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Develop an essay to address the below. QUESTION: The 2018 National Defense Strategy (Links to an external site.) posits that the United States is currently facing an “increasingly complex security environment” partially due to “rapid technological change” in the domains of land, sea, and air, as well as the opening of new domains of space and cyber. In all of these areas, “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security”. By now, you have been exposed to the ideas of several airpower theorists (Gorrell, Mitchell, Pape, Boyd, and Warden). Which of these theorist’s ideas do you believe are the most relevant to thinking about and overcoming the current and projected future security challenges and in what specific areas do you think these theories need to be expanded upon to be more relevant and applicable? Support and defend your answer using specific examples from the course materials. John Boyd and John Warden
Air Power’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis
DAVID S. FADOK, Major, USAF
School of Advanced Airpower Studies
THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES,
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA, FOR
COMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS,
ACADEMIC YEAR 1993–94
Air University Press
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
February 1995
Chapter 3
Boyd’s Theory of Strategic Paralysis
Machines don’t fight wars. Terrain doesn’t fight wars. Humans fight wars. You must
get into the mind of humans. That’s where the battles are won.
—Col John Boyd
The tactical seeds of John Boyd’s theory of conflict were sown throughout
an Air Force career spanning nearly three decades. During the Korean War,
Boyd, a fighter pilot who flew the F-86 Sabre up and down “MiG Alley,”
developed his first intuitive appreciation for the efficacy of what he would
later refer to as “fast transient maneuvers.” Although the Soviet-built MiG-15
was technologically superior in many respects, the F-86’s full power hydraulic
flight controls provided Sabre pilots with one decisive advantage over their
opponents—the ability to shift more rapidly from one maneuver to another
during aerial dogfights. Just when the MiG pilot began reacting to the initial
Sabre movement, a rapid change in direction would render the enemy
response inappropriate to the new tactical situation. This agility contributed
to the Sabre pilots’ establishment of an impressive 10 to 1 kill ratio against
the formidable MiG-15.
Before war’s end, Boyd was reassigned as an instructor at the Fighter
Weapons School at Nellis AFB, Nevada, where he codified these air-to-air
combat lessons of maneuver and countermaneuver in a tactical manual
entitled, Aerial Attack Study. A few years later at Eglin AFB, Florida, he
quantified these tactical ideas in the form of his energy maneuverability
theory. Although updated over the years, the basic concepts expressed in
Boyd’s tactical works have collectively remained the American fighter pilot’s
bible.
A recognized expert in both the tactical and technical world of aerial
combat, Boyd was called to the Pentagon to assist in the plagued FX project.
His modifications eventually resulted in the production of today’s premier air
superiority platform, the F-15 Eagle. However, it was his later work with the
YF-16 that confirmed his earlier, implicit affinity for “fast transient
maneuvers.” Most test pilots favored the YF-16 over its YF-17 competitor
because of its superior ability to shift maneuvers more rapidly; that is, “to win
more quickly.” These pilot testimonials on behalf of agility were additional
data stored in the recesses of Boyd’s mind on what it took to succeed in
combat.
13
It was not until his retirement that Boyd set out to expand his tactical
concepts of aerial maneuver warfare into a more generalized theory of
conflict.1 Beginning in 1976 with a concise, 16-page essay entitled
“Destruction and Creation,” Boyd’s strategic ideas evolved over the next
decade into an unpublished, five-part series of briefings, “A Discourse on
Winning and Losing.” Ironically, the “Discourse” itself is a product of the very
process of analysis and synthesis described in “Destruction and Creation,” a
cognitive process which Boyd insist is crucial to prevailing in a highly
unpredictable and competitive world. It is a form of mental agility, “a process
of reaching across many perspectives; pulling each and every one apart
(analysis), all the while intuitively looking for those parts of the disassembled
perspectives which naturally interconnect with one another to form a higher
order, more general elaboration (synthesis) of what is taking place.”2
Boyd demonstrated his own capacity to perform these cognitive gymnastics
by combining concepts from the seemingly unrelated fields of mathematical
logic, physics, and thermodynamics. Analyzing these three discrete sciences,
Boyd became the first individual ever to link Godel’s incompleteness theorem,
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, and the Second Law on entropy.3 In doing
so, he synthesized the following: One cannot determine the nature and
character of a system within itself and, furthermore, any attempts to do so will
lead to greater disorder and confusion. Upon this single proposition, Boyd
would build a comprehensive theory of conflict which linked victory to
successfully forcing an inward-orientation upon the adversary by folding him
back inside himself.
Using the dialectic process of “Destruction and Creation,” Boyd embarked
upon an in-depth review of military history to unravel the mysteries of
success and failure in conflict. This scholarly exercise was undoubtedly
influenced by a firm belief in “fast transient maneuvers” instilled during his
fighter days. The end product is an eclectic and esoteric discourse on how to
survive and win in a competitive world, the substance of which I now discuss
in more detail.
*******
Boyd’s theory of conflict advocates a form of maneuver warfare that is more
psychological and temporal in its orientation than physical and spatial.4 Its
military object is “to break the spirit and will of the enemy command by
creating surprising and dangerous operational or strategic situations.”5 To
achieve this end, one must operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than one’s
adversaries. Put differently, the aim of Boyd’s maneuver warfare is to render
the enemy powerless by denying him the time to mentally cope with the
rapidly unfolding, and naturally uncertain, circumstances of war.6 One’s
military operations aim to: (1) create and perpetuate a highly fluid and
menacing state of affairs for the enemy, and (2) disrupt or incapacitate his
ability to adapt to such an environment.7
Based upon an analysis of ancient and modern military history, Boyd
identifies four key qualities of successful operations—initiative, harmony,
14
variety, and rapidity.8 Collectively, these characteristics allow one to adapt to
and to shape the uncertain, friction-filled environment of war. Boyd credits
Clausewitz for recognizing the need to improve one’s adaptability in war by
minimizing one’s own frictions. In addition, borrowing from Sun Tzu, Boyd
insists that friction can be used to shape the conflict in one’s favor by creating
and exploiting the frictions faced by one’s opponent. He then relates this idea
of minimizing friendly friction and maximizing enemy friction to his key
qualities of initiative, harmony, variety, and rapidity.
To minimize friendly friction, one must act and react more quickly than
one’s opponent. This is best accomplished by the exercise of initiative at the
lower levels within a chain-of-command. However, this decentralized control
of how things are done must be guided by a centralized command of what and
why things are done. This shared vision of a single commander’s intent
ensures strategic and operational harmony among the various tactical actions
and reactions. Without a common aim and similar outlook on how best to
satisfy the commander’s intent, subordinate freedom-of-action risks disunity
of effort and an attendant increase in friction.9
To maximize enemy friction, one should plan to attack with a variety of
actions which can be executed with the greatest possible rapidity. Similar to
the contemporary notion of parallel warfare, this lethal combination of varied,
rapid actions serves to overload the adversary’s capacity to properly identify
and address those events which are most threatening. By steadily reducing an
opponent’s physical and mental capability to resist, one ultimately crushes his
moral will to resist as well.
While Boyd’s theory of conflict addresses all levels of war (to include the
grand strategic), this discussion focuses on the operational and strategic
levels. At the operational level, Boyd speaks of severely disrupting the
adversary’s combat operation process used to develop and execute his initial
and subsequent campaign plans. This disruption occurs by rapidly and
repeatedly presenting the enemy with a combination of ambiguous, but
threatening events and deceptive, but nonthreatening ones. These multiple
events, compressed in time, will quickly generate mismatches, or anomalies,
between those actions the opponent believes to threaten his survival and
those which actually do. The enemy must eliminate these mismatches
between perception and reality if his reactions are to remain relevant—that
is, if he is to survive.
The operational aim should be to ensure the opponent cannot rid himself of
these menacing anomalies by hampering his ability to process information,
make decisions, and take appropriate action. In consequence, he can no longer
determine what is being done to him and how he should respond. Ultimately,
the adversary’s initial confusion will degenerate into paralyzing panic, and his
ability and/or willingness to resist will cease.
Similarly, at the strategic level, Boyd speaks of penetrating an adversary’s
“moral-mental-physical being to dissolve his moral fiber, disorient his mental
images, disrupt his operations, and overload his system.” This threedimensional being consists of “moral-mental-physical bastions, connections, or
15
activities that he depends upon.”10 To paralyze this strategic being, Boyd
advocates standing Clausewitz on his head. Instead of destroying “hubs of all
power and movement,” one should create noncooperative centers of gravity by
attacking the moral-mental-physical linkages which bind the hubs together.
At the operational level, the end result is the destruction of the enemy’s
internal harmony and external connection to the real world. Theoretically,
this severing of internal and external bonds produces paralysis and collapses
resistance.
In what is perhaps the most well-known feature of Boyd’s theory, he
contends that all rational human behavior, individual or organizational, can
be depicted as a continual cycling through four distinct tasks—observation,
orientation, decision, and action. Boyd refers to this decision-making cycle as
the “OODA loop.” (fig. 1) Using this construct, the crux of winning vice losing
becomes the relational movement of opponents through their respective
OODA loops.11 The winner will be he who repeatedly observes, orients,
decides, and acts more rapidly (and accurately) than his enemy.12 By doing so,
he “folds his opponent back inside himself” and eventually makes enemy
reaction totally inappropriate to the situation at hand.13 The key to attaining
a favorable edge in OODA loop speed and accuracy (and, hence, to winning
instead of losing) is efficient and effective orientation.
To survive and grow within a complex, ever-changing world of conflict, we
must effectively and efficiently orient ourselves; that is, we must quickly and
accurately develop mental images, or schema, to help comprehend and cope
with the vast array of threatening and nonthreatening events we face. This
Figure 1. Boyd’s OODA Loop
16
image construction, or orientation, is nothing more than the process of
destruction (analysis) and creation (synthesis) described earlier. It is, in
Boyd’s words, the process of “examining the world from a number of
perspectives so that we can generate mental images or impressions that
correspond to that world.”14 Done well, it is the key to winning instead of
losing. Done exceedingly well, it is the mark of genius.15
The mental images we construct are shaped by our personal experience,
genetic heritage, and cultural traditions. They ultimately influence our
decisions, actions, and observations.16 Observations that match up with
certain mental schema call for certain decisions and actions. The timeliness
and accuracy of those decisions and actions are directly related to our
ability to correctly orient and reorient to the rapidly unfolding, perpetually
uncertain events of war. Mismatches between the real world and our
mental images of that world will generate inaccurate responses. These, in
turn, produce confusion and disorientation which then diminish both the
accuracy and the speed of subsequent decision making. Left uncorrected,
disorientation will steadily expand one’s OODA loop until it eventually
becomes a death trap.
Tying the preceding comments together, Boyd proposes that success in
conflict stems from getting inside an adversary’s OODA loop and staying
there. The military commander can do so in two supplementary ways. First,
he must minimize his own friction through initiative and harmony of
response. This decrease in friendly friction acts to “tighten” his own loop (i.e.,
to speed up his own decision-action cycle time). Second, he must maximize his
opponent’s friction through variety and rapidity of response. This increase in
enemy friction acts to “loosen” the adversary’s loop (i.e., to slow down his
decision-action cycle time). Together, these “friction manipulations” assure
one’s continual operation within the enemy’s OODA loop in menacing and
unpredictable ways. Initially, this produces confusion and disorder within the
enemy camp. Ultimately, it produces panic and fear which manifest
themselves in a simultaneous paralysis of ability to cope and willingness to
resist.
Using an analytical model developed by political scientist Robert Pape,
Boyd’s theory of strategic paralysis can be graphically depicted as follows in
figure 2:
*******
Figure 2. Boyd’s Theory of Conflict
17
As Boyd himself would admit, his theory of conflict is quite esoteric. He
speaks of dismembering the “moral-mental-physical being” of the enemy, of
getting inside his “mind-time-space,” yet offers few, if any, operational details
as to how to go about accomplishing these abstract aims. The absence of detail
is particularly frustrating for the practically minded war fighter whose
profession centers on translating relatively obscure political ends into
concrete military ways and means. But while Boyd’s purpose is not to
frustrate, neither is it to dictate.
As he tells it, John Boyd is a believer in theories not theory, in doctrines not
doctrine.17 He refuses to advocate any one approach, any one formula;
following a single path to victory makes one predictable and vulnerable.
Moreover, through the study of all theories and doctrines, the warrior is able
to accumulate a full bag of strategic tricks. Then, as a particular conflict
unfolds, he can pick and choose from this bag as the situation demands. So,
although Boyd’s work is void of practical recipes for success, it is so by
design.18 A more appropriate critique of his discourse on winning and losing
lies elsewhere.
Ironically, one of the greatest strengths of Boyd’s theory is, at the same
time, a potential weakness—the emphasis on the temporal dimension of
conflict. Reflecting an American bias for fast-paced operations and the related
preference for short wars, Boyd presumes that operating at a faster tempo
than one’s opponent matters; or, more to the point, that it matters to the
enemy. He may not care that we are “OODA looping” more quickly. Indeed, it
may be in his interest to refuse to play by our rules. To illustrate this point, I
turn to the game of basketball.
If our opponent is not particularly suited to a “fast break” style of play, it is
in his interest to slow things down if we are a “run and gun” team. If he
refuses to play at our faster pace and intentionally tries to slow things down,
he may succeed in taking us out of our game just enough to win—even if we
retain a relative advantage in speed throughout. Boyd would no doubt argue
that the “fast breaking” side will paralyze its opponent because of its quicker
tempo. This point may be true in some instances. It is certainly true if the
naturally slower opponent agrees to speed things up. If, however, he slows the
pace down, knowing full well that our fans will not stand for anything but
“fast break” ball, he may frustrate our game plan sufficiently such that, in the
end, he is the victor. This basketball analogy seems to apply even better
when, as in war, we remove the time clock.
In fact, it was precisely this approach that Mao Tse-tung advocated as the
strategy by which to liberate China from the scorch of the Rising Sun in the
War of Resistance against Japan. In contrast to both the subjugationists
within the Kuomintang government and the theorists of quick victory within
his own Communist party, Mao proposed the notion of “protracted war” as the
way by which to defeat the militarily superior Japanese aggressors.
In a series of lectures from 26 May to 3 June 1938 , Mao explained and
justified his plans for protracted war against Japan, couching his descriptions
and arguments in the traditional Eastern dialectic of yin and yang. For Mao,
18
this Taoist “duality of opposites” informed not only the object of war, but also
the strategy for war. He argued that war aimed at the destruction of one’s
enemy and the preservation of oneself.19 This two-fold object “is the essence of
war and the basis of all war activities, an essence which pervades all war
activities, from the technical to the strategic.” As such, “no technical, tactical,
or strategic concepts or principles can in any way depart from it.”20
In consequence, he preached that the War of Resistance against Japan should
not be characterized by either the “desperate recklessness” of perpetual attack or
the “flightism” of perpetual retreat.21 Instead, the current military advantage
enjoyed by Imperial Japan demanded a blend of attack and retreat, a blend of
operational/tactical swiftness and strategic protraction. In this way alone could
the Chinese resistance simultaneously preserve itself and defeat the enemy
through the gradual erosion of his relative superiority.
Mao insisted that calls for quick victory within the Chinese Communist
camp were not based upon an objective appraisal of current capabilities, and
therefore played into the hands of the Japanese army. Similarly, calls for
national subjugation within the Kuomintang government were not based
upon an objective appraisal of future possibilities.
It follows from the contrast between strength and weakness that Japan can ride
roughshod over China for a certain time and to a certain extent, that China must
unavoidably travel a hard stretch of road, and that the War of Resistance will be a
protracted war and not a war of quick decision; nevertheless, it follows from the
other contrast—a small country, retrogression and meagre support versus a big
country, progress and abundant support—that Japan cannot ride roughshod over
China indefinitely but is sure to meet final defeat, while China can never be subjugated but is sure to win final victory.22
In other words, Mao claimed the Chinese could win the War of Resistance
against Japan tomorrow if they could survive today. Brandishing time as a
weapon to achieve the dual object of enemy destruction and self-preservation,
Mao’s strategy of protracted war proved successful in the Chinese resistance
of Japan and, later, in the Vietnamese resistance of both France and the
United States.
Boyd readily acknowledges the influence of Maoism and other Eastern
philosophies of war on his own thoughts. This impact is most evident in his
emphasis on the temporal dimension of war; specifically, in his incorporation
of the notion of time as a weapon. Yet, Boyd fails to fully appreciate this
weapon in the context of Taoism’s yin and yang. The “duality of opposites”
suggests, and twentieth century revolutionary warfare supports, the
conclusion that time can be a most potent force in either its contracted or its
protracted forms.
*******
Throughout his retirement, Boyd has briefed his “Discourse on Winning
and Losing” to hundreds of audiences in both civilian and military circles,
leaving copies behind to assure a degree of permanence for his ideas.
Interestingly, one of the agencies he talked to several times in the early 1980s
19
was the newly formed Checkmate Division within the Air Staff at the
Pentagon. This division’s responsibilities include the short- and long-range
contingency planning for the employment of the United States Air Force.
Eventually, this same division would be run by our second modern-day
theorist of strategic paralysis, Col John Warden.23
Notes
1. Boyd’s ideas have significantly impacted the operational doctrines of both the United
States Army, as reflected in Field Manual (FM) 100-5, 1986, and Marines, as reflected in Fleet
Marine Force Manual Number 1, 1989. To date, they have had little or no influence upon Air
Force or Navy operational doctrines.
2. John R. Boyd, “A Discourse on Winning and Losing.” (August 1987) A collection of
unpublished briefings and essays. Air University Library, Document No. M-U 30352-16 no.
7791, 2.
3. Very briefly, Godel proved that one could not determine the consistency of a system
within itself; that is, using its own language and logic. Heisenberg demonstrated that one could
not simultaneously measure the position and velocity of a particle since the observer intrudes
upon the observed, making the true nature of the observed indeterminate. Finally, the Second
Law states that, within closed systems, the entropy, or state of disorder, is ever-increasing.
4. Boyd’s biographer, Grant Hammond, claims that Boyd is doing for time what Sun Tzu
did for space. Interview with Grant T. Hammond, 3 February 1994.
5. William S. Lind, “Military Doctrine, Force Structure, and the Defense Decision-Making
Process,” Air University Review 30, no. 4 (May–June 1979): 22.
6. This psychological paralysis often entails physical destruction, but such destruction is
never an end in itself.
7. Interestingly, these two aims comprise the essence of parallel warfare, a term currently
in vogue thanks to the aerial successes enjoyed by coalition air forces during the Persian Gulf
War, as well as to the theoretical works of John Warden. See section 4 for additional details.
8. Boyd’s analysis is documented in his “Patterns of Conflict” briefing within “A Discourse
on Winning and Losing.”
9. Boyd’s coupling of initiative and harmony stems from his study and acceptance of the
German concepts of Auftragstaktik—mission order tactics—and Schwerpunkt— focus of main
effort.
10. Boyd, “Patterns of Conflict” in “A Discourse on Winning and Losing,” 141.
11. William S. Lind, “Defining Maneuver Warfare for the Marine Corps,” Marine Corps
Gazette 64 (March 1980): 56.
12. Boyd treats decision making and action taking as the process and product of a unitary
rational actor. However, as Graham Allison argues, there are other models of nation-state
behavior which account for the bureaucratic nature of governments and the complications this
introduces into the behavioral equation. See Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston:
HarperCollins Publishers, 1971). Boyd would maintain, however, that minimizing the impact of
such bureaucratic factors by streamlining organizational form and process is just another way
to enhance your own OODA loop.
13. By “folding an opponent back inside himself,” Boyd simply means to restrict an
opponent’s ability to reorient to a rapidly changing environment.
14. Boyd, “The Strategic Game of ? and ?” in “A Discourse on Winning and Losing,” 10.
15. Boyd’s dialectic process of destruction and creation corresponds fairly well with the
modern scientific literature on genius. In “The Puzzle of Genius” (Newsweek 121, no. 26, 28
June 1993), Sharon Begley suggests that genius rests in the ability to combine in novel
ways elements from seemingly unrelated fields. Interestingly, Boyd’s analysis/synthesis
also correlates with the bi-hemispheric organization of the human mind as indicated by
modern split-brain research. Pioneered by California Institute of Technology psychologist
20
R.W. Perry, co-winner of the 1981 Nobel Prize, this research suggests a division of labor
between the left and right cerebral hemispheres of the brain. As Jan Ehrenwald explains in
Anatomy of Genius (New York: Human Sciences Press, 1984), the left side is analytic and
rational in its thinking, focusing on the trees. In contrast, the right side is holistic and
artistic, focusing on the forest. He then states that concerted evidence supports a combined
left- and right-hemispheric approach to the mental process we call “genius.” (See pp. 14–19)
R. Ochse offers a similar definition of creative genius in Before the Gates of Excellence
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). It involves “bringing something into being
that is original (new, unusual, novel, unexpected) and also valuable (useful, good, adaptive,
appropriate).”
16. This is precisely why Boyd claims that orientation is the most important portion of the
OODA loop.
17. John R. Boyd, interview, 30 March 1994.
18. For those disappointed readers still looking for an operational example of Boyd’s ideas, I
offer the following two, both of which were acceptable to Boyd as possible applications. The
first was mentioned to me by Robert Pape and is the Russian concept of the Operational
Maneuver Group (OMG). The OMG is a combined-arms team of raiders, paratroopers, and
diversionary units designed to operate within enemy formations. As Dr Harold Orenstein
describes it, “Such activity changes the classical concept of crushing a formation from
without (by penetration, encirclement and blockade) into one of splitting it from within (by
raids, airborne landings and diversions).” See Harold Orenstein, “Warsaw Pact Views on
Trends in Ground Forces Tactics,” International Defense Review 9 (September 1989):
1149–52.
A second example specifically relates to air power and revolves around another Russian
concept, that of the “reconnaissance-strike complex.” In a nutshell, this complex weds real-time
intelligence (from space-based surveillance and target acquisition systems) to long-range strike
platforms. See Mary C. FitzGerald, “The Soviet Mililtary and the New ‘Technological
Operation’ in the Gulf,” Naval War College Review 44 no. 4 (Autumn 1991): 16–43. Used in
conjunction with comprehensive psychological operations, these platforms would engage in
parallel warfare against strategic command, control, communications, computer, and
intelligence (C4I) targets to get inside and disintegrate the enemys “moral-mental-physical
being.”
19. Clausewitz defines the “ultimate object” of war in identical terms. See Carl von
Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1976), 484.
20. Mao Tse-tung, Six Essays on Military Affairs (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1972),
273.
21. Ibid., 299.
22. Ibid., 219-20.
23. In discussing his briefings to the USAF Checkmate Division, Boyd implies that he
implanted this idea of strategic paralysis in the Air Staff. (Interview with Boyd, 30 March
1994) However, the historical review in section 2 suggests that this notion has underpinned US
strategic air theory from its earliest days. Boyd does not recall briefing John Warden directly
and Warden claims to have only a superficial appreciation of Boyd’s ideas. He is, however, most
familiar with those concerning air combat and energy maneuverability, owing to his fighter
background. Interview with Col John A. Warden III, 27 January 1994.
21
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