionary international theory. Instead, we contend that the absence ofreactionary theory has likely shaped the field’s inattentionto political reaction as such. While current internationaltheory may overlook political reaction, it is all aroundus in contemporary politics. We see it in Western nativistJoseph MacKay is a research fellow in the Department of International Relations, Australian National University.Christopher David LaRoche is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science and a fellow at the Trudeau Centre for Peace, Conflict and Justiceat the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto.Authors’ Note: The authors would like to thank Kiran Banerjee, Scott Dodds,Alena Drieschova, Michael Millerman, and David Polansky, who (along with considered disagreements) offered a range of helpful comments. We also thank theanonymous reviewers and editors of International Studies Quarterly. 1We allude to Wight (1966), whose own political orientation we review below. 2That research challenges international-relations theory’s once-canonical origin story as a battle between liberal progressives and realist critics, pointing toheterodox and sometimes problematic beginnings (Schmidt 2012; Guilhot 2013;Vitalis 2015). While some scholars assess expressly conservative internationalthought (Hall and Rengger 2005; Hall 2015), few treat reaction rigorously andspecifically as an analytical category.movements that, reacting to globalism, defend putatively“purer” racially or culturally homogenous societies and callfor closed borders. We find it in the Islamist radicalismthat those nativists condemn, which itself recalls an idealized Pax Islamica of more than a millennium ago. Theseideas shape world politics and share a common attitudetoward historical change—yet current internationalrelations theory provides little systematic insight into,or understanding of, them.By reactionary, we mean a specific political attitude towardlong-run historical change. The word is more commonlyused as a term of abuse than one of self-attribution—a pejorative description for those who “unthinkingly” reject thefruits of progress. In contrast, we find a potentially systematic, influential, and important tradition, predicated on adistinctive attitude toward history. Liberal progressives andradicals alike view change, explicitly or tacitly, as both possible and often desirable. Realists emphasize fundamentalcontinuities in politics and tend to discount the significanceof apparent changes in world politics. In contrast, reactionaries neither embrace historical change nor discount itsimportance. Instead, they understand deep historical transformations as both real and catastrophic. For reactionaries,the world was once better: a past political order, now lost,shows us retrospectively how things should be but no longerare. Fixated on this prelapsarian world, reaction is a doctrine of political nostalgia. It imagines a past it hopes torecreate.3We offer an exploratory account of reactionary international politics. We proceed in four sections. First, we definepolitical reaction. Second, we show its nearly complete absence from contemporary international-relations theory. Wealso explore the field’s reactionary early history and findscattered and incomplete reaction in more recent scholarship. Third, for context, we offer a brief history of Western3 On how theories or philosophies of history shape international relations, seeMacKay and LaRoche (2017).MacKay, Joseph, and Christopher David LaRoche. (2018) Why Is There No Reactionary International Theory? International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1093/isq/sqx083© The Author(s) (2018). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association.All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.comDownloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isq/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isq/sqx083/4951415by gueston 19 April 20182 Why Is There No Reactionary International Theory?reactionary political thought. Fourth, we illustrate its importance in world politics, identifying two reactionary strategies in world politics—revisionism and restructuring—withrespective historical examples: Nazi Germany and the Concert of Europe’s counter-revolutionary “Metternich system.”A conclusion rethinks reaction’s place in the field.What is Political Reaction?We understand reaction as the claim that a past politicalorder is preferable to the present. It is often accompanied by attempts to restore that past order.4 Like liberalprogressivism or Marxian radicalism, reaction focuses onthe processes, particularly with respect to modernity, of historical transformation. Its distinguishing feature is a beliefin the fundamentally destructive character of reformist orprogressive change. However, where progressives imagine abetter world that does not yet exist, reactionaries refer toone they understand as already behind us.5 Reactionary politics have historically appealed to wide and diverse groupsand may be as, or more, convincing to audiences as theseother traditions. As Lilla (2016, xiv) notes, “Hope can bedisappointed. Nostalgia is irrefutable.”6Reactionaries believe in a lost prior order that is constitutive of the good life or conditions for human flourishing, recognize a specific event or process that destroyed it,and blame some actor, group, or event for that destructivechange. Reactionary international theory, in turn, imaginesa past in which either a given national political order (nowlost) was secure within the larger world order, or the worldorder itself was both different and preferable.7 This understanding constitutes an ideal type—an analytically simplifiedaccount that, while precisely describing few cases, nonetheless captures core features held in common across most instances.8 We now explore it in greater detail.First, reactionaries imagine a past preferable to thepresent or expected future. They posit a long-run historical trajectory, over which change is linear and systematically knowable. Thus, religious radicals, nativists, and otherkinds of reactionaries begin by describing an idealized past.This serves as a baseline against which to judge the presentand future. This history need not be complete—or even accurate. Catholic reactionaries may excoriate the Reformation as dogmatic, blaming it for later events such as theFrench Revolution, but also deemphasize Medieval Christendom’s less attractive doctrinal practices, such as the Inquisition.9 Violent reactionaries in the west today, such as4We draw here on Lilla’s (2016, ix–xxi) recent concise theoretical work. Sodefined, reaction is distinct from such related concepts as conservatism, nostalgia, romanticism, populism, nationalism, and others. We thus adopt a morespecific definition than Robin (2011, 34), who uses “the words conservative,reactionary, and counterrevolutionary interchangeably”—treating conservative“philosophers, statesmen, slaveholders, scribblers, Catholics, fascists, evangelicals,businessmen, racists, and hacks” as belonging to the same core political experience: “a meditation on—and theoretical rendition of—the felt experience of having power, seeing it threatened, and trying to win it back” (Robin 2011, 4, see also28). Such elite impulses may animate reaction as we define it, but need not. Nor,we argue below, need reaction be strictly rightwing. Eliding distinctions betweenthese terms makes for less precise and useful analysis. 5Bauman (2017, 5, 8) terms this imagined past “retrotopia.” 6The word was coined in 1688, by a Swiss medical student, from the Greeknostos (return or homecoming) and algos (pain). It originally described a psychiatric diagnosis: a malignant and destructive homesickness and, more broadly, a“refusal to consider any but a world lost to the past as the habitable world” (Roth1991, 15). It is linked to longing for one’s homeland and thus nationalism.7Thus, for example, the “fascist internationalism” of the interwar period(Steffek 2015, 3–4). 8 On ideal-types in international relations, see Jackson (2011, 37, 142–46). 9 See, for example, Kuehnelt-Leddihn (1952, 179–87); More recently, Gregory(2012) locates modern disillusionment in the Reformation.Theodore Kaczynski or Anders Breivik, imagine technologically or racially different pasts, with dubious historical accuracy. Islamic radicals likewise are sometimes silent onthe violence, slavery, and eventual corruption of the earlyCaliphates. However, reactionaries may internationally emphasize these features, or argue they are the acceptable costsof an overall better society. In some instances, reactionaries may simply mythologize the past. What matters is thatthe putative status quo ante represents a condition of greatermoral-political wellbeing than the present.Second, reactionaries imagine an event or process thatdestroyed that order. Reactionaries understand “progressive” political change as destructive, whether in the formof cataclysm or of gradual decay. The signal event fornineteenth-century reactionaries was the French Revolution, which they saw as catalyzed by the Enlightenment’sdisenchantment of traditionally religious authority (Maistre1994, for example, 41–48). Late twentieth-century Americanreactionaries often blamed societal instability on “social engineers” disrupting traditional ways of life (Buckley 1955).To treat the past as prelapsarian, reactionaries must identifythe Fall that destroyed it.Third, reactionaries generally blame some actor or groupfor that destructive change. Islamic radicals have oftenblamed European imperialism, and Islamic modernizationattempts, for the nineteenth and twentieth century moraland political nadir of the Islamic world (Euben 1999, 93–94). The Nazis blamed the Jews for the decadence, moraldisorder, international capitalism, and destruction of national culture they claimed to see in modern Europe. Asthese examples suggest, this component may have somebasis in fact or none at all. Nor need the disruption beintentional. Reactionaries need not claim that Enlightenment philosophers meant to destroy medieval Europeancivilization—disillusionment was merely a by-product oftheir intellectual flourishing.We stress the ideal-typical character of the preceding description. Actual cases of reactionary thought and practicewill fit imperfectly; many combine elements with other ideologies and even represent “borderline” cases. Degrees ofreaction vary, both in the remoteness of the past recalledand the means mobilized to recapture it. Whereas Metternich wanted only a restored prerevolutionary monarchicalEurope, Hitler aimed at an imagined premodern utopia.What matters is not our ability to neatly and unproblematically categorize theorists, movements, and regimes. Instead,we trace reaction, by degrees, across cases and contexts.Moreover, while we focus on conservative reactionaries,reaction is not coextensive with the right (Lilla 2016, xii).10The British Luddites recalled a past before machines replaced their labor (Randall 1986, 8–9). Some deep ecologists today imagine restoring a closer, preindustrial linkbetween humanity and nature (Devall and Sessions 1985).Contemporary opponents of modern medicine (e.g., vaccine sceptics) sometimes idealize, tacitly or explicitly, a more“natural” human past reliant on folk remedies instead ofmodern pharmacology (for example, Kata 2010, 171–14).Inversely, many conservatives have scant reactionary beliefs.Burke (2014) grounded his impassioned criticism of theFrench Revolution in a defense of gradual and local change,not of wholesale return to the past (see Welsh 1995). More10 Our account nonetheless resonates with Mannheim’s (1936, 207) conception of a conservative “counter-utopia which serves as a means of self-orientationand defence” against progressive and revolutionary ideologies. For Mannheim,conservatives do not resist reform first in principle. Instead, they do so in practiceand acquire ideological frameworks only in response to insurrection. We distinguish reaction as a systematic ideational appeal to the past, as against the statusquo.Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isq/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isq/sqx083/4951415by gueston 19 April 2018J OSEPH MA CKAY AND C HRISTOPHER DAVID LAR OCHE 3recent free-market conservatives or right-libertarians neednot be explicitly nostalgic at all (Friedman 1962, 7–21).11Finally, we focus on reaction primarily as a modernand Western phenomenon. Accelerated change linked tointellectual, political, and industrial modernity—perhapsfirst and most acutely experienced in the West—provideconditions in which reactionary thinking became commonplace. Non-European peoples often first experiencedmodernity as colonial domination. Responses to it wereconsequently different and varied widely across contexts.12In principle, some political reaction may have no connection with modernity—Confucius and Homer both recalledgolden ages prior to their own. Nor is all criticism of modernity reactionary. Those who link declining attention spans tosocial media or question the uneven effects of globalizationon traditional ways of life are not necessarily reactionary. Reactionaries go beyond criticism, instead idealizing a past social order and endorsing it over the present. Criticism aimsto understand modernity; reaction sets out to replace it.13Nonetheless, modernity presents distinctive conditions ofpersistent transformation that have permitted antimodernnostalgia to proliferate (Lilla 2016, xiv).14Reactionary International RelationsOn this definition, no major contemporary school in international relations theory is meaningfully reactionary. Thisshould be obvious in the cases of classical and neoliberalprogressivism and historical materialist radicalism.15 In theircanonical forms, all of these schools imagined better futures that differ from the past, whether achieved throughgradual evolution or revolutionary struggle.16 However,those schools sometimes called conservative are not usuallyreactionary, at least in their more recent formulations. Realism, the school most commonly linked to conservatism, describes no corrosive historical change. Instead, realists question whether fundamental international change is possibleat all. Waltz (1979, 66) is perhaps clearest: “The texture ofinternational politics remains highly constant, patterns recur, and events repeat themselves endlessly. The relationsthat prevail internationally seldom shift rapidly in type or inquality. They are marked instead by dismaying persistence.”Mearsheimer (2003, 2) concurs: “international politics hasalways been a ruthless and dangerous business, and it islikely to remain that way.” This vision has little transformation of any kind—good or ill.11Nor is reaction equivalent to populism, which may be a doctrine of theleft or right and says nothing systematic about the past (Müller 2016, 21–22; seealso Marchlewska, Cichocka, Panayiotou, Castellanos, and Batayneh 2017). Nor isreaction inherently populist—it may be a doctrine of return to traditional socialhierarchy. 12Anticolonial reaction contrasts with more common progressive or radicalanticolonialism (for example, Fanon 1965). Elsewhere, quasi-modernities mayhave emerged independently of the West (Woodside 2009, 1, 10). 13 Similarly, not all theoretical critics of modernity, such as Leo Strauss andothers, propose a reactionary political program (Zuckert 2011). Some may evenaim to ameliorate modern politics (Arendt 1998; 2006) or defend some elements of modernity while criticizing others (Manent 2006; Elshtain 1993, 2008;Thompson 2008; Delsol 2010). Other schools, such as postmodernism, are hostile to modernity without nostalgia of any kind. See note 42 for two liminal cases,Martin Heidegger and Carl Schmitt. 14Reaction as we define it may presuppose modernity, insofar as reactionarypolitical beliefs require a historicist conception of political life. Such understandings became available only through Rousseau, Hegel, and other modern European theorists. 15 International relations scholars tend to have left-liberal political views(Maliniak, Peterson, and Tierney 2012). 16Early liberal internationalists were progressive, and sometimes antiimperialist, as was Angell, but also paternalistic and Eurocentric—and thus at leastpotentially reactionary (Hobson 2012, 40–45). On Angell generally, see Ceadel(2009).While many classical realists had reactionary sentiments,these did not amount to wholly reactionary theory. Morgenthau, Kennan, and Kissinger all expressed nostalgia for anineteenth-century diplomatic order that predated democratized foreign policy.17 But Morgenthau, like Niebuhr, emphasized unchanging, “perennial” political problems thatimpede progress and cannot be permanently solved.18Kennan’s views on social hierarchy and race led him to simultaneously condemn South African apartheid and discourage America from attempting to end it.19 Indeed, recent scholarship finds that many classical realists had critical, liberal, or progressive elements, including Morgenthau,Niebuhr, Carr, Wolfers, and Herz (Williams 2005a, 82–127;Neacsu 2010; Scheuerman 2011; Levine 2012, 120–35).20Raymond Aron’s defense of liberalism is well known.21Kissinger has cautiously embraced elements of progressiveliberal internationalism over time.22 Whatever their differences, classical and neorealists alike do not view historicaltransformation as destructive. Instead, they view it as impossible or misguided, at least on liberal terms.23 So understood, realist values are not strictly reactionary.The English School is sometimes identified as conservative (Buzan 2014, 89 passim) and thus might be thoughtof as reactionary. Most English School conservatism is either broadly Burkean or gradualist, or is the status-quo conservatism of realism. However, as Hall (2011, 48–55) hasshown, many first generation English School scholars, including Butterfield and Wight, expressed a strident nostalgia for empire and imperial-era international society. EarlyEnglish School theorists claimed this period was more socially “thick” and pacific. They linked colonial notions of civilizational superiority to a stable and peaceful internationalorder. Hedley Bull was relatively isolated among them in accepting decolonization.24 However, second generation English School accounts locate conservative tendencies withinthe school’s larger pluralism (Little 2000; Buzan 2004).Third generation English School work can be more or lessexplicitly anticolonial (Suzuki 2009).Other exceptions are rare and mostly partial, proving therule. While power transition theories claim rising powersare more risk acceptant than declining ones (Gilpin 1983),some versions argue declining states too are risk acceptant(Levy 1987). Here though, states in decline aim to preventlater, more destructive wars—not recover lost power andstanding. Elsewhere, Schweller (2014) describes an entropicprocess whereby the modern world’s increasing complexity17 See the review in Bessner and Guilhot (2015, 85–98); for Morgenthauspecifically, see Neacsu (2010, chaps. 4 and 5). 18 See Morgenthau (1948, 13; 2004, 15–16) and Niebuhr (2008, chap. 7).While they differ from Waltzian structuralism, both see violence as persistent andinternational progress tenuous at best. 19 See Gaddis (2011, 603–5), who notes Kennan “long believed that raceshaped culture.” Kennan’s (2014, 46–47) diaries suggest a generalized nostalgia:“I cannot help but regret I did not live fifty or a hundred years sooner. . . . I shouldhave lived in those days when . . . foreign countries were still foreign, when a vastpart of the world always bore the glamour of the great unknown, when there werestill wars worth fighting and gods worth worshipping.” 20The later Morgenthau, for example, endorsed world federalism(Scheuerman 2011, 117–58). 21 For an overview, see Anderson (1997). 22 See Kissinger (1994, 804–12, 832–36; 2014, 371–74, 372): “A world orderof states affirming individual dignity and participatory governance, and cooperating internationally in accordance with agreed-upon rules, can be our hopeand should be our inspiration. But progress toward it will need to be sustainedthrough intermediary stages.” In his first book Kissinger (2013) expressed admiration for Metternich’s post-Napoleonic restoration (see below). 23Carr (2001, 113) had an exceptional, quasi-Hegelian view of progress, seeing it as possible but aimed toward goals revealed only as they were realized(MacKay and LaRoche 2017, 226). 24 See, for example, Bull (1959); discussion in Hall (2011, 51–52).Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isq/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isq/sqx083/4951415by gueston 19 April 20184 Why Is There No Reactionary International Theory?drives disorder and chaos. However, he does not describea specific Fall from a clearly delineated better past. Nordoes he hold anyone responsible—the effect is structural.Elsewhere still, neoconservatives have deep ties to someforms of liberalism.25An exception in recent decades is Huntington’s (1997)overtly reactionary Clash of Civilizations. Huntington locates group identity and fellow feeling in large, historicallyrooted silos—prone, he believed, to conflict with one another. Huntington’s subsequent account of American national identity, Who We Are (2004), argued that Americashould return to the cultural homogeneity of its “founding” white Anglo-Saxon protestant values to renew its national strength. Taken together, Clash and Who We Are propose a narrative of decline in which Western nationalismis under attack by both expanding liberal multiculturalismand undifferentiated foreign civilizations; America can berescued by ethnonational homogeneity at home and antagonism abroad. Hassner (1996, 65, 69) usefully summarizes:Huntington’s civilizational emphasis on “tradition and religion cannot be understood except as a reaction to modernization and its discontents.” The rise of civilizational international politics makes sense only if construed as reactionary.As Welch (2013) notes, the account was neither predictivenor explanatory—instead, “it was a wish.” Although Huntington’s work is often discussed in nonacademic settings, international relations scholars remain consistently critical ofit, suggesting he led no larger trend in the field.26Absent a reactionary school, we might look for scholars who take reaction as an object of study. Constructivism,which focuses on ideas (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 393),could in principle take reaction seriously. However, constructivists have not in practice documented the social construction of international reaction. While some emphasizethe divisive, realist, power-politics of ideas (Mitzen 2006;Barkin 2010), they do not pay much attention to narratives of historical decline.27 Psychological accounts of identity emphasize in-group/out-group dynamics (Mercer 1995)but not over time.28 Postcolonial international-relations theory finds imperial nostalgia in contemporary world politics(for example, Seth 2013, 152–53) but does not offer a systematic treatment of reaction as such.Strikingly, however, this absence itself elides early international relations’ history of reactionary and quasi-reactionarytendencies.29 The field’s early history includes many formsof imperial, geopolitical, or racialized nostalgia. As Hobson(2012, chaps. 5 and 7) has pointed out, early twentiethcentury classical geopolitics had pronounced reactionarystrains, including geographic ethnonationalism and imperial nostalgia. Halford Mackinder hoped much of hiswork, including his now-famous “geographical pivot” theory,would renew British seafaring imperialism against competition from land empires. In the United States, Alfred Mahan25Neoconservatism lacks standard formulations in international relationstheory—the field usually relies on outside analytical reconstructions (for example, Williams 2005b; Drolet 2011). 26 Huntington’s thesis has been repeatedly disproven empirically (Chiozza2002; Fox 2002; survey in Musgrave 2017). His account is distinct from constructivist accounts of grand cultural or civilizational difference (for example,Katzenstein 2009; Acharya 2014). 27 See Adamson (2005, 547) on the “liberal bias” of constructivism, exemplified by its blindness to political Islam. 28Exceptionally, Freedman (2016) emphasizes lost perceived status and attempts to regain it. 29Although reflexive international relations scholars such as Hobson haverecently (re-)connected classical geopolitics to early international relations, thiscritique was first made by critical geographers vis-à-vis their own discipline: seeTuathail (1996); Tuathail, Dalby, and Routledge (2006).advocated a geopolitical worldview and American naval militarism (Tuathail 1996, chaps. 1, 3; Black 2016, 126–41). Bothaddressed the “closing of the world”: the increasing proximity of once isolated societies to the United States, especiallyan encroaching “Asiatic” world (Hobson 2012, 123–30). Reacting to Germany’s post-1919 crises, German geographersalso attempted to revive German expansion with geopolitical theory. After World War 2, classical geopolitics fell outof academic favor because of its associations with Nazism(Tuathail 1996, chap. 4; Black 2016, chap. 7; cf. Hobson2012, 158–65). When Kissinger and others revived the term“geopolitics” during the Cold War, they used it and relatedterms as “casual synonyms for realist views of internationalstrategic rivalry and interaction” (Deudney 2000, 79), eliding their reactionary linkages.30Apart from geopolitics, early international-relations, including early liberalism, was deeply tied up with the linkedtasks of administering empires and maintaining whitesupremacy.31 As European imperialism declined, post-warBritish liberal imperialists in international studies becametacitly reactionary: nostalgic adherents of an older order(Hall 2011, 44–47). The narrative of “great debates” between liberals and realists, from which the discipline putatively emerged, concealed this history. Imperial nostalgiawas erased from international relations’ origin story.32No contemporary international relations scholar is systematically reactionary. However, disciplinary internationalrelations elides a significant portion of its own history. Indeed, reaction has deeply shaped both modern politicaltheory (in its many antimodern forms) and the modernpractice of world politics. We address these in the next twosections.A Brief History of Political ReactionModern political reaction initially responded to the FrenchRevolution, in which the term réaction referred to anyonewho opposed the Jacobins (Lilla 2016, xi). Some early modern thinkers opposed large-scale change—Thomas More’scampaign against the Reformation is exemplary. However,reactionary thought in the sense we mean emerged from theRevolutionary period. Its canonical statement was and remains Joseph de Maistre’s (1994) Considérations sur la France.30Recent geopolitics revivals acknowledge critical geography’s critique whiledisagreeing with its poststructuralism (for example, Deudney 2000; Kelly 2016,45–69; Black 2016, 202–4, 229–39). 31 For example, Foreign Affairs was founded as the Journal of Race Development(Vitalis 2015, ix–x). The elision of such episodes from standard histories of thefield is a double injustice, obscuring both the field’s imperial origins and theearly scholars who resisted it. Henderson (2017) documents the contributionsof the “Howard School” (the term is Vitalis’s) to international relations theory.Some early American political scientists, such as Paul Reinsch, advocated a more“benign” imperialism (Schmidt 2008; Hobson 2012, 121–23). This broader racialized history of the early field overlaps only partially with political reaction as wedefine it. Rather than being reactionary or nostalgic at the time, racism was alltoo normal. Thus, for example, Vucetic (2011) traces the emergence of the “Anglosphere” to racializing processes distinguishing the English-speaking peoplesfrom others. See also Thakur, Davis, and Vale (2017) on the South African originsof the field. On empire and liberalism in international relations, see Jahn (2005a;2005b; 2013, 17–19); on empire and political theory more broadly, see Pitts (2005;2010).32 Indeed, tropes now thought of as typifying the period had roots in geopolitical forerunners. For example, Mackinder’s (1919, 10–16) reference to “democratic idealism” and “reality” prefigures Carr’s utopian vs. realist formulation. ForMackinder, however, reality and idealism can be synthetized in modernist efficiency, the excesses of which may be destructive—his diagnostic case is the FrenchRevolution’s Terror. The modern realist critique of idealism goes back at least toMachiavelli (Pangle and Ahrensdorf 1999, chaps. 4 and 5; Zuckert 2017) but isdistinct from reactionary politics as defined here.Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isq/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isq/sqx083/4951415by gueston 19 April 2018J OSEPH MA CKAY AND C HRISTOPHER DAVID LAR OCHE 5Maistre advanced a providential, theocratic understandingof politics, blamed the revolution on Enlightenment philosophy, and advocated a Bourbon restoration.33 As PierreManent writes in his introduction to Maistre (2006, vii), “instead of critiquing the Revolution for this or that measure,or for its excesses in general, [Considérations] rejects it entirely, in its essence, as contrary to the very nature of socialand moral man.” By defending hierarchical political tradition against abstract and destructive Enlightenment rationalism, Maistre helped establish and spread an intellectualtradition dedicated to restoring and defending an idealizedpast.34The revolution also implicated two figures who, thoughnot reactionaries themselves, shaped later reaction. Thefirst was Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whose arguments inspiredboth the revolution itself and later forms of political antimodernism. For Rousseau (1997, Note IX, 197), humanity was originally “naturally good,” and human ills were social creations—epitomized in eighteenth-century Europe’scorrupt, “bourgeois” society. Revolutionaries (both left andright) drew radical conclusions from this: if all problemswere social, then society itself could and should be transformed and the human condition perfected. In the reactionary version, this meant recreating an earlier, purer society not yet corrupted by bourgeois culture.35 The second wasEdmund Burke, who founded modern conservatism. LikeMaistre, Burke saw the Revolution as imposing a radicallyabstract, inhuman modernity on the tradition-dependent,complex reality of human life.36However, neither Rousseau nor Burke was strictly reactionary. Burke represented a “progressive” conservative aspect of the Enlightenment, intended to temper change andcurtail universalism.37 Rousseau questioned the Enlightenment’s transformative premises but aimed to reform themin his later work.38Modern political reaction is descended from these eventsand theorists, in more and less radical forms. Later writers expanded, modified, and transformed its core ideas—appeal to tradition and religion against revolutionary modernism. They influenced many of the statesmen responsible for the 1815 post-Napoleonic restoration, as wellas later reactionaries, including Louis de Bonald and33 See Maistre (1994, 62–76, 84–85; emphases original): “It will be in the nameof the VERY GOOD AND VERY GREAT GOD . . . that you will return to your oldconstitution and that a king will give you the only thing that you ought wisely todesire—liberty through the monarchy.” 34 For the historical reception of Maistre, see Armenteros and Lebrun (2011). 35Rousseau did not describe, or necessarily intend, a program of reaction.Many of his intellectual descendants were leftist radicals, including Robespierreand Marx. On Rousseau and the French Revolution, see Furet (1997); on hispractical politics, see Kelly’s introduction to Rousseau (2005, xiii–xxiii). 36 For example, Burke (2014, 17–36). Both excoriate modern theory or whatBurke (see 2014, 8, 22, 59–62, 185–88, 224–27) labels “metaphysical” abstractionsand Maistre (1994, 41, 45, 47, 57) “philosophy” and “philosophism.” Burke advocated armed intervention against the French Revolution, but also the progressivegradualism of British constitutionalism, defending the 1688 and 1776 revolutions(Welsh 1995). Maistre (1994, 60–61, 104–21) disliked all three but was nonetheless a “liberal” or (we prefer) moderate reactionary: he admired Britain’s constitutional monarchy and although he wanted “a restoration of the old order . . . heha[d] a fairly liberal understanding of what defined the old order” (Beiner 2011,350; cf. Garrard 2001, 162–63). For Maistre’s relationship with Burke, see Lebrun(2001). 37 For example: “A state without the means of some change is a state withoutthe means of its conservation”; “by preserving the method of nature in the conduct of the state, in what we improve we are never wholly new; in what we retainwe are never wholly obsolete” (Burke 2014, 23, 35). 38Although considered an Enlightenment thinker, Rousseau challenged prevailing narratives of scientific and social progress. He argued that they undermined political and social life. See Garrard (2003) and Pangle and Ahrensdorf(1999, 185–90).Donoso Cortés. For example, the French romantic writerChateaubriand was a staunch royalist decades after therevolution and a defender of Catholicism against secularizing Enlightenment critique.39 Later, Nietzsche’s radical critique of Western philosophy often implied extremeantimodernism—although he never expressly advocated apremodern politics.40In twentieth-century America, reaction referred to thosewho would, in William F. Buckley’s (1955) phrase, “standathwart history, yelling Stop”—in opposition to “Social Engineers” who would undermine “the organic moral order.”Across the Atlantic, the influence of Maistre and Cortéswas most visible in the decisionism of Carl Schmitt. Schmitt(2003) expressed nostalgia for the pre-Wilsonian Jus Publicum Europaeum era of international public law, condemnedthe corroding effects of liberal “Atlanticist” commercialism, and advocated supranational “Großraüme” that couldcounter-balance Atlantist imperialism.41 Schmitt’s antiliberalism has had a wide impact: apart from his revival on thecritical left, Schmitt influenced Morgenthau’s realism, “newright” writers in Europe such as Alain de Benoist (Hooker2009, 204–13), and the international thought of RussianAlexander Dugin.42 By degrees, all of these accounts participate in political reaction: they view social change or reformitself as destructive, with some aiming to recreate a traditional social and political order in response.In the twentieth century, a second strain of reactionemerged, often linked to mass ideological movements. Influenced by Nietzsche and more distantly by Rousseau, writers such as Julius Evola lent it intellectual ammunition. Thismass reactionary politics sought a more radicalized and uncompromising reversion to an original, mythical past, onesince degraded by modernity, capitalism, or bourgeois society. It was most visible in National Socialism and other fascistmovements, peaking in the 1930s and 1940s. While defeatedin WWII, this more radical reaction persists today. CurrentEuropean far-right intellectual movements and parties—forexample, “Golden Dawn”—also intend to recover a putatively purer past (Charalambous 2015). They deploy modernizing means, including advanced communications andweapons technologies, to antimodern ends: the aggressiveor radical transformation of the world around them. Global39Not all reactionaries of the period agreed unproblematically with one another in practice. Chateaubriand, for example, advocated unilateral French revision of the Vienna settlement status quo maintained by Metternich’s congresssystem (Schroeder 1962, 210, 229–36). 40Likewise, Spengler (1991) elaborated a nostalgic philosophy of history inwhich the West was in decline—but did not advocate any return to the past; seeDannhauser (1995). 41Despite his Nazism, Schmitt more closely resembled the moderate (if theocratic) reaction of Maistre (Garrard 2001; cf. Meier 2011; Mouffe 1999; 2007).His core intellectual commitments did not include reversion to an antimodernsocial order and, thus, were not wholly consistent with Nazism. On this basis manycontemporary theorists on the left (for example Mouffe 1993; 2005), have usedSchmittian concepts to critique modern democratic practice from a critical standpoint. In contrast, Heidegger (the other academic theorist most closely linked toNazism) had vague but extreme political views. While thinly articulated, his reaction was likely more radical. Schmitt’s international thought has attracted attention from critical international-relations scholars and others (Odysseos and Petito2007; Hooker 2009). 42Dugin’s published works in English are mostly concerned with domesticpolitics. His account of international relations advocates an expressly reactionaryformulation of Russia’s place in the world (Astrov and Morozova 2012, 209–15;Schouten 2014). His theory of multipolarity focuses on regional-civilizationalpoles he claims can collectively counter the United States–backed Atlanticisthegemony—an account indebted to Schmitt and classical geopolitics. Despite hispublic profile however, Dugin is influential neither in mainstream Western international theory nor in Russian foreign policy practice (Laruelle 2015).Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isq/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isq/sqx083/4951415by gueston 19 April 20186 Why Is There No Reactionary International Theory?jihadist movements, too, combine reactionary politics withthe techniques of modern politics.43Moderate and radical political reactionaries alike acceptthe premises of modern thought and politics but do soin opposed ways. Moderate reaction aims to slow or pausemodernity’s progressive march by defending traditional institutions against progressive undermining or attack. Radical reaction takes the modern premise that human societyis malleable as an opportunity to reconstruct or approximate a pre-modern society. It leverages modern ideologiesand technologies to antimodern ends. Nonetheless, the twolie on a continuum, and actual instances may fall betweenthem. The most radical extreme may take on the historical unreality of, for example, core Nazi ideology. Moderatereaction may shade into gradual acceptance of modernityitself.Reactionary World PoliticsIf reaction is an important feature of modern politicalthought, it has also recurred as a central feature of modern international political practice. We distinguish twoideal-type varieties of reactionary action—revisionism andrestructuring—and show briefly how each plays out historically. The two correspond to the radical and moderatemodes of reaction above.Revision, the most direct approach, corresponds to radical or militant reactionary antimodernism. Faced with theperceived loss of a morally superior past, revisionist reactionaries aim to restore the status quo ante, often in directand uncompromising ways. The diagnostic case is Nazi Germany.44 Believing in a premodern better world and armedwith the military capacity of a modern great power, Nazielites set out to reconfigure Europe on the model of animagined past by sheer force of arms.More moderate reactionaries may aim to restructure,restoring past political order by building institutions and coordinating international order. Restructuring requires lesscoercion and instead emphasizes cooperation and multilateralism. New international institutional frameworks becomethe vessels for restored past political orders.45 The diagnostic case is the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe andspecifically its “Metternich system” of counterrevolutionarymanagement. Here, a coalition of European great powerspartially restored and maintained the monarchical orderthat preceded the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars43As Ahmad (2017, 16) writes, a key aspect of today’s “reactionary yet hypermodern” Islamist groups lies in their promise to recreate “a romanticized goldenage that predates the miseries of the colonial era and draws on an imagined conception of an Islamic nation that transcends all other loyalties.” Some, such asDaesh and the Islamic Courts Union, also employ modern state-building techniques, co-opt and tax local businesspeople, and recruit new followers using modern communications technology. A key early intellectual here is Qutb (2006),whose antimodernism is expressly reactionary—as distinct from progressive anticolonialisms. On parallels between Qutb and Maistre, see Euben (1999, 199,n181). On Islamist politics generally, see Ismail (2003), Shapiro and Fair (2010),Raqib and Barreto (2014), and Ahmad (2015; 2016). On Islamism and political violence, see Greenberg (2005), Toft (2007), Farrall (2011), and Hamid and Farrall(2015). 44An alternate example, the Khmer Rouge, blended left and right. Theysought to recreate the Khmer empire and “restored” Cambodian society to a putative “year zero.” They did this by emptying urban centers, murdering educatedand foreign-influenced elites, and instituting a closed agrarian society (Kiernan2008, chapter 15).45This “reactionary institutionalism” differs in goals, if not means, from theinstitutionalism of neoliberals (Keohane and Martin 1995) or neofunctionalists(Haas 1964). The contrast suggests little about institutionalism is inherently liberal or progressive (Steffek 2015).(Kissinger 2013).46 Below, these two examples illustrate therole of reaction in world politics.47Revisionism and the Third Reich, 1933–45Nazi Germany was perhaps the most extreme reactionarystate on record. While Nazi ideology was often vague andinconsistent (Mann 2004, 140–43), it aimed consistently “torestore to the German people an ethnic purity that wasimagined to have existed in the past” (Turner 1972, 551).It recalled the “First Reich” of Charlemagne, a loosely Germanic medieval empire. This provided “a powerful symbolic link to the imagined greatness of the past” (Evans2005, 460), tied to the idea of a premodern Volk. Imperial Germany echoed this ancestral Germanic utopia after 1870 as the “Second Reich,” but it was destroyed byWorld War I, the punitive Versailles peace treaty, andWeimar-era economic disaster. Consistent with the viewthat “Fascists need a demonized enemy against which tomobilize followers” (Paxton 2007, 37), the Nazis blamedthe Jews for these circumstances. German Jews were alargely assimilated minority and made up less than onepercent of the interwar German population. The Nazisnonetheless cast them as an inassimilable other—a stateless, landless, internationalized people—and linked themto the vicissitudes of international finance, which theNazis also blamed for German hardship (Snyder 2015,42–44).48The Nazis were not merely reactionary; they were revisionist. Their goals conflicted acutely with the existing worldorder.49 A rapidly rearmed Germany set out to expand itsborders and turn Europe into a premodern, racially stratified world: “they sought to transcend existing reality at oneblow and substitute for it a radically different social order”(Turner 1972, 552). To do this the Nazis used modern technologies and institutions to antimodern ends. Nazi revisionism proceeded by war, structural reconfiguration, and genocide.50 Germany conquered most European states west ofthe rapidly receding Soviet frontier or turned them intosatellite regimes. The Nazis aimed to transform the European state system into a hierarchy, with the Third Reich at itsapex. They then set out to erase the Jews, whom they blamedfor pre-war Germany’s ruin, from the face of the earth.51Did reactionary Nazi ideology drive German actions?Even structuralist accounts of WWII suggest a linkage.Schweller (1998, 5) allows that “Hitler’s ideas distinguishedhim from prior German leaders.” While ideology did notcause the war, German reactionary revisionism helped create46Reactionary states with neither coercive capacity nor multilateral linkagesmay adopt a third strategy: withdrawal. Franco’s Spain, for example, lacked bothgreat power status and ideological allies after 1945. Instead of seeking to overturnother parts of Europe, it isolated itself from the post-war international order. 47 Our cases are illustrations, not empirical tests. We select diagnostic cases,not ambiguous ones. This approach is akin to a “plausibility probe” (George andBennett 2005, 75). 48 On the “Nazi conscience” generally, see Koonz (2003). 49Reactionary revisionist states differ from other revisionists in their goals—the early Soviet Union aimed at world transformation but was in no sense reactionary. 50The relationship between the Holocaust and modernity is contested. ForBauman (2001), the Holocaust is part of modernity itself, bound up with modernnationalism, technologically implemented mass murder, and the depersonalizingeffects of modernity itself. We emphasize additionally the Nazis’ expressed antimodernism. Herf (1986, 1–4) terms Nazism a form of “reactionary modernism,”a term since taken up by Mirowski (2013, 212–17) to describe early internationalrelations theory. 51While the Nazis targeted and murdered multiple groups, they focused onEurope’s Jews as those primarily responsible for putative German civilizationaldecline.Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isq/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isq/sqx083/4951415by gueston 19 April 2018J OSEPH MA CKAY AND C HRISTOPHER DAVID LAR OCHE 7its conditions of possibility.52 The ideological idiosyncrasiesof Nazism may not have been necessary, but a will to overthrow the status quo and recreate a mythical past was.53Restructuring and the Metternich System, 1815–1848A prominent example of reactionary restructuring occurredduring the great power management of post-Napoleonic Europe, sometimes labelled the “Congress system” or Concertof Europe.54 Recent international-relations analyses have focused either on the Concert’s progressive institutionalismor its material balance of power (Finnemore 2004, 108–124; Mitzen 2013, 2015; Kagan 1997; Slantchev 2005; cf.Weber 1995, 40–60). Both understate the Concert’s centralrepressive apparatus, sometimes called the “Metternich System” after Austrian foreign minister Prince Klemenz vonMetternich.55 Although Metternich represented the weakest of Europe’s five great powers, along with the BurkeanLord Castlereagh, he played a central role in managing thepost-Napoleonic restoration, such that Kissinger (2013, 11)termed him “Prime Minister of Europe.”The Metternich system grew out of treaties signed byEurope’s powers, particularly the four allied powers thatcontributed most to defeating Napoleon—Prussia, Russia,Britain, and Austria. Gathering in Vienna in 1814–15,the allies redrew the European map and restored manypre-Revolutionary monarchies. The “Vienna settlement”created a territorial balance of power that hemmed inFrance and satisfied Europe’s other powers (Kissinger 2013,41–190; Jarrett 2013, 43–205; Slantchev 2005). Worried revolution could spread throughout Europe and upset the Vienna settlement, Metternich spent three decades coordinating the allies—and, after 1818, France—to repress Jacobinism, uphold monarchical legitimacy, and strengthenGreat Power cooperation. Concerns about international stability and regime type were thus deeply intertwined. ForMetternich, constitutionalist and liberal regimes threatenedthe hard-won Vienna equilibrium.56 Agreements at Troppau (1820) and Münchengrätz (1833) secured Prussian andRussian cooperation in Metternich’s antirevolutionary interventions, which suppressed revolts in Italy and Poland.Aided by French disorganization and the Burkean tenor ofBritish politics, Metternich also largely succeeded in preventing Western cabinets from upsetting the Vienna restoration. As Alan Sked (2008, 105) summarizes, “fear of revolution” was the “bottom line in international affairs” for Europe’s powers. In short, reactionary institution building was,for decades, the basis of European order.5752Moreover, as Goddard (2015) shows, Nazi claims of legitimacy for Germanrevanchism helped secure British and Allied appeasement, prior to Munich. 53The memory of fascism and antifascism in Europe remains contested between the political center and left (see for example Grunenberg 1997; Mammone2006; Prezioso 2008; García, Yusta, Tabet, and Clímaco 2016). 54Labels for the post-Napoleonic order vary widely; see Schroeder (1962, 4–5); Jarrett (2013, 347–69). We focus on what has been labelled the “Metternichsystem,” the part of the order committed to repressing constitutionalist rebellionsand which ended in 1848. 55While realists downplay ideas (Kagan 1997; Slantchev 2005), constructivistsacknowledge its illiberalism without focusing on it (Mitzen 2013). Earlier international relations analyses sometimes feature the repressive apparatus (for example,Morgenthau 1948, 481–90); see also Vick (2014) for a criticism. 56 Finnemore (2004, 108–24). Like Maistre, Metternich respected British constitutionalism but did not think it was transferable to the continent. As the topminister in the multinational Austrian Empire, he had a material interest inmaintaining monarchical absolutism and suppressing nationalist revolt. See Sked(2008, esp. 1–25, 64–106, 244–46).57 See Jarrett (2013, esp. 72–84, 231–77); Schroeder (1962, 235–66; 1994, 583–804); and Sked (2008).ConclusionReaction, we have argued, is almost completely absent fromcontemporary international-relations theory. However, wecan find fragmentary traces of reaction in the field’s historyand an extensive presence in the history of political thought.Reactionary beliefs and dispositions play a significant rolein modern international political practice. This raises thequestion: why is there now no reactionary international theory? Here, we can only offer some conjectures. We suspectthat its absence is linked to the field’s putatively ameliorativeorientation—that is, the way the field often locates its rootsin liberal idealism and the decidedly nonreactionary challenge posed by realists. Such a narrative, and particularlythe part played by liberalism, suggests notions of “the good”in world politics incompatible with reactionary ideas.58This narrative renders past international-relations reactionaries invisible by obscuring connections between canonical international-relations schools and reactionary ideas.Early realists are read as emphasizing the permanent limitsof political change. Early geopolitical reactionaries have, until recently, been read out of the discipline entirely. Liberallinkages to empire were elided as embarrassing. Later critical theorists rejected liberals and realists alike as unreflexiveand presentist—as too focused on the status quo and blindto the possibilities of emancipatory politics. However, theydid so in the name of “a critique of domination” that wouldexplore means of resistance available to “those systematically or casually subjected to sustained forms of suffering,denigration, and/or exclusion” (Weber 2014, 532).59 Suchcriticisms may reject reaction generally but do little to distinguish it from the joint liberal-realist project of internationalrelations theory as such.Why then does reaction matter? The practice of reactionary international politics appears more widespread atpresent than at any time in the post-war period. At the timeof writing, far-right parties are active—though not quiteascendant—across Europe; the politics of reaction appearsincreasingly normalized (Cole 2005; Fligstein, Polyakova,and Sandholtz 2012). British voters, led by activists chieflyfrom the right, narrowly chose to leave the European Union.This “Brexit” was partially motivated by “cultural backlash”(Inglehart and Norris 2016, 29–31) or racially tinged (RajanRankin 2017, 2) nostalgia. The stated positions of the newAmerican president, who campaigned on a promise to“Make America Great Again,” often upend the traditionalparty system and deride liberal international order (Patrick2017). The so-called Islamic State has declared a Caliphate,putatively modeled on a premodern Islamic world order(Ahmad 2017, 12). Elsewhere in the West, individual reactionary radicals like Kaczynski and Breivik no longer seemisolated, as evidenced by the rise of the alt-right and its selfstyled ideologues, such as Richard Spencer (Wood 2017).Once-solid bulwarks between the mainstream right and extremists no longer seem secure.60 Reactionary politics areon the march and are reshaping the world political future.58When, for example, Angell (1972, 59) insisted war “belongs to a stage ofdevelopment out of which we have passed,” he implied progress was both possibleand desirable. 59 See similarly feminist IR scholars, who assert the power of critical scholarship to produce desirable change in the world (Tickner 2006 386–87; Sjoberg2006, 233–34; Eschle and Maiguashca 2007; Ackerly and True 2008; Wibben 2011,111–12). For a similar ethos in postcolonial critique, see chapters in Chowdhryand Nair (2004), Jabri (2005), and Agathangelou and Ling (2009). 60Kaczynski’s ideological predilections have been linked to his upbringingand education (Chase 2003), and Breivik’s racist terrorism radicalized ideas normal on the European far right (Berntzen and Sandberg 2014). These beliefs werelikely never truly marginal.Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isq/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isq/sqx083/4951415by gueston 19 April 20188 Why Is There No Reactionary International Theory?However concerning this may be, though, the account abovereminds us these circumstances are not new: reaction is a recurring feature of international politics.61If we are correct, then the contemporary discipline,scrupulously forgetful of its reactionary past, is shorn of intellectual history that might clarify present circumstances.A field that ignores reaction as such may be blind to reactionary political practice. This blindness in turn weakensthe responses scholars can offer. Indeed, contemporary reaction might have been anticipated. A quarter century ago,in framing his otherwise ultra-liberal “end of history” thesis,Francis Fukuyama noted a powerful nostalgia for the timewhen history existed:Such nostalgia, in fact, will continue to fuel competition and conflict even in the post-historical worldfor some time to come. Even though I recognize itsinevitability, I have the most ambivalent feelings forthe civilization that has been created in Europe since1945, with its north Atlantic and Asian offshoots. Perhaps this very prospect of centuries of boredom at theend of history will serve to get history started onceagain. (Fukuyama 1989, 18)That nostalgia now appears present in force in world politics.62 In the years ahead, a central task for internationalrelations theory will be to take reaction seriously, as both anintellectual tradition and a form of practical politics. Scholars whose political preferences are liberal or radical, or whoembrace a realist skepticism of both projects, may find littleto dislike in their field’s implicit antireactionary moral orientation. We do not advocate a reactionary alternative. Weaim instead to consider the analytical and political implications of having neglected reaction as such. 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