quiz on durkheim, freud, and mauss

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INSTRUCTIONS: Answer all the questions in the space provided. You must meet the minimum word count to receive credit. This is an essay quiz. You will have 14 days to complete it. You must include citations to class material (either direct quotations or direct reference to specific page numbers). The citations must take the following form: (AUTHOR’S NAME, PUBLICATION DATE: PAGE NUMBERS). For example: (Freud, 1989: 39). DO NOT CITE LECTURES. DO NOT CITE OUTSIDE SOURCES. This is an examination on class material. Responses that do not include textual citations (including specific page numbers) will not get credit. Once you hit the submit button, you will not be able to edit your response. So please don’t submit until you are ready. Finally, if you are using the editions of the texts I ordered from the bookstore, no works cited page is necessary. If you use different editions of the same texts, please email me the works cited page after completing the quiz. Each question is worth 5 points. The entire quiz is worth 20 points. GRADING RUBRIC FOR EACH RESPONSE: The sentences are clear and grammatical: 1 point The argument is logical: 1 point The argument fully answers the question: 2 points The citations chosen are the most appropriate for the argument: 1 point23372119 minutes ago

Here are the questions in which you will have to asnwer- 1. Connect Durkheim’s theory of the “totem” to Freud’s theory of the “leading idea” in group formation. Required word count: 300-400 words. 2. Explain the relation between Durkheim’s theory of the “totem” and Marcel Mauss’s idea of “habitus.” Required word count: 300-400 words. 3. Freud writes: “Fundamentally indeed every religion is in this same way a religion of love for all those whom it embraces; while cruelty and intolerance towards those who do not belong to it are natural to every religion.” According to Freud’s theories, why must this be the case? Required word count: 500-600 words. 4. In The Gift, Mauss writes: “To trade, the first condition was to be able to lay aside the spear.” Use this line from Mauss to explain the “ancient morality of the gift.” What is the purpose of gift exchange? How does it function in social groups? Required word count: 300-400 words.

https://TheVirtualLibrary.orgTHE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL LIBRARYNo. 6GROUP PSYCHOLOGYANDTHE ANALYSIS OF THE EGOBYSIGM. FREUD, M. D., LL. D.AUTHORIZED TRANSLATIONBYJAMES STRACHEYTHE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL PRESSLONDON MCMXXII VIENNACopyright 1922TRANSLATOR’S NOTEA comparison of the following pages with the German original (Massenpsychologie undIch-Analyse, Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, Vienna, 1921) will show thatcertain passages have been transferred in the English version from the text to thefootnotes. This alteration has been carried out at the author’s express desire.All technical terms have been translated in accordance with the Glossary to be publishedas a supplement to the International Journal of Psycho-Analysis.J. S.CONTENTSPageI Introduction 1II Le Bon’s Description of the Group Mind 5III Other Accounts of Collective Mental Life 23IV Suggestion and Libido 33V Two Artificial Groups: the Church and the Army 41VI Further Problems and Lines of Work 52VII Identification 60VIII Being in Love and Hypnosis 71IX The Herd Instinct 81X The Group and the Primal Horde 90XI A Differentiating Grade in the Ego 101XII Postscript 110FootnotesIndexGROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND THEANALYSIS OF THE EGOIINTRODUCTIONThe contrast between Individual Psychology and Social or Group[1] Psychology, which ata first glance may seem to be full of significance, loses a great deal of its sharpness whenit is examined more closely. It is true that Individual Psychology is concerned with theindividual man and explores the paths by which he seeks to find satisfaction for hisinstincts; but only rarely and under certain exceptional conditions is IndividualPsychology in a position to disregard the relations of this individual to others. In theindividual’s mental life someone else is invariably involved, as a model, as an object, as ahelper, as an opponent, and so from the very first Individual Psychology is at the sametime Social Psychology as well—in this extended but entirely justifiable sense of thewords.The relations of an individual to his parents and to his brothers and sisters, to the objectof his love, and to his physician—in fact all the relations which have hitherto been thechief subject of psycho-analytic research—may claim to be considered as socialphenomena; and in this respect they may be contrasted with certain other processes,described by us as ‘narcissistic’, in which the satisfaction of the instincts is partially ortotally withdrawn from the influence of other people. The contrast between social andnarcissistic—Bleuler would perhaps call them ‘autistic’—mental acts therefore fallswholly within the domain of Individual Psychology, and is not well calculated todifferentiate it from a Social or Group Psychology.The individual in the relations which have already been mentioned—to his parents andto his brothers and sisters, to the person he is in love with, to his friend, and to hisphysician—comes under the influence of only a single person, or of a very small numberof persons, each one of whom has become enormously important to him. Now in speakingof Social or Group Psychology it has become usual to leave these relations on one sideand to isolate as the subject of inquiry the influencing of an individual by a large numberof people simultaneously, people with whom he is connected by something, thoughotherwise they may in many respects be strangers to him. Group Psychology is thereforeconcerned with the individual man as a member of a race, of a nation, of a caste, of aprofession, of an institution, or as a component part of a crowd of people who have beenorganised into a group at some particular time for some definite purpose. When oncenatural continuity has been severed in this way, it is easy to regard the phenomena thatappear under these special conditions as being expressions of a special instinct that is notfurther reducible, the social instinct (‘herd instinct’, ‘group mind’), which does not cometo light in any other situations. But we may perhaps venture to object that it seems difficultto attribute to the factor of number a significance so great as to make it capable by itself orarousing in our mental life a new instinct that is otherwise not brought into play. Ourexpectation is therefore directed towards two other possibilities: that the social instinctmay not be a primitive one and insusceptible of dissection, and that it may be possible todiscover the beginnings of its development in a narrower circle, such as that of the family.Although Group Psychology is only in its infancy, it embraces an immense number ofseparate issues and offers to investigators countless problems which have hitherto not evenbeen properly distinguished from one another. The mere classification of the differentforms of group formation and the description of the mental phenomena produced by themrequire a great expenditure of observation and exposition, and have already given rise to acopious literature. Anyone who compares the narrow dimensions of this little book withthe extent of Group Psychology will at once be able to guess that only a few points chosenfrom the whole material are to be dealt with here. And they will in fact only be a fewquestions with which the depth-psychology of psycho-analysis is specially concerned.IILE BON’S DESCRIPTION OF THE GROUP MINDInstead of starting from a definition, it seems more useful to begin with some indication ofthe range of the phenomena under review, and to select from among them a few speciallystriking and characteristic facts to which our inquiry can be attached. We can achieve bothof these aims by means of quotation from Le Bon’s deservedly famous work Psychologiedes foules.[2]Let us make the matter clear once again. If a Psychology, concerned with exploring thepredispositions, the instincts, the motives and the aims of an individual man down to hisactions and his relations with those who are nearest to him, had completely achieved itstask, and had cleared up the whole of these matters with their inter-connections, it wouldthen suddenly find itself confronted by a new task which would lie before it unachieved. Itwould be obliged to explain the surprising fact that under a certain condition thisindividual whom it had come to understand thought, felt, and acted in quite a differentway from what would have been expected. And this condition is his insertion into acollection of people which has acquired the characteristic of a ‘psychological group’.What, then, is a ‘group’? How does it acquire the capacity for exercising such a decisiveinfluence over the mental life of the individual? And what is the nature of the mentalchange which it forces upon the individual?It is the task of a theoretical Group Psychology to answer these three questions. The bestway of approaching them is evidently to start with the third. Observation of the changes inthe individual’s reactions is what provides Group Psychology with its material; for everyattempt at an explanation must be preceded by a description of the thing that is to beexplained.I will now let Le Bon speak for himself. He says: ‘The most striking peculiaritypresented by a psychological group[3] is the following. Whoever be the individuals thatcompose it, however like or unlike be their mode of life, their occupations, their character,or their intelligence, the fact that they have been transformed into a group puts them inpossession of a sort of collective mind which makes them feel, think, and act in a mannerquite different from that in which each individual of them would feel, think, and act werehe in a state of isolation. There are certain ideas and feelings which do not come intobeing, or do not transform themselves into acts except in the case of individuals forming agroup. The psychological group is a provisional being formed of heterogeneous elements,which for a moment are combined, exactly as the cells which constitute a living body formby their reunion a new being which displays characteristics very different from thosepossessed by each of the cells singly.’ (p. 29.)[4]We shall take the liberty of interrupting Le Bon’s exposition with glosses of our own,and shall accordingly insert an observation at this point. If the individuals in the group arecombined into a unity, there must surely be something to unite them, and this bond mightbe precisely the thing that is characteristic of a group. But Le Bon does not answer thisquestion; he goes on to consider the alteration which the individual undergoes when in agroup and describes it in terms which harmonize well with the fundamental postulates ofour own depth-psychology.‘It is easy to prove how much the individual forming part of a group differs from theisolated individual, but it is less easy to discover the causes of this difference.‘To obtain at any rate a glimpse of them it is necessary in the first place to call to mindthe truth established by modern psychology, that unconscious phenomena play analtogether preponderating part not only in organic life, but also in the operations of theintelligence. The conscious life of the mind is of small importance in comparison with itsunconscious life. The most subtle analyst, the most acute observer, is scarcely successfulin discovering more than a very small number of the conscious[5] motives that determinehis conduct. Our conscious acts are the outcome of an unconscious substratum created inthe mind in the main by hereditary influences. This substratum consists of the innumerablecommon characteristics handed down from generation to generation, which constitute thegenius of a race. Behind the avowed causes of our acts there undoubtedly lie secret causesthat we do not avow, but behind these secret causes there are many others more secret still,of which we ourselves are ignorant.[6] The greater part of our daily actions are the result ofhidden motives which escape our observation.’ (p. 30.)Le Bon thinks that the particular acquirements of individuals become obliterated in agroup, and that in this way their distinctiveness vanishes. The racial unconscious emerges;what is heterogeneous is submerged in what is homogeneous. We may say that the mentalsuperstructure, the development of which in individuals shows such dissimilarities, isremoved, and that the unconscious foundations, which are similar in everyone, standexposed to view.In this way individuals in a group would come to show an average character. But Le Bonbelieves that they also display new characteristics which they have not previouslypossessed, and he seeks the reason for this in three different factors.‘The first is that the individual forming part of a group acquires, solely from numericalconsiderations, a sentiment of invincible power which allows him to yield to instinctswhich, had he been alone, he would perforce have kept under restraint. He will be the lessdisposed to check himself from the consideration that, a group being anonymous, and inconsequence irresponsible, the sentiment of responsibility which always controlsindividuals disappears entirely.’ (p. 33.)From our point of view we need not attribute so much importance to the appearance ofnew characteristics. For us it would be enough to say that in a group the individual isbrought under conditions which allow him to throw off the repressions of his unconsciousinstincts. The apparently new characteristics which he then displays are in fact themanifestations of this unconscious, in which all that is evil in the human mind is containedas a predisposition. We can find no difficulty in understanding the disappearance ofconscience or of a sense of responsibility in these circumstances. It has long been ourcontention that ‘dread of society [soziale Angst]’ is the essence of what is calledconscience.[7]‘The second cause, which is contagion, also intervenes to determine the manifestation ingroups of their special characteristics, and at the same time the trend they are to take.Contagion is a phenomenon of which it is easy to establish the presence, but that it is noteasy to explain. It must be classed among those phenomena of a hypnotic order, which weshall shortly study. In a group every sentiment and act is contagious, and contagious tosuch a degree that an individual readily sacrifices his personal interest to the collectiveinterest. This is an aptitude very contrary to his nature, and of which a man is scarcelycapable, except when he makes part of a group.’ (p. 33.)We shall later on base an important conjecture upon this last statement.‘A third cause, and by far the most important, determines in the individuals of a groupspecial characteristics which are quite contrary at times to those presented by the isolatedindividual. I allude to that suggestibility of which, moreover, the contagion mentionedabove is only an effect.‘To understand this phenomenon it is necessary to bear in mind certain recentphysiological discoveries. We know to-day that by various processes an individual may bebrought into such a condition that, having entirely lost his conscious personality, he obeysall the suggestions of the operator who has deprived him of it, and commits acts in uttercontradiction with his character and habits. The most careful investigations seem to provethat an individual immersed for some length of time in a group in action soon findshimself—either in consequence of the magnetic influence given out by the group, or fromsome other cause of which we are ignorant—in a special state, which much resembles thestate of fascination in which the hypnotised individual finds himself in the hands of thehypnotiser…. The conscious personality has entirely vanished; will and discernment arelost. All feelings and thoughts are bent in the direction determined by the hypnotiser.‘Such also is approximately the state of the individual forming part of a psychologicalgroup. He is no longer conscious of his acts. In his case, as in the case of the hypnotisedsubject, at the same time that certain faculties are destroyed, others may be brought to ahigh degree of exaltation. Under the influence of a suggestion, he will undertake theaccomplishment of certain acts with irresistible impetuosity. This impetuosity is the moreirresistible in the case of groups than in that of the hypnotised subject, from the fact that,the suggestion being the same for all the individuals of the group, it gains in strength byreciprocity.’ (p. 34.)‘We see, then, that the disappearance of the conscious personality, the predominance ofthe unconscious personality, the turning by means of suggestion and contagion of feelingsand ideas in an identical direction, the tendency to immediately transform the suggestedideas into acts; these, we see, are the principal characteristics of the individual formingpart of a group. He is no longer himself, but has become an automaton who has ceased tobe guided by his will.’ (p. 35.)I have quoted this passage so fully in order to make it quite clear that Le Bon explainsthe condition of an individual in a group as being actually hypnotic, and does not merelymake a comparison between the two states. We have no intention of raising any objectionat this point, but wish only to emphasize the fact that the two last causes of an individualbecoming altered in a group (the contagion and the heightened suggestibility) areevidently not on a par, since the contagion seems actually to be a manifestation of thesuggestibility. Moreover the effects of the two factors do not seem to be sharplydifferentiated in the text of Le Bon’s remarks. We may perhaps best interpret his statementif we connect the contagion with the effects of the individual members of the group uponone another, while we point to another source for those manifestations of suggestion in thegroup which are put on a level with the phenomena of hypnotic influence. But to whatsource? We cannot avoid being struck with a sense of deficiency when we notice that oneof the chief elements of the comparison, namely the person who is to replace the hypnotistin the case of the group, is not mentioned in Le Bon’s exposition. But he neverthelessdistinguishes between this influence of fascination which remains plunged in obscurityand the contagious effect which the individuals exercise upon one another and by whichthe original suggestion is strengthened.Here is yet another important consideration for helping us to understand the individual ina group: ‘Moreover, by the mere fact that he forms part of an organised group, a mandescends several rungs in the ladder of civilisation. Isolated, he may be a cultivatedindividual; in a crowd, he is a barbarian—that is, a creature acting by instinct. Hepossesses the spontaneity, the violence, the ferocity, and also the enthusiasm and heroismof primitive beings.’ (p. 36.) He then dwells especially upon the lowering in intellectualability which an individual experiences when he becomes merged in a group.[8]Let us now leave the individual, and turn to the group mind, as it has been outlined byLe Bon. It shows not a single feature which a psycho-analyst would find any difficulty inplacing or in deriving from its source. Le Bon himself shows us the way by pointing to itssimilarity with the mental life of primitive people and of children (p. 40).A group is impulsive, changeable and irritable. It is led almost exclusively by theunconscious.[9] The impulses which a group obeys may according to circumstances begenerous or cruel, heroic or cowardly, but they are always so imperious that no personalinterest, not even that of self-preservation, can make itself felt (p. 41). Nothing about it ispremeditated. Though it may desire things passionately, yet this is never so for long, for itis incapable of perseverance. It cannot tolerate any delay between its desire and thefulfilment of what it desires. It has a sense of omnipotence; the notion of impossibilitydisappears for the individual in a group.[10]A group is extraordinarily credulous and open to influence, it has no critical faculty, andthe improbable does not exist for it. It thinks in images, which call one another up byassociation (just as they arise with individuals in states of free imagination), and whoseagreement with reality is never checked by any reasonable function [Instanz].[11] Thefeelings of a group are always very simple and very exaggerated. So that a group knowsneither doubt nor uncertainty.[12]It goes directly to extremes; if a suspicion is expressed, it is instantly changed into anincontrovertible certainty; a trace of antipathy is turned into furious hatred (p. 56).[13]Inclined as it itself is to all extremes, a group can only be excited by an excessivestimulus. Anyone who wishes to produce an effect upon it needs no logical adjustment inhis arguments; he must paint in the most forcible colours, he must exaggerate, and he mustrepeat the same thing again and again.Since a group is in no doubt as to what constitutes truth or error, and is conscious,moreover, of its own great strength, it is as intolerant as it is obedient to authority. Itrespects force and can only be slightly influenced by kindness, which it regards merely asa form of weakness. What it demands of its heroes is strength, or even violence. It wantsto be ruled and oppressed and to fear its masters. Fundamentally it is entirely conservative,and it has a deep aversion from all innovations and advances and an unbounded respect fortradition (p. 62).In order to make a correct judgement upon the morals of groups, one must take intoconsideration the fact that when individuals come together in a group all their individualinhibitions fall away and all the cruel, brutal and destructive instincts, which lie dormantin individuals as relics of a primitive epoch, are stirred up to find free gratification. Butunder the influence of suggestion groups are also capable of high achievements in theshape of abnegation, unselfishness, and devotion to an ideal. While with isolatedindividuals personal interest is almost the only motive force, with groups it is very rarelyprominent. It is possible to speak of an individual having his moral standards raised by agroup (p. 65). Whereas the intellectual capacity of a group is always far below that of anindividual, its ethical conduct may rise as high above his as it may sink deep below it.Some other features in Le Bon’s description show in a clear light how well justified isthe identification of the group mind with the mind of primitive people. In groups the mostcontradictory ideas can exist side by side and tolerate each other, without any conflictarising from the logical contradiction between them. But this is also the case in theunconscious mental life of individuals, of children and of neurotics, as psycho-analysishas long pointed out.[14]A group, further, is subject to the truly magical power of words; they can evoke the mostformidable tempests in the group mind, and are also capable of stilling them (p. 117).‘Reason and arguments are incapable of combating certain words and formulas. They areuttered with solemnity in the presence of groups, and as soon as they have beenpronounced an expression of respect is visible on every countenance, and all heads arebowed. By many they are considered as natural forces, as supernatural powers.’ (p. 117.) Itis only necessary in this connection to remember the taboo upon names among primitivepeople and the magical powers which they ascribe to names and words.[15]And, finally, groups have never thirsted after truth. They demand illusions, and cannotdo without them. They constantly give what is unreal precedence over what is real; theyare almost as strongly influenced by what is untrue as by what is true. They have anevident tendency not to distinguish between the two (p. 77).We have pointed out that this predominance of the life of phantasy and of the illusionborn of an unfulfilled wish is the ruling factor in the psychology of neuroses. We havefound that what neurotics are guided by is not ordinary objective reality but psychologicalreality. A hysterical symptom is based upon phantasy instead of upon the repetition of realexperience, and the sense of guilt in an obsessional neurosis is based upon the fact of anevil intention which was never carried out. Indeed, just as in dreams and in hypnosis, inthe mental operations of a group the function for testing the reality of things falls into thebackground in comparison with the strength of wishes with their affective cathexis.[16]What Le Bon says on the subject of leaders of groups is less exhaustive, and does notenable us to make out an underlying principle so clearly. He thinks that as soon as livingbeings are gathered together in certain numbers, no matter whether they are a herd ofanimals or a collection of human beings, they place themselves instinctively under theauthority of a chief (p. 134). A group is an obedient herd, which could never live without amaster. It has such a thirst for obedience that it submits instinctively to anyone whoappoints himself its master.Although in this way the needs of a group carry it half-way to meet the leader, yet he toomust fit in with it in his personal qualities. He must himself be held in fascination by astrong faith (in an idea) in order to awaken the group’s faith; he must possess a strong andimposing will, which the group, which has no will of its own, can accept from him. LeBon then discusses the different kinds of leaders, and the means by which they work uponthe group. On the whole he believes that the leaders make themselves felt by means of theideas in which they themselves are fanatical believers.Moreover, he ascribes both to the ideas and to the leaders a mysterious and irresistiblepower, which he calls ‘prestige’. Prestige is a sort of domination exercised over us by anindividual, a work or an idea. It entirely paralyses our critical faculty, and fills us withastonishment and respect. It would seem to arouse a feeling like that of fascination inhypnosis (p. 148). He distinguishes between acquired or artificial and personal prestige.The former is attached to persons in virtue of their name, fortune and reputation, and toopinions, works of art, etc., in virtue of tradition. Since in every case it harks back to thepast, it cannot be of much help to us in understanding this puzzling influence. Personalprestige is attached to a few people, who become leaders by means of it, and it has theeffect of making everything obey them as though by the operation of some magneticmagic. All prestige, however, is also dependent upon success, and is lost in the event offailure (p. 159).We cannot feel that Le Bon has brought the function of the leader and the importance ofprestige completely into harmony with his brilliantly executed picture of the group mind.IIIOTHER ACCOUNTS OF COLLECTIVE MENTAL LIFEWe have made use of Le Bon’s description by way of introduction, because it fits in sowell with our own Psychology in the emphasis which it lays upon unconscious mental life.But we must now add that as a matter of fact none of that author’s statements bringforward anything new. Everything that he says to the detriment and depreciation of themanifestations of the group mind had already been said by others before him with equaldistinctness and equal hostility, and has been repeated in unison by thinkers, statesmen andwriters since the earliest periods of literature.[17] The two theses which comprise the mostimportant of Le Bon’s opinions, those touching upon the collective inhibition ofintellectual functioning and the heightening of affectivity in groups, had been formulatedshortly before by Sighele.[18] At bottom, all that is left over as being peculiar to Le Bonare the two notions of the unconscious and of the comparison with the mental life ofprimitive people, and even these had naturally often been alluded to before him.But, what is more, the description and estimate of the group mind as they have beengiven by Le Bon and the rest have not by any means been left undisputed. There is nodoubt that all the phenomena of the group mind which have just been mentioned havebeen correctly observed, but it is also possible to distinguish other manifestations of thegroup formation, which operate in a precisely opposite sense, and from which a muchhigher opinion of the group mind must necessarily follow.Le Bon himself was prepared to admit that in certain circumstances the morals of agroup can be higher than those of the individuals that compose it, and that onlycollectivities are capable of a high degree of unselfishness and devotion. ‘While withisolated individuals personal interest is almost the only motive force, with groups it is veryrarely prominent.’ (p. 65.) Other writers adduce the fact that it is only society whichprescribes any ethical standards at all for the individual, while he as a rule fails in one wayor another to come up to its high demands. Or they point out that in exceptionalcircumstances there may arise in communities the phenomenon of enthusiasm, which hasmade the most splendid group achievements possible.As regards intellectual work it remains a fact, indeed, that great decisions in the realm ofthought and momentous discoveries and solutions of problems are only possible to anindividual, working in solitude. But even the group mind is capable of genius inintellectual creation, as is shown above all by language itself, as well as by folk-song,folk-lore and the like. It remains an open question, moreover, how much the individualthinker or writer owes to the stimulation of the group in which he lives, or whether hedoes more than perfect a mental work in which the others have had a simultaneous share.In face of these completely contradictory accounts, it looks as though the work of GroupPsychology were bound to come to an ineffectual end. But it is easy to find a more hopefulescape from the dilemma. A number of very different formations have probably beenmerged under the term ‘group’ and may require to be distinguished. The assertions ofSighele, Le Bon and the rest relate to groups of a short-lived character, which somepassing interest has hastily agglomerated out of various sorts of individuals. Thecharacteristics of revolutionary groups, and especially those of the great FrenchRevolution, have unmistakably influenced their descriptions. The opposite opinions owetheir origin to the consideration of those stable groups or associations in which mankindpass their lives, and which are embodied in the institutions of society. Groups of the firstkind stand in the same sort of relation to those of the second as a high but choppy sea to aground swell.McDougall, in his book on The Group Mind,[19] starts out from the same contradictionthat has just been mentioned, and finds a solution for it in the factor of organisation. In thesimplest case, he says, the ‘group’ possesses no organisation at all or one scarcelydeserving the name. He describes a group of this kind as a ‘crowd’. But he admits that acrowd of human beings can hardly come together without possessing at all events therudiments of an organisation, and that precisely in these simple groups many of thefundamental facts of Collective Psychology can be observed with special ease (p. 22).Before the members of a random crowd of people can constitute something in the natureof a group in the psychological sense of the word, a condition has to be fulfilled; theseindividuals must have something in common with one another, a common interest in anobject, a similar emotional bias in some situation or other, and (‘consequently’, I shouldlike to interpolate) ‘some degree of reciprocal influence’ (p. 23). The higher the degree of‘this mental homogeneity’, the more readily do the individuals form a psychologicalgroup, and the more striking are the manifestations of a group mind.The most remarkable and also the most important result of the formation of a group isthe ‘exaltation or intensification of emotion’ produced in every member of it (p. 24). InMcDougall’s opinion men’s emotions are stirred in a group to a pitch that they seldom ornever attain under other conditions; and it is a pleasurable experience for those who areconcerned to surrender themselves so unreservedly to their passions and thus to becomemerged in the group and to lose the sense of the limits of their individuality. The mannerin which individuals are thus carried away by a common impulse is explained byMcDougall by means of what he calls the ‘principle of direct induction of emotion by wayof the primitive sympathetic response’ (p. 25), that is, by means of the emotionalcontagion with which we are already familiar. The fact is that the perception of the signsof an emotional state is calculated automatically to arouse the same emotion in the personwho perceives them. The greater the number of people in whom the same emotion can besimultaneously observed, the stronger does this automatic compulsion grow. Theindividual loses his power of criticism, and lets himself slip into the same emotion. But inso doing he increases the excitement of the other people, who had produced this effectupon him, and thus the emotional charge of the individuals becomes intensified by mutualinteraction. Something is unmistakably at work in the nature of a compulsion to do thesame as the others, to remain in harmony with the many. The coarser and simpleremotions are the more apt to spread through a group in this way (p. 39).This mechanism for the intensification of emotion is favoured by some other influenceswhich emanate from groups. A group impresses the individual with a sense of unlimitedpower and of insurmountable peril. For the moment it replaces the whole of humansociety, which is the wielder of authority, whose punishments the individual fears, and forwhose sake he has submitted to so many inhibitions. It is clearly perilous for him to puthimself in opposition to it, and it will be safer to follow the example of those around himand perhaps even ‘hunt with the pack’. In obedience to the new authority he may put hisformer ‘conscience’ out of action, and so surrender to the attraction of the increasedpleasure that is certainly obtained from the removal of inhibitions. On the whole,therefore, it is not so remarkable that we should see an individual in a group doing orapproving things which he would have avoided in the normal conditions of life; and in thisway we may even hope to clear up a little of the mystery which is so often covered by theenigmatic word ‘suggestion’.McDougall does not dispute the thesis as to the collective inhibition of intelligence ingroups (p. 41). He says that the minds of lower intelligence bring down those of a higherorder to their own level. The latter are obstructed in their activity, because in general anintensification of emotion creates unfavourable conditions for sound intellectual work, andfurther because the individuals are intimidated by the group and their mental activity is notfree, and because there is a lowering in each individual of his sense of responsibility forhis own performances.The judgement with which McDougall sums up the psychological behaviour of a simple‘unorganised’ group is no more friendly than that of Le Bon. Such a group ‘is excessivelyemotional, impulsive, violent, fickle, inconsistent, irresolute and extreme in action,displaying only the coarser emotions and the less refined sentiments; extremelysuggestible, careless in deliberation, hasty in judgment, incapable of any but the simplerand imperfect forms of reasoning; easily swayed and led, lacking in self-consciousness,devoid of self-respect and of sense of responsibility, and apt to be carried away by theconsciousness of its own force, so that it tends to produce all the manifestations we havelearnt to expect of any irresponsible and absolute power. Hence its behaviour is like that ofan unruly child or an untutored passionate savage in a strange situation, rather than likethat of its average member; and in the worst cases it is like that of a wild beast, rather thanlike that of human beings.’ (p. 45.)Since McDougall contrasts the behaviour of a highly organised group with what has justbeen described, we shall be particularly interested to learn in what this organisationconsists, and by what factors it is produced. The author enumerates five ‘principalconditions’ for raising collective mental life to a higher level.The first and fundamental condition is that there should be some degree of continuity ofexistence in the group. This may be either material or formal; the former, if the sameindividuals persist in the group for some time; and the latter, if there is developed withinthe group a system of fixed positions which are occupied by a succession of individuals.The second condition is that in the individual member of the group some definite ideashould be formed of the nature, composition, functions and capacities of the group, so thatfrom this he may develop an emotional relation to the group as a whole.The third is that the group should be brought into interaction (perhaps in the form ofrivalry) with other groups similar to it but differing from it in many respects.The fourth is that the group should possess traditions, customs and habits, and especiallysuch as determine the relations of its members to one another.The fifth is that the group should have a definite structure, expressed in thespecialisation and differentiation of the functions of its constituents.According to McDougall, if these conditions are fulfilled, the psychologicaldisadvantages of the group formation are removed. The collective lowering of intellectualability is avoided by withdrawing the performance of intellectual tasks from the group andreserving them for individual members of it.It seems to us that the condition which McDougall designates as the ‘organisation’ of agroup can with more justification be described in another way. The problem consists inhow to procure for the group precisely those features which were characteristic of theindividual and which are extinguished in him by the formation of the group. For theindividual, outside the primitive group, possessed his own continuity, his selfconsciousness,his traditions and customs, his own particular functions and position, andkept apart from his rivals. Owing to his entry into an ‘unorganised’ group he had lost thisdistinctiveness for a time. If we thus recognise that the aim is to equip the group with theattributes of the individual, we shall be reminded of a valuable remark of Trotter’s,[20] tothe effect that the tendency towards the formation of groups is biologically a continuationof the multicellular character of all the higher organisms.IVSUGGESTION AND LIBIDOWe started from the fundamental fact that an individual in a group is subjected through itsinfluence to what is often a profound alteration in his mental activity. His emotionsbecome extraordinarily intensified, while his intellectual ability becomes markedlyreduced, both processes being evidently in the direction of an approximation to the otherindividuals in the group; and this result can only be reached by the removal of thoseinhibitions upon his instincts which are peculiar to each individual, and by his resigningthose expressions of his inclinations which are especially his own. We have heard thatthese often unwelcome consequences are to some extent at least prevented by a higher‘organisation’ of the group; but this does not contradict the fundamental fact of GroupPsychology—the two theses as to the intensification of the emotions and the inhibition ofthe intellect in primitive groups. Our interest is now directed to discovering thepsychological explanation of this mental change which is experienced by the individual ina group.It is clear that rational factors (such as the intimidation of the individual which hasalready been mentioned, that is, the action of his instinct of self-preservation) do not coverthe observable phenomena. Beyond this what we are offered as an explanation byauthorities upon Sociology and Group Psychology is always the same, even though it isgiven various names, and that is—the magic word ‘suggestion’. Tarde calls it ‘imitation’;but we cannot help agreeing with a writer who protests that imitation comes under theconcept of suggestion, and is in fact one of its results.[21] Le Bon traces back all thepuzzling features of social phenomena to two factors: the mutual suggestion of individualsand the prestige of leaders. But prestige, again, is only recognizable by its capacity forevoking suggestion. McDougall for a moment gives us an impression that his principle of‘primitive induction of emotion’ might enable us to do without the assumption ofsuggestion. But on further consideration we are forced to perceive that this principle saysno more than the familiar assertions about ‘imitation’ or ‘contagion’, except for a decidedstress upon the emotional factor. There is no doubt that something exists in us which,when we become aware of signs of an emotion in someone else, tends to make us fall intothe same emotion; but how often do we not successfully oppose it, resist the emotion, andreact in quite an opposite way? Why, therefore, do we invariably give way to thiscontagion when we are in a group? Once more we should have to say that what compelsus to obey this tendency is imitation, and what induces the emotion in us is the group’ssuggestive influence. Moreover, quite apart from this, McDougall does not enable us toevade suggestion; we hear from him as well as from other writers that groups aredistinguished by their special suggestibility.We shall therefore be prepared for the statement that suggestion (or more correctlysuggestibility) is actually an irreducible, primitive phenomenon, a fundamental fact in themental life of man. Such, too, was the opinion of Bernheim, of whose astonishing arts Iwas a witness in the year 1889. But I can remember even then feeling a muffled hostilityto this tyranny of suggestion. When a patient who showed himself unamenable was metwith the shout: ‘What are you doing? Vous vous contresuggestionnez!‘, I said to myselfthat this was an evident injustice and an act of violence. For the man certainly had a rightto counter-suggestions if they were trying to subdue him with suggestions. Later on myresistance took the direction of protesting against the view that suggestion, whichexplained everything, was itself to be preserved from explanation. Thinking of it, Irepeated the old conundrum:[22]Christoph trug Christum,Christus trug die ganze Welt,Sag’ wo hat ChristophDamals hin den Fuss gestellt?[23]Christophorus Christum, sed Christus sustulit orbem:Constiterit pedibus dic ubi Christophorus?Now that I once more approach the riddle of suggestion after having kept away from itfor some thirty years, I find there is no change in the situation. To this statement I candiscover only a single exception, which I need not mention, since it is one which bearswitness to the influence of psycho-analysis. I notice that particular efforts are being madeto formulate the concept of suggestion correctly, that is, to fix the conventional use of thename.[24] And this is by no means superfluous, for the word is acquiring a more and moreextended use and a looser and looser meaning, and will soon come to designate any sort ofinfluence whatever, just as in English, where ‘to suggest’ and ‘suggestion’ correspond toour nahelegen and Anregung. But there has been no explanation of the nature ofsuggestion, that is, of the conditions under which influence without adequate logicalfoundation takes place. I should not avoid the task of supporting this statement by ananalysis of the literature of the last thirty years, if I were not aware that an exhaustiveinquiry is being undertaken close at hand which has in view the fulfilment of this verytask.Instead of this I shall make an attempt at using the concept of libido for the purpose ofthrowing light upon Group Psychology, a concept which has done us such good service inthe study of psycho-neuroses.Libido is an expression taken from the theory of the emotions. We call by that name theenergy (regarded as a quantitative magnitude, though not at present actually mensurable)of those instincts which have to do with all that may be comprised under the word ‘love’.The nucleus of what we mean by love naturally consists (and this is what is commonlycalled love, and what the poets sing of) in sexual love with sexual union as its aim. But wedo not separate from this—what in any case has a share in the name ‘love’—on the onehand, self-love, and on the other, love for parents and children, friendship and love forhumanity in general, and also devotion to concrete objects and to abstract ideas. Ourjustification lies in the fact that psycho-analytic research has taught us that all thesetendencies are an expression of the same instinctive activities; in relations between thesexes these instincts force their way towards sexual union, but in other circumstances theyare diverted from this aim or are prevented from reaching it, though always preservingenough of their original nature to keep their identity recognizable (as in such features asthe longing for proximity, and self-sacrifice).We are of opinion, then, that language has carried out an entirely justifiable piece ofunification in creating the word ‘love’ with its numerous uses, and that we cannot do betterthan take it as the basis of our scientific discussions and expositions as well. By coming tothis decision, psycho-analysis has let loose a storm of indignation, as though it had beenguilty of an act of outrageous innovation. Yet psycho-analysis has done nothing original intaking love in this ‘wider’ sense. In its origin, function, and relation to sexual love, the‘Eros‘ of the philosopher Plato coincides exactly with the love force, the libido, of psychoanalysis,as has been shown in detail by Nachmansohn and Pfister;[25] and when theapostle Paul, in his famous epistle to the Corinthians, prizes love above all else, hecertainly understands it in the same ‘wider’ sense.[26] But this only shows that men do notalways take their great thinkers seriously, even when they profess most to admire them.Psycho-analysis, then, gives these love instincts the name of sexual instincts, a potioriand by reason of their origin. The majority of ‘educated’ people have taken their revengeby retorting upon psycho-analysis with the reproach of ‘pan-sexualism’. Anyone whoconsiders sex as something mortifying and humiliating to human nature is at liberty tomake use of the more genteel expressions ‘Eros’ and ‘erotic’. I might have done so myselffrom the first and thus have spared myself much opposition. But I did not want to, for Ilike to avoid concessions to faint-heartedness. One can never tell where that road may leadone; one gives way first in words, and then little by little in substance too. I cannot see anymerit in being ashamed of sex; the Greek word ‘Eros’, which is to soften the affront, is inthe end nothing more than a translation of our German word Liebe [love]; and finally, hewho knows how to wait need make no concessions.We will try our fortune, then, with the supposition that love relationships (or, to use amore neutral expression, emotional ties) also constitute the essence of the group mind. Letus remember that the authorities make no mention of any such relations. What wouldcorrespond to them is evidently concealed behind the shelter, the screen, of suggestion.Our hypothesis finds support in the first instance from two passing thoughts. First, that agroup is clearly held together by a power of some kind: and to what power could this featbe better ascribed than to Eros, who holds together everything in the world? Secondly, thatif an individual gives up his distinctiveness in a group and lets its other members influencehim by suggestion, it gives one the impression that he does it because he feels the need ofbeing in harmony with them rather than in opposition to them—so that perhaps after all hedoes it ‘ihnen zu Liebe‘.[27]VTWO ARTIFICIAL GROUPS: THE CHURCH AND THE ARMYWe may recall from what we know of the morphology of groups that it is possible todistinguish very different kinds of groups and opposing lines in their development. Thereare very fleeting groups and extremely lasting ones; homogeneous ones, made up of thesame sorts of individuals, and unhomogeneous ones; natural groups, and artificial ones,requiring an external force to keep them together; primitive groups, and highly organisedones with a definite structure. But for reasons which have yet to be explained we shouldlike to lay particular stress upon a distinction to which the authorities have rather given toolittle attention; I refer to that between leaderless groups and those with leaders. And, incomplete opposition to the usual practice, we shall not choose a relatively simple groupformation as our point of departure, but shall begin with highly organised, lasting andartificial groups. The most interesting example of such structures are churches—communities of believers—and armies.A church and an army are artificial groups, that is, a certain external force is employedto prevent them from disintegrating and to check alterations in their structure. As a rule aperson is not consulted or is given no choice, as to whether he wants to enter such a group;any attempt at leaving it is usually met with persecution or with severe punishment, or hasquite definite conditions attached to it. It is quite outside our present interest to enquirewhy these associations need such special safeguards. We are only attracted by onecircumstance, namely that certain facts, which are far more concealed in other cases, canbe observed very clearly in those highly organised groups which are protected fromdissolution in the manner that has been mentioned. In a church (and we may withadvantage take the Catholic Church as a type) as well as in an army, however different thetwo may be in other respects, the same illusion holds good of there being a head—in theCatholic Church Christ, in an army its Commander-in-Chief—who loves all theindividuals in the group with an equal love. Everything depends upon this illusion; if itwere to be dropped, then both Church and army would dissolve, so far as the externalforce permitted them to. This equal love was expressly enunciated by Christ: ‘Inasmuch asye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me.’ Hestands to the individual members of the group of believers in the relation of a kind elderbrother; he is their father surrogate. All the demands that are made upon the individual arederived from this love of Christ’s. A democratic character runs through the Church, for thevery reason that before Christ everyone is equal, and that everyone has an equal share inhis love. It is not without a deep reason that the similarity between the Christiancommunity and a family is invoked, and that believers call themselves brothers in Christ,that is, brothers through the love which Christ has for them. There is no doubt that the tiewhich unites each individual with Christ is also the cause of the tie which unites them withone another. The like holds good of an army. The Commander-in-Chief is a father wholoves all his soldiers equally, and for that reason they are comrades among themselves.The army differs structurally from the Church in being built up of a series of such groups.Every captain is, as it were, the Commander-in-Chief and the father of his company, andso is every non-commissioned officer of his section. It is true that a similar hierarchy hasbeen constructed in the Church, but it does not play the same part in it economically; formore knowledge and care about individuals may be attributed to Christ than to a humanCommander-in-Chief.[28]It is to be noticed that in these two artificial groups each individual is bound bylibidinal[29] ties on the one hand to the leader (Christ, the Commander-in-Chief) and on theother hand to the other members of the group. How these two ties are related to each other,whether they are of the same kind and the same value, and how they are to be describedpsychologically—these questions must be reserved for subsequent enquiry. But we shallventure even now upon a mild reproach against the authorities for not having sufficientlyappreciated the importance of the leader in the psychology of the group, while our ownchoice of a first object for investigation has brought us into a more favourable position. Itwould appear as though we were on the right road towards an explanation of the principalphenomenon of Group Psychology—the individual’s lack of freedom in a group. If eachindividual is bound in two directions by such an intense emotional tie, we shall find nodifficulty in attributing to that circumstance the alteration and limitation which have beenobserved in his personality.A hint to the same effect, that the essence of a group lies in the libidinal ties existing init, is also to be found in the phenomenon of panic, which is best studied in military groups.A panic arises if a group of that kind becomes disintegrated. Its characteristics are thatnone of the orders given by superiors are any longer listened to, and that each individual isonly solicitous on his own account, and without any consideration for the rest. The mutualties have ceased to exist, and a gigantic and senseless dread [Angst] is set free. At thispoint, again, the objection will naturally be made that it is rather the other way round; andthat the dread has grown so great as to be able to disregard all ties and all feelings ofconsideration for others. McDougall has even (p. 24) made use of the case of panic(though not of military panic) as a typical instance of that intensification of emotion bycontagion (‘primary induction’) upon which he lays so much emphasis. But neverthelessthis rational method of explanation is here quite inadequate. The very question that needsexplanation is why the dread has become so gigantic. The greatness of the danger cannotbe responsible, for the same army which now falls a victim to panic may previously havefaced equally great or greater danger with complete success; it is of the very essence ofpanic that it bears no relation to the danger that threatens, and often breaks out upon themost trivial occasions. If an individual in panic dread begins to be solicitous only on hisown account, he bears witness in so doing to the fact that the emotional ties, which havehitherto made the danger seem small to him, have ceased to exist. Now that he is byhimself in facing the danger, he may surely think it greater. The fact is, therefore, thatpanic dread presupposes a relaxation in the libidinal structure of the group and reacts to itin a justifiable manner, and the contrary view—that the libidinal ties of the group aredestroyed owing to dread in the face of the danger—can be refuted.The contention that dread in a group is increased to enormous proportions by means ofinduction (contagion) is not in the least contradicted by these remarks. McDougall’s viewmeets the case entirely when the danger is a really great one and when the group has nostrong emotional ties—conditions which are fulfilled, for instance, when a fire breaks outin a theatre or a place of amusement. But the really instructive case and the one which canbe best employed for our purposes is that mentioned above, in which a body of troopsbreaks into a panic although the danger has not increased beyond a degree that is usualand has often been previously faced. It is not to be expected that the usage of the word‘panic’ should be clearly and unambiguously determined. Sometimes it is used to describeany collective dread, sometimes even dread in an individual when it exceeds all bounds,and often the name seems to be reserved for cases in which the outbreak of dread is notwarranted by the occasion. If we take the word ‘panic’ in the sense of collective dread, wecan establish a far-reaching analogy. Dread in an individual is provoked either by thegreatness of a danger or by the cessation of emotional ties (libidinal cathexes[30][Libidobesetzungen]); the latter is the case of neurotic dread.[31] In just the same waypanic arises either owing to an increase of the common danger or owing to thedisappearance of the emotional ties which hold the group together; and the latter case isanalogous to that of neurotic dread.[32]Anyone who, like McDougall (l.c.), describes a panic as one of the plainest functions ofthe ‘group mind’, arrives at the paradoxical position that this group mind does away withitself in one of its most striking manifestations. It is impossible to doubt that panic meansthe disintegration of a group; it involves the cessation of all the feelings of considerationwhich the members of the group otherwise show one another.The typical occasion of the outbreak of a panic is very much as it is represented inNestroy’s parody of Hebbel’s play about Judith and Holofernes. A soldier cries out: “Thegeneral has lost his head!” and thereupon all the Assyrians take to flight. The loss of theleader in some sense or other, the birth, of misgivings about him, brings on the outbreak ofpanic, though the danger remains the same; the mutual ties between the members of thegroup disappear, as a rule, at the same time as the tie with their leader. The group vanishesin dust, like a Bologna flask when its top is broken off.The dissolution of a religious group is not so easy to observe. A short time ago therecame into my hands an English novel of Catholic origin, recommended by the Bishop ofLondon, with the title When It Was Dark. It gave a clever and, as it seems to me, aconvincing picture of such a possibility and its consequences. The novel, which issupposed to relate to the present day, tells how a conspiracy of enemies of the figure ofChrist and of the Christian faith succeed in arranging for a sepulchre to be discovered inJerusalem. In this sepulchre is an inscription, in which Joseph of Arimathaea confessesthat for reasons of piety he secretly removed the body of Christ from its grave on the thirdday after its entombment and buried it in this spot. The resurrection of Christ and hisdivine nature are by this means disposed of, and the result of this archaeological discoveryis a convulsion in European civilisation and an extraordinary increase in all crimes andacts of violence, which only ceases when the forgers’ plot has been revealed.The phenomenon which accompanies the dissolution that is here supposed to overtake areligious group is not dread, for which the occasion is wanting. Instead of it ruthless andhostile impulses towards other people make their appearance, which, owing to the equallove of Christ, they had previously been unable to do.[33] But even during the kingdom ofChrist those people who do not belong to the community of believers, who do not lovehim, and whom he does not love, stand outside this tie. Therefore a religion, even if it callsitself the religion of love, must be hard and unloving to those who do not belong to it.Fundamentally indeed every religion is in this same way a religion of love for all thosewhom it embraces; while cruelty and intolerance towards those who do not belong to it arenatural to every religion. However difficult we may find it personally, we ought not toreproach believers too severely on this account; people who are unbelieving or indifferentare so much better off psychologically in this respect. If to-day that intolerance no longershows itself so violent and cruel as in former centuries, we can scarcely conclude thatthere has been a softening in human manners. The cause is rather to be found in theundeniable weakening of religious feelings and the libidinal ties which depend upon them.If another group tie takes the place of the religious one—and the socialistic tie seems to besucceeding in doing so—, then there will be the same intolerance towards outsiders as inthe age of the Wars of Religion; and if differences between scientific opinions could everattain a similar significance for groups, the same result would again be repeated with thisnew motivation.VIFURTHER PROBLEMS AND LINES OF WORKWe have hitherto considered two artificial groups and have found that they are dominatedby two emotional ties. One of these, the tie with the leader, seems (at all events for thesecases) to be more of a ruling factor than the other, which holds between the members ofthe group.Now much else remains to be examined and described in the morphology of groups. Weshould have to start from the ascertained fact that a mere collection of people is not agroup, so long as these ties have not been established in it; but we should have to admitthat in any collection of people the tendency to form a psychological group may veryeasily become prominent. We should have to give our attention to the different kinds ofgroups, more or less stable, that arise spontaneously, and to study the conditions of theirorigin and of their dissolution. We should above all be concerned with the distinctionbetween groups which have a leader and leaderless groups. We should consider whethergroups with leaders may not be the more primitive and complete, whether in the others anidea, an abstraction, may not be substituted for the leader (a state of things to whichreligious groups, with their invisible head, form a transition stage), and whether a commontendency, a wish in which a number of people can have a share, may not in the same wayserve as a substitute. This abstraction, again, might be more or less completely embodiedin the figure of what we might call a secondary leader, and interesting varieties wouldarise from the relation between the idea and the leader. The leader or the leading ideamight also, so to speak, be negative; hatred against a particular person or institution mightoperate in just the same unifying way, and might call up the same kind of emotional ties aspositive attachment. Then the question would also arise whether a leader is reallyindispensable to the essence of a group—and other questions besides.But all these questions, which may, moreover, have been dealt with in part in theliterature of Group Psychology, will not succeed in diverting our interest from thefundamental psychological problems that confront us in the structure of a group. And ourattention will first be attracted by a consideration which promises to bring us in the mostdirect way to a proof that libidinal ties are what characterize a group.Let us keep before our eyes the nature of the emotional relations which hold betweenmen in general. According to Schopenhauer’s famous simile of the freezing porcupines noone can tolerate a too intimate approach to his neighbour.[34]The evidence of psycho-analysis shows that almost every intimate emotional relationbetween two people which lasts for some time—marriage, friendship, the relationsbetween parents and children[35]—leaves a sediment of feelings of aversion and hostility,which have first to be eliminated by repression. This is less disguised in the commonwrangles between business partners or in the grumbles of a subordinate at his superior.The same thing happens when men come together in larger units. Every time two familiesbecome connected by a marriage, each of them thinks itself superior to or of better birththan the other. Of two neighbouring towns each is the other’s most jealous rival; everylittle canton looks down upon the others with contempt. Closely related races keep oneanother at arm’s length; the South German cannot endure the North German, theEnglishman casts every kind of aspersion upon the Scotchman, the Spaniard despises thePortuguese. We are no longer astonished that greater differences should lead to an almostinsuperable repugnance, such as the Gallic people feel for the German, the Aryan for theSemite, and the white races for the coloured.When this hostility is directed against people who are otherwise loved we describe it asambivalence of feeling; and we explain the fact, in what is probably far too rational amanner, by means of the numerous occasions for conflicts of interest which arise preciselyin such intimate relations. In the undisguised antipathies and aversions which people feeltowards strangers with whom they have to do we may recognize the expression of selflove—of narcissism. This self-love works for the self-assertion of the individual, andbehaves as though the occurrence of any divergence from his own particular lines ofdevelopment involved a criticism of them and a demand for their alteration. We do notknow why such sensitiveness should have been directed to just these details ofdifferentiation; but it is unmistakable that in this whole connection men give evidence of areadiness for hatred, an aggressiveness, the source of which is unknown, and to which oneis tempted to ascribe an elementary character.[36]But the whole of this intolerance vanishes, temporarily or permanently, as the result ofthe formation of a group, and in a group. So long as a group formation persists or so far asit extends, individuals behave as though they were uniform, tolerate other people’speculiarities, put themselves on an equal level with them, and have no feeling of aversiontowards them. Such a limitation of narcissism can, according to our theoretical views, onlybe produced by one factor, a libidinal tie with other people. Love for oneself knows onlyone barrier—love for others, love for objects.[37] The question will at once be raisedwhether community of interest in itself, without any addition of libido, must notnecessarily lead to the toleration of other people and to considerateness for them. Thisobjection may be met by the reply that nevertheless no lasting limitation of narcissism iseffected in this way, since this tolerance does not persist longer than the immediateadvantage gained from the other people’s collaboration. But the practical importance ofthe discussion is less than might be supposed, for experience has shown that in cases ofcollaboration libidinal ties are regularly formed between the fellow-workers whichprolong and solidify the relation between them to a point beyond what is merelyprofitable. The same thing occurs in men’s social relations as has become familiar topsycho-analytic research in the course of the development of the individual libido. Thelibido props itself upon the satisfaction of the great vital needs, and chooses as its firstobjects the people who have a share in that process. And in the development of mankindas a whole, just as in individuals, love alone acts as the civilizing factor in the sense that itbrings a change from egoism to altruism. And this is true both of the sexual love forwomen, with all the obligations which it involves of sparing what women are fond of, andalso of the desexualised, sublimated homosexual love for other men, which springs fromwork in common. If therefore in groups narcissistic self-love is subject to limitationswhich do not operate outside them, that is cogent evidence that the essence of a groupformation consists in a new kind of libidinal ties among the members of the group.But our interest now leads us on to the pressing question as to what may be the nature ofthese ties which exist in groups. In the psycho-analytic study of neuroses we have hithertobeen occupied almost exclusively with ties that unite with their objects those love instinctswhich still pursue directly sexual aims. In groups there can evidently be no question ofsexual aims of that kind. We are concerned here with love instincts which have beendiverted from their original aims, though they do not operate with less energy on thataccount. Now we have already observed within the range of the usual sexual objectcathexis[Objektbesetzung] phenomena which represent a diversion of the instinct from itssexual aim. We have described them as degrees of being in love, and have recognized thatthey involve a certain encroachment upon the ego. We shall now turn our attention moreclosely to these phenomena of being in love, in the firm expectation of finding in themconditions which can be transferred to the ties that exist in groups. But we should also liketo know whether this kind of object-cathexis, as we know it in sexual life, represents theonly manner of emotional tie with other people, or whether we must take othermechanisms of the sort into account. As a matter of fact we learn from psycho-analysisthat there do exist other mechanisms for emotional ties, the so-called identifications,insufficiently-known processes and hard to describe, the investigation of which will forsome time keep us away from the subject of Group Psychology.VIIIDENTIFICATIONIdentification is known to psycho-analysis as the earliest expression of an emotional tiewith another person. It plays a part in the early history of the Oedipus complex. A littleboy will exhibit a special interest in his father; he would like to grow like him and be likehim, and take his place everywhere. We may say simply that he takes his father as hisideal. This behaviour has nothing to do with a passive or feminine attitude towards hisfather (and towards males in general); it is on the contrary typically masculine. It fits invery well with the Oedipus complex, for which it helps to prepare the way.At the same time as this identification with his father, or a little later, the boy has begunto develop a true object-cathexis towards his mother according to the anaclitic type[Anlehnungstypus].[38] He then exhibits, therefore, two psychologically distinct ties: astraightforward sexual object-cathexis towards his mother and a typical identificationtowards his father. The two subsist side by side for a time without any mutual influence orinterference. In consequence of the irresistible advance towards a unification of mental lifethey come together at last; and the normal Oedipus complex originates from theirconfluence. The little boy notices that his father stands in his way with his mother. Hisidentification with his father then takes on a hostile colouring and becomes identical withthe wish to replace his father in regard to his mother as well. Identification, in fact, isambivalent from the very first; it can turn into an expression of tenderness as easily as intoa wish for someone’s removal. It behaves like a derivative of the first oral phase of theorganisation of the libido, in which the object that we long for and prize is assimilated byeating and is in that way annihilated as such. The cannibal, as we know, has remained atthis standpoint; he has a devouring affection for his enemies and only devours people ofwhom he is fond.[39]The subsequent history of this identification with the father may easily be lost sight of. Itmay happen that the Oedipus complex becomes inverted, and that the father is taken as theobject of a feminine attitude, an object from which the directly sexual instincts look forsatisfaction; in that event the identification with the father has become the precursor of anobject tie with the father. The same holds good, with the necessary substitutions, of thebaby daughter as well.It is easy to state in a formula the distinction between an identification with the fatherand the choice of the father as an object. In the first case one’s father is what one wouldlike to be, and in the second he is what one would like to have. The distinction, that is,depends upon whether the tie attaches to the subject or to the object of the ego. The formeris therefore already possible before any sexual object-choice has been made. It is muchmore difficult to give a clear metapsychological representation of the distinction. We canonly see that identification endeavours to mould a person’s own ego after the fashion ofthe one that has been taken as a ‘model’.Let us disentangle identification as it occurs in the structure of a neurotic symptom fromits rather complicated connections. Supposing that a little girl (and we will keep to her forthe present) develops the same painful symptom as her mother—for instance, the sametormenting cough. Now this may come about in various ways. The identification maycome from the Oedipus complex; in that case it signifies a hostile desire on the girl’s partto take her mother’s place, and the symptom expresses her object love towards her father,and brings about a realisation, under the influence of a sense of guilt, of her desire to takeher mother’s place: ‘You wanted to be your mother, and now you are—anyhow as far asthe pain goes’. This is the complete mechanism of the structure of a hysterical symptom.Or, on the other hand, the symptom may be the same as that of the person who is loved—(so, for instance, Dora in the ‘Bruchstück einer Hysterieanalyse’[40] imitated her father’scough); in that case we can only describe the state of things by saying that identificationhas appeared instead of object-choice, and that object-choice has regressed toidentification. We have heard that identification is the earliest and original form ofemotional tie; it often happens that under the conditions in which symptoms areconstructed, that is, where there is repression and where the mechanisms of theunconscious are dominant, object-choice is turned back into identification—the ego, thatis, assumes the characteristics of the object. It is noticeable that in these identifications theego sometimes copies the person who is not loved and sometimes the one who is loved. Itmust also strike us that in both cases the identification is a partial and extremely limitedone and only borrows a single trait from the person who is its object.There is a third particularly frequent and important case of symptom formation, in whichthe identification leaves any object relation to the person who is being copied entirely outof account. Supposing, for instance, that one of the girls in a boarding school has had aletter from someone with whom she is secretly in love which arouses her jealousy, andthat she reacts to it with a fit of hysterics; then some of her friends who know about it willcontract the fit, as we say, by means of mental infection. The mechanism is that ofidentification based upon the possibility or desire of putting oneself in the same situation.The other girls would like to have a secret love affair too, and under the influence of asense of guilt they also accept the pain involved in it. It would be wrong to suppose thatthey take on the symptom out of sympathy. On the contrary, the sympathy only arises outof the identification, and this is proved by the fact that infection or imitation of this kindtakes place in circumstances where even less pre-existing sympathy is to be assumed thanusually exists between friends in a girls’ school. One ego has perceived a significantanalogy with another upon one point—in our example upon a similar readiness foremotion; an identification is thereupon constructed on this point, and, under the influenceof the pathogenic situation, is displaced on to the symptom which the one ego hasproduced. The identification by means of the symptom has thus become the mark of apoint of coincidence between the two egos which has to be kept repressed.What we have learned from these three sources may be summarised as follows. First,identification is the original form of emotional tie with an object; secondly, in a regressiveway it becomes a substitute for a libidinal object tie, as it were by means of theintrojection of the object into the ego; and thirdly, it may arise with every new perceptionof a common quality shared with some other person who is not an object of the sexualinstinct. The more important this common quality is, the more successful may this partialidentification become, and it may thus represent the beginning of a new tie.We already begin to divine that the mutual tie between members of a group is in thenature of an identification of this kind, based upon an important emotional commonquality; and we may suspect that this common quality lies in the nature of the tie with theleader. Another suspicion may tell us that we are far from having exhausted the problemof identification, and that we are faced by the process which psychology calls ‘empathy[Einfühlung]’ and which plays the largest part in our understanding of what is inherentlyforeign to our ego in other people. But we shall here limit ourselves to the immediateemotional effects of identification, and shall leave on one side its significance for ourintellectual life.Psycho-analytic research, which has already occasionally attacked the more difficultproblems of the psychoses, has also been able to exhibit identification to us in some othercases which are not immediately comprehensible. I shall treat two of these cases in detailas material for our further consideration.The genesis of male homosexuality in a large class of cases is as follows. A young manhas been unusually long and intensely fixated upon his mother in the sense of the Oedipuscomplex. But at last, after the end of his puberty, the time comes for exchanging hismother for some other sexual object. Things take a sudden turn: the young man does notabandon his mother, but identifies himself with her; he transforms himself into her, andnow looks about for objects which can replace his ego for him, and on which he canbestow such love and care as he has experienced from his mother. This is a frequentprocess, which can be confirmed as often as one likes, and which is naturally quiteindependent of any hypothesis that may be made as to the organic driving force and themotives of the sudden transformation. A striking thing about this identification is its amplescale; it remoulds the ego in one of its important features—in its sexual character—uponthe model of what has hitherto been the object. In this process the object itself isrenounced—whether entirely or in the sense of being preserved only in the unconscious isa question outside the present discussion. Identification with an object that is renounced orlost as a substitute for it, introjection of this object into the ego, is indeed no longer anovelty to us. A process of the kind may sometimes be directly observed in small children.A short time ago an observation of this sort was published in the Internationale Zeitschriftfür Psychoanalyse. A child who was unhappy over the loss of a kitten declared straight outthat now he himself was the kitten, and accordingly crawled about on all fours, would noteat at table, etc.[41]Another such instance of introjection of the object has been provided by the analysis ofmelancholia, an affection which counts among the most remarkable of its exciting causesthe real or emotional loss of a loved object. A leading characteristic of these cases is acruel self-depreciation of the ego combined with relentless self-criticism and bitter selfreproaches.Analyses have shown that this disparagement and these reproaches apply atbottom to the object and represent the ego’s revenge upon it. The shadow of the object hasfallen upon the ego, as I have said elsewhere.[42] The introjection of the object is hereunmistakably clear.But these melancholias also show us something else, which may be of importance forour later discussions. They show us the ego divided, fallen into two pieces, one of whichrages against the second. This second piece is the one which has been altered byintrojection and which contains the lost object. But the piece which behaves so cruelly isnot unknown to us either. It comprises the conscience, a critical faculty [Instanz][43] withinthe ego, which even in normal times takes up a critical attitude towards the ego, thoughnever so relentlessly and so unjustifiably. On previous occasions we have been driven tothe hypothesis[44] that some such faculty develops in our ego which may cut itself off fromthe rest of the ego and come into conflict with it. We have called it the ‘ego ideal’, and byway of functions we have ascribed to it self-observation, the moral conscience, thecensorship of dreams, and the chief influence in repression. We have said that it is the heirto the original narcissism in which the childish ego found its self-sufficiency; it graduallygathers up from the influences of the environment the demands which that environmentmakes upon the ego and which the ego cannot always rise to; so that a man, when hecannot be satisfied with his ego itself, may nevertheless be able to find satisfaction in theego ideal which has been differentiated out of the ego. In delusions of observation, as wehave further shown, the disintegration of this faculty has become patent, and has thusrevealed its origin in the influence of superior powers, and above all of parents.[45] But wehave not forgotten to add that the amount of distance between this ego ideal and the realego is very variable from one individual to another, and that with many people thisdifferentiation within the ego does not go further than with children.But before we can employ this material for understanding the libidinal organisation ofgroups, we must take into account some other examples of the mutual relations betweenthe object and the ego.[46]VIIIBEING IN LOVE AND HYPNOSISEven in its caprices the usage of language remains true to some kind of reality. Thus itgives the name of ‘love’ to a great many kinds of emotional relationship which we toogroup together theoretically as love; but then again it feels a doubt whether this love isreal, true, actual love, and so hints at a whole scale of possibilities within the range of thephenomena of love. We shall have no difficulty in making the same discovery empirically.In one class of cases being in love is nothing more than object-cathexis on the part of thesexual instincts with a view to directly sexual satisfaction, a cathexis which expires,moreover, when this aim has been reached; this is what is called common, sensual love.But, as we know, the libidinal situation rarely remains so simple. It was possible tocalculate with certainty upon the revival of the need which had just expired; and this mustno doubt have been the first motive for directing a lasting cathexis upon the sexual objectand for ‘loving’ it in the passionless intervals as well.To this must be added another factor derived from the astonishing course ofdevelopment which is pursued by the erotic life of man. In his first phase, which hasusually come to an end by the time he is five years old, a child has found the first objectfor his love in one or other of his parents, and all of his sexual instincts with their demandfor satisfaction have been united upon this object. The repression which then sets incompels him to renounce the greater number of these infantile sexual aims, and leavesbehind a profound modification in his relation to his parents. The child still remains tied tohis parents, but by instincts which must be described as being ‘inhibited in their aim[zielgehemmte]’. The emotions which he feels henceforward towards these objects of hislove are characterized as ‘tender’. It is well known that the earlier ‘sensual’ tendenciesremain more or less strongly preserved in the unconscious, so that in a certain sense thewhole of the original current continues to exist.[47]At puberty, as we know, there set in new and very strong tendencies with directly sexualaims. In unfavourable cases they remain separate, in the form of a sensual current, fromthe ‘tender’ emotional trends which persist. We are then faced by a picture the two aspectsof which certain movements in literature take such delight in idealising. A man of thiskind will show a sentimental enthusiasm for women whom he deeply respects but who donot excite him to sexual activities, and he will only be potent with other women whom hedoes not ‘love’ but thinks little of or even despises.[48] More often, however, theadolescent succeeds in bringing about a certain degree of synthesis between the unsensual,heavenly love and the sensual, earthly love, and his relation to his sexual object ischaracterised by the interaction of uninhibited instincts and of instincts inhibited in theiraim. The depth to which anyone is in love, as contrasted with his purely sensual desire,may be measured by the size of the share taken by the inhibited instincts of tenderness.In connection with this question of being in love we have always been struck by thephenomenon of sexual over-estimation—the fact that the loved object enjoys a certainamount of freedom from criticism, and that all its characteristics are valued more highlythan those of people who are not loved, or than its own were at a time when it itself wasnot loved. If the sensual tendencies are somewhat more effectively repressed or set aside,the illusion is produced that the object has come to be sensually loved on account of itsspiritual merits, whereas on the contrary these merits may really only have been lent to itby its sensual charm.The tendency which falsifies judgement in this respect is that of idealisation. But thismakes it easier for us to find our way about. We see that the object is being treated in thesame way as our own ego, so that when we are in love a considerable amount ofnarcissistic libido overflows on to the object. It is even obvious, in many forms of lovechoice, that the object serves as a substitute for some unattained ego ideal of our own. Welove it on account of the perfections which we have striven to reach for our own ego, andwhich we should now like to procure in this roundabout way as a means of satisfying ournarcissism.If the sexual over-estimation and the being in love increase even further, then theinterpretation of the picture becomes still more unmistakable. The tendencies whose trendis towards directly sexual satisfaction may now be pushed back entirely, as regularlyhappens, for instance, with the young man’s sentimental passion; the ego becomes moreand more unassuming and modest, and the object more and more sublime and precious,until at last it gets possession of the entire self-love of the ego, whose self-sacrifice thusfollows as a natural consequence. The object has, so to speak, consumed the ego. Traits ofhumility, of the limitation of narcissism, and of self-injury occur in every case of being inlove; in the extreme case they are only intensified, and as a result of the withdrawal of thesensual claims they remain in solitary supremacy.This happens especially easily with love that is unhappy and cannot be satisfied; for inspite of everything each sexual satisfaction always involves a reduction in sexual overestimation.Contemporaneously with this ‘devotion’ of the ego to the object, which is nolonger to be distinguished from a sublimated devotion to an abstract idea, the functionsallotted to the ego ideal entirely cease to operate. The criticism exercised by that faculty issilent; everything that the object does and asks for is right and blameless. Conscience hasno application to anything that is done for the sake of the object; in the blindness of loveremorselessness is carried to the pitch of crime. The whole situation can be completelysummarised in a formula: The object has taken the place of the ego ideal.It is now easy to define the distinction between identification and such extremedevelopments of being in love as may be described as fascination or infatuation. In theformer case the ego has enriched itself with the properties of the object, it has ‘introjected’the object into itself, as Ferenczi expresses it. In the second case it is impoverished, it hassurrendered itself to the object, it has substituted the object for its most importantconstituent. Closer consideration soon makes it plain, however, that this kind of accountcreates an illusion of contradistinctions that have no real existence. Economically there isno question of impoverishment or enrichment; it is even possible to describe an extremecase of being in love as a state in which the ego has introjected the object into itself.Another distinction is perhaps better calculated to meet the essence of the matter. In thecase of identification the object has been lost or given up; it is then set up again inside theego, and the ego makes a partial alteration in itself after the model of the lost object. In theother case the object is retained, and there is a hyper-cathexis of it by the ego and at theego’s expense. But here again a difficulty presents itself. Is it quite certain thatidentification presupposes that object-cathexis has been given up? Can there be noidentification with the object retained? And before we embark upon a discussion of thisdelicate question, the perception may already be beginning to dawn on us that yet anotheralternative embraces the real essence of the matter, namely, whether the object is put in theplace of the ego or of the ego ideal.From being in love to hypnosis is evidently only a short step. The respects in which thetwo agree are obvious. There is the same humble subjection, the same compliance, thesame absence of criticism, towards the hypnotist just as towards the loved object. There isthe same absorption of one’s own initiative; no one can doubt that the hypnotist hasstepped into the place of the ego ideal. It is only that everything is even clearer and moreintense in hypnosis, so that it would be more to the point to explain being in love bymeans of hypnosis than the other way round. The hypnotist is the sole object, and noattention is paid to any but him. The fact that the ego experiences in a dream-like waywhatever he may request or assert reminds us that we omitted to mention among thefunctions of the ego ideal the business of testing the reality of things.[49] No wonder thatthe ego takes a perception for real if its reality is vouched for by the mental faculty whichordinarily discharges the duty of testing the reality of things. The complete absence oftendencies which are uninhibited in their sexual aims contributes further towards theextreme purity of the phenomena. The hypnotic relation is the devotion of someone inlove to an unlimited degree but with sexual satisfaction excluded; whereas in the case ofbeing in love this kind of satisfaction is only temporarily kept back, and remains in thebackground as a possible aim at some later time.But on the other hand we may also say that the hypnotic relation is (if the expression ispermissible) a group formation with two members. Hypnosis is not a good object forcomparison with a group formation, because it is truer to say that it is identical with it. Outof the complicated fabric of the group it isolates one element for us—the behaviour of theindividual to the leader. Hypnosis is distinguished from a group formation by thislimitation of number, just as it is distinguished from being in love by the absence ofdirectly sexual tendencies. In this respect it occupies a middle position between the two.It is interesting to see that it is precisely those sexual tendencies that are inhibited intheir aims which achieve such lasting ties between men. But this can easily be understoodfrom the fact that they are not capable of complete satisfaction, while sexual tendencieswhich are uninhibited in their aims suffer an extraordinary reduction through the dischargeof energy every time the sexual aim is attained. It is the fate of sensual love to becomeextinguished when it is satisfied; for it to be able to last, it must from the first be mixedwith purely tender components—with such, that is, as are inhibited in their aims—or itmust itself undergo a transformation of this kind.Hypnosis would solve the riddle of the libidinal constitution of groups for us straightaway, if it were not that it itself exhibits some features which are not met by the rationalexplanation we have hitherto given of it as a state of being in love with the directly sexualtendencies excluded. There is still a great deal in it which we must recognise asunexplained and mystical. It contains an additional element of paralysis derived from therelation between someone with superior power and someone who is without power andhelpless—which may afford a transition to the hypnosis of terror which occurs in animals.The manner in which it is produced and its relationship to sleep are not clear; and thepuzzling way in which some people are subject to it, while others resist it completely,points to some factor still unknown which is realised in it and which perhaps alone makespossible the purity of the attitudes of the libido which it exhibits. It is noticeable that, evenwhen there is complete suggestive compliance in other respects, the moral conscience ofthe person hypnotized may show resistance. But this may be due to the fact that inhypnosis as it is usually practised some knowledge may be retained that what is happeningis only a game, an untrue reproduction of another situation of far more importance to life.But after the preceding discussions we are quite in a position to give the formula for thelibidinal constitution of groups: or at least of such groups as we have hitherto considered,namely, those that have a leader and have not been able by means of too much‘organisation’ to acquire secondarily the characteristics of an individual. A primary groupof this kind is a number of individuals who have substituted one and the same object fortheir ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego.This condition admits of graphic representation:IXTHE HERD INSTINCTWe cannot for long enjoy the illusion that we have solved the riddle of the group with thisformula. It is impossible to escape the immediate and disturbing recollection that all wehave really done has been to shift the question on to the riddle of hypnosis, about which somany points have yet to be cleared up. And now another objection shows us our furtherpath.It might be said that the intense emotional ties which we observe in groups are quitesufficient to explain one of their characteristics—the lack of independence and initiative intheir members, the similarity in the reactions of all of them, their reduction, so to speak, tothe level of group individuals. But if we look at it as a whole, a group shows us more thanthis. Some of its features—the weakness of intellectual ability, the lack of emotionalrestraint, the incapacity for moderation and delay, the inclination to exceed every limit inthe expression of emotion and to work it off completely in the form of action—these andsimilar features, which we find so impressively described in Le Bon, show anunmistakable picture of a regression of mental activity to an earlier stage such as we arenot surprised to find among savages or children. A regression of this sort is in particular anessential characteristic of common groups, while, as we have heard, in organized andartificial groups it can to a large extent be checked.We thus have an impression of a state in which an individual’s separate emotion andpersonal intellectual act are too weak to come to anything by themselves and areabsolutely obliged to wait till they are reinforced through being repeated in a similar wayin the other members of the group. We are reminded of how many of these phenomena ofdependence are part of the normal constitution of human society, of how little originalityand personal courage are to be found in it, of how much every individual is ruled by thoseattitudes of the group mind which exhibit themselves in such forms as racialcharacteristics, class prejudices, public opinion, etc. The influence of suggestion becomesa greater riddle for us when we admit that it is not exercised only by the leader, but byevery individual upon every other individual; and we must reproach ourselves with havingunfairly emphasized the relation to the leader and with having kept the other factor ofmutual suggestion too much in the background.After this encouragement to modesty, we shall be inclined to listen to another voice,which promises us an explanation based upon simpler grounds. Such a one is to be foundin Trotter’s thoughtful book upon the herd instinct, concerning which my only regret isthat it does not entirely escape the antipathies that were set loose by the recent great war.[50]Trotter derives the mental phenomena that are described as occurring in groups from aherd instinct (‘gregariousness’), which is innate in human beings just as in other species ofanimals. Biologically this gregariousness is an analogy to multicellularity and as it were acontinuation of it. From the standpoint of the libido theory it is a further manifestation ofthe inclination, which proceeds from the libido, and which is felt by all living beings ofthe same kind, to combine in more and more comprehensive units.[51] The individual feels‘incomplete’ if he is alone. The dread shown by small children would seem already to bean expression of this herd instinct. Opposition to the herd is as good as separation from it,and is therefore anxiously avoided. But the herd turns away from anything that is new orunusual. The herd instinct would appear to be something primary, something ‘whichcannot be split up’.Trotter gives as the list of instincts which he considers as primary those of selfpreservation,of nutrition, of sex, and of the herd. The last often comes into oppositionwith the others. The feelings of guilt and of duty are the peculiar possessions of agregarious animal. Trotter also derives from the herd instinct the repressive forces whichpsycho-analysis has shown to exist in the ego, and from the same source accordingly theresistances which the physician comes up against in psycho-analytic treatment. Speechowes its importance to its aptitude for mutual understanding in the herd, and upon it theidentification of the individuals with one another largely rests.While Le Bon is principally concerned with typical transient group formations, andMcDougall with stable associations, Trotter has chosen as the centre of his interest themost generalised form of assemblage in which man, that Ϛὡον πολιτικὁν, passes his life,and he gives us its psychological basis. But Trotter is under no necessity of tracing backthe herd instinct, for he characterizes it as primary and not further reducible. Boris Sidis’sattempt, to which he refers, at tracing the herd instinct back to suggestibility is fortunatelysuperfluous as far as he is concerned; it is an explanation of a familiar and unsatisfactorytype, and the converse proposition—that suggestibility is a derivative of the herd instinct—would seem to me to throw far more light on the subject.But Trotter’s exposition, with even more justice than the others’, is open to the objectionthat it takes too little account of the leader’s part in a group, while we incline rather to theopposite judgement, that it is impossible to grasp the nature of a group if the leader isdisregarded. The herd instinct leaves no room at all for the leader; he is merely thrown inalong with the herd, almost by chance; it follows, too, that no path leads from this instinctto the need for a God; the herd is without a herdsman. But besides this Trotter’s expositioncan be undermined psychologically; that is to say, it can be made at all events probablethat the herd instinct is not irreducible, that it is not primary in the same sense as theinstinct of self-preservation and the sexual instinct.It is naturally no easy matter to trace the ontogenesis of the herd instinct. The dreadwhich is shown by small children when they are left alone, and which Trotter claims asbeing already a manifestation of the instinct, nevertheless suggests more readily anotherinterpretation. The dread relates to the child’s mother, and later to other familiar persons,and it is the expression of an unfulfilled desire, which the child does not yet know how todeal with in any way except by turning it into dread.[52] Nor is the child’s dread when it isalone pacified by the sight of any haphazard ‘member of the herd’, but on the contrary it isonly brought into existence by the approach of a ‘stranger’ of this sort. Then for a longtime nothing in the nature of herd instinct or group feeling is to be observed in children.Something like it grows up first of all, in a nursery containing many children, out of thechildren’s relation to their parents, and it does so as a reaction to the initial envy withwhich the elder child receives the younger one. The elder child would certainly like to putits successor jealously aside, to keep it away from the parents, and to rob it of all itsprivileges; but in face of the fact that this child (like all that come later) is loved by theparents in just the same way, and in consequence of the impossibility of maintaining itshostile attitude without damaging itself, it is forced into identifying itself with the otherchildren. So there grows up in the troop of children a communal or group feeling, which isthen further developed at school. The first demand made by this reaction-formation is forjustice, for equal treatment for all. We all know how loudly and implacably this claim isput forward at school. If one cannot be the favourite oneself, at all events nobody elseshall be the favourite. This transformation—the replacing of jealousy by a group feeling inthe nursery and classroom—might be considered improbable, if the same process couldnot later on be observed again in other circumstances. We have only to think of the troopof women and girls, all of them in love in an enthusiastically sentimental way, who crowdround a singer or pianist after his performance. It would certainly be easy for each of themto be jealous of the rest; but, in face of their numbers and the consequent impossibility oftheir reaching the aim of their love, they renounce it, and, instead of pulling out oneanother’s hair, they act as a united group, do homage to the hero of the occasion with theircommon actions, and would probably be glad to have a share of his flowing locks.Originally rivals, they have succeeded in identifying themselves with one another bymeans of a similar love for the same object. When, as is usual, a situation in the field ofthe instincts is capable of various outcomes, we need not be surprised if the actualoutcome is one which involves the possibility of a certain amount of satisfaction, whileanother, even though in itself more obvious, is passed over because the circumstances oflife prevent its attaining this aim.What appears later on in society in the shape of Gemeingeist, esprit de corps, ‘groupspirit’, etc., does not belie its derivation from what was originally envy. No one must wantto put himself forward, every one must be the same and have the same. Social justicemeans that we deny ourselves many things so that others may have to do without them aswell, or, what is the same thing, may not be able to ask for them. This demand for equalityis the root of social conscience and the sense of duty. It reveals itself unexpectedly in thesyphilitic’s dread of infecting other people, which psycho-analysis has taught us tounderstand. The dread exhibited by these poor wretches corresponds to their violentstruggles against the unconscious wish to spread their infection on to other people; forwhy should they alone be infected and cut off from so much? why not other people aswell? And the same germ is to be found in the pretty anecdote of the judgement ofSolomon. If one woman’s child is dead, the other shall not have a live one either. Thebereaved woman is recognized by this wish.Thus social feeling is based upon the reversal of what was first a hostile feeling into apositively-toned tie of the nature of an identification. So far as we have hitherto been ableto follow the course of events, this reversal appears to be effected under the influence of acommon tender tie with a person outside the group. We do not ourselves regard ouranalysis of identification as exhaustive, but it is enough for our present purpose that weshould revert to this one feature—its demand that equalization shall be consistently carriedthrough. We have already heard in the discussion of the two artificial groups, church andarmy, that their preliminary condition is that all their members should be loved in the sameway by one person, the leader. Do not let us forget, however, that the demand for equalityin a group applies only to its members and not to the leader. All the members must beequal to one another, but they all want to be ruled by one person. Many equals, who canidentify themselves with one another, and a single person superior to them all—that is thesituation that we find realised in groups which are capable of subsisting. Let us venture,then, to correct Trotter’s pronouncement that man is a herd animal and assert that he israther a horde animal, an individual creature in a horde led by a chief.XTHE GROUP AND THE PRIMAL HORDEIn 1912 I took up a conjecture of Darwin’s to the effect that the primitive form of humansociety was that of a horde ruled over despotically by a powerful male. I attempted toshow that the fortunes of this horde have left indestructible traces upon the history ofhuman descent; and, especially, that the development of totemism, which comprises initself the beginnings of religion, morality, and social organisation, is connected with thekilling of the chief by violence and the transformation of the paternal horde into acommunity of brothers.[53] To be sure, this is only a hypothesis, like so many others withwhich archaeologists endeavour to lighten the darkness of prehistoric times—a ‘Just-SoStory’, as it was amusingly called by a not unkind critic (Kroeger); but I think it iscreditable to such a hypothesis if it proves able to bring coherence and understanding intomore and more new regions.Human groups exhibit once again the familiar picture of an individual of superiorstrength among a troop of similar companions, a picture which is also contained in ouridea of the primal horde. The psychology of such a group, as we know it from thedescriptions to which we have so often referred—the dwindling of the consciousindividual personality, the focussing of thoughts and feelings into a common direction, thepredominance of the emotions and of the unconscious mental life, the tendency to theimmediate carrying out of intentions as they emerge—all this corresponds to a state ofregression to a primitive mental activity, of just such a sort as we should be inclined toascribe to the primal horde.[54]Thus the group appears to us as a revival of the primal horde. Just as primitive manvirtually survives in every individual, so the primal horde may arise once more out of anyrandom crowd; in so far as men are habitually under the sway of group formation werecognise in it the survival of the primal horde. We must conclude that the psychology ofthe group is the oldest human psychology; what we have isolated as individualpsychology, by neglecting all traces of the group, has only since come into prominence outof the old group psychology, by a gradual process which may still, perhaps, be describedas incomplete. We shall later venture upon an attempt at specifying the point of departureof this development.Further reflection will show us in what respect this statement requires correction.Individual psychology must, on the contrary, be just as old as group psychology, for fromthe first there were two kinds of psychologies, that of the individual members of the groupand that of the father, chief, or leader. The members of the group were subject to ties justas we see them to-day, but the father of the primal horde was free. His intellectual actswere strong and independent even in isolation, and his will needed no reinforcement fromothers. Consistency leads us to assume that his ego had few libidinal ties; he loved no onebut himself, or other people only in so far as they served his needs. To objects his egogave away no more than was barely necessary.He, at the very beginning of the history of mankind, was the Superman whom Nietzscheonly expected from the future. Even to-day the members of a group stand in need of theillusion that they are equally and justly loved by their leader; but the leader himself needlove no one else, he may be of a masterly nature, absolutely narcissistic, but self-confidentand independent. We know that love puts a check upon narcissism, and it would bepossible to show how, by operating in this way, it became a factor of civilisation.The primal father of the horde was not yet immortal, as he later became by deification. Ifhe died, he had to be replaced; his place was probably taken by a youngest son, who hadup to then been a member of the group like any other. There must therefore be apossibility of transforming group psychology into individual psychology; a condition mustbe discovered under which such a transformation is easily accomplished, just as it ispossible for bees in case of necessity to turn a larva into a queen instead of into a worker.One can imagine only one possibility: the primal father had prevented his sons fromsatisfying their directly sexual tendencies; he forced them into abstinence andconsequently into the emotional ties with him and with one another which could arise outof those of their tendencies that were inhibited in their sexual aim. He forced them, so tospeak, into group psychology. His sexual jealousy and intolerance became in the last resortthe causes of group psychology.[55]Whoever became his successor was also given the possibility of sexual satisfaction, andwas by that means offered a way out of the conditions of group psychology. The fixationof the libido to woman and the possibility of satisfaction without any need for delay oraccumulation made and end of the importance of those of his sexual tendencies that wereinhibited in their aim, and allowed his narcissism always to rise to its full height. We shallreturn in a postscript to this connection between love and character formation.We may further emphasize, as being specially instructive, the relation that holds betweenthe contrivance by means of which an artificial group is held together and the constitutionof the primal horde. We have seen that with an army and a church this contrivance is theillusion that the leader loves all of the individuals equally and justly. But this is simply anidealistic remodelling of the state of affairs in the primal horde, where all of the sons knewthat they were equally persecuted by the primal father, and feared him equally. This samerecasting upon which all social duties are built up is already presupposed by the next formof human society, the totemistic clan. The indestructible strength of the family as a naturalgroup formation rests upon the fact that this necessary presupposition of the father’s equallove can have a real application in the family.But we expect even more of this derivation of the group from the primal horde. It oughtalso to help us to understand what is still incomprehensible and mysterious in groupformations—all that lies hidden behind the enigmatic words hypnosis and suggestion. AndI think it can succeed in this too. Let us recall that hypnosis has something positivelyuncanny about it; but the characteristic of uncanniness suggests something old andfamiliar that has undergone repression.[56] Let us consider how hypnosis is induced. Thehypnotist asserts that he is in possession of a mysterious power which robs the subject ofhis own will, or, which is the same thing, the subject believes it of him. This mysteriouspower (which is even now often described popularly as animal magnetism) must be thesame that is looked upon by primitive people as the source of taboo, the same thatemanates from kings and chieftains and makes it dangerous to approach them (mana). Thehypnotist, then, is supposed to be in possession of this power; and how does he manifestit? By telling the subject to look him in the eyes; his most typical method of hypnotising isby his look. But it is precisely the sight of the chieftain that is dangerous and unbearablefor primitive people, just as later that of the Godhead is for mortals. Even Moses had to actas an intermediary between his people and Jehovah, since the people could not support thesight of God; and when he returned from the presence of God his face shone—some of themana had been transferred on to him, just as happens with the intermediary amongprimitive people.[57]It is true that hypnosis can also be evoked in other ways, for instance by fixing the eyesupon a bright object or by listening to a monotonous sound. This is misleading and hasgiven occasion to inadequate physiological theories. As a matter of fact these proceduresmerely serve to divert conscious attention and to hold it riveted. The situation is the sameas if the hypnotist had said to the subject: ‘Now concern yourself exclusively with myperson; the rest of the world is quite uninteresting.’ It would of course be technicallyinexpedient for a hypnotist to make such a speech; it would tear the subject away from hisunconscious attitude and stimulate him to conscious opposition. The hypnotist avoidsdirecting the subject’s conscious thoughts towards his own intentions, and makes theperson upon whom he is experimenting sink into an activity in which the world is boundto seem uninteresting to him; but at the same time the subject is in reality unconsciouslyconcentrating his whole attention upon the hypnotist, and is getting into an attitude ofrapport, of transference on to him. Thus the indirect methods of hypnotising, like many ofthe technical procedures used in making jokes, have the effect of checking certaindistributions of mental energy which would interfere with the course of events in theunconscious, and they lead eventually to the same result as the direct methods of influenceby means of staring or stroking.[58]Ferenczi has made the true discovery that when a hypnotist gives the command to sleep,which is often done at the beginning of hypnosis, he is putting himself in the place of thesubject’s parents. He thinks that two sorts of hypnosis are to be distinguished: one coaxingand soothing, which he considers is modelled upon the mother, and another threatening,which is derived from the father.[59] Now the command to sleep in hypnosis meansnothing more nor less than an order to withdraw all interest from the world and toconcentrate it upon the person of the hypnotist. And it is so understood by the subject; forin this withdrawal of interest from the outer world lies the psychological characteristic ofsleep, and the kinship between sleep and the state of hypnosis is based upon it.By the measures that he takes, then, the hypnotist awakens in the subject a portion of hisarchaic inheritance which had also made him compliant towards his parents and which hadexperienced an individual re-animation in his relation to his father; what is thus awakenedis the idea of a paramount and dangerous personality, towards whom only a passivemasochisticattitude is possible, to whom one’s will has to be surrendered,—while to bealone with him, ‘to look him in the face’, appears a hazardous enterprise. It is only insome such way as this that we can picture the relation of the individual member of theprimal horde to the primal father. As we know from other reactions, individuals havepreserved a variable degree of personal aptitude for reviving old situations of this kind.Some knowledge that in spite of everything hypnosis is only a game, a deceptive renewalof these old impressions, may however remain behind and take care that there is aresistance against any too serious consequences of the suspension of the will in hypnosis.The uncanny and coercive characteristics of group formations, which are shown in theirsuggestion phenomena, may therefore with justice be traced back to the fact of their originfrom the primal horde. The leader of the group is still the dreaded primal father; the groupstill wishes to be governed by unrestricted force; it has an extreme passion for authority; inLe Bon’s phrase, it has a thirst for obedience. The primal father is the group ideal, whichgoverns the ego in the place of the ego ideal. Hypnosis has a good claim to beingdescribed as a group of two; there remains as a definition for suggestion—a convictionwhich is not based upon perception and reasoning but upon an erotic tie.[60]XIA DIFFERENTIATING GRADE IN THE EGOIf we survey the life of an individual man of to-day, bearing in mind the mutuallycomplementary accounts of group psychology given by the authorities, we may lose thecourage, in face of the complications that are revealed, to attempt a comprehensiveexposition. Each individual is a component part of numerous groups, he is bound by tiesof identification in many directions, and he has built up his ego ideal upon the mostvarious models. Each individual therefore has a share in numerous group minds—those ofhis race, of his class, of his creed, of his nationality, etc.—and he can also raise himselfabove them to the extent of having a scrap of independence and originality. Such stableand lasting group formations, with their uniform and constant effects, are less striking toan observer than the rapidly formed and transient groups from which Le Bon has made hisbrilliant psychological character sketch of the group mind. And it is just in these noisyephemeral groups, which are as it were superimposed upon the others, that we are met bythe prodigy of the complete, even though only temporary, disappearance of exactly whatwe have recognized as individual acquirements.We have interpreted this prodigy as meaning that the individual gives up his ego idealand substitutes for it the group ideal as embodied in the leader. And we must add by wayof correction that the prodigy is not equally great in every case. In many individuals theseparation between the ego and the ego ideal is not very far advanced; the two stillcoincide readily; the ego has often preserved its earlier self-complacency. The selection ofthe leader is very much facilitated by this circumstance. He need only possess the typicalqualities of the individuals concerned in a particularly clearly marked and pure form, andneed only give an impression of greater force and of more freedom of libido; and in thatcase the need for a strong chief will often meet him half-way and invest him with apredominance to which he would otherwise perhaps have had no claim. The othermembers of the group, whose ego ideal would not, apart from this, have become embodiedin his person without some correction, are then carried away with the rest by ‘suggestion’,that is to say, by means of identification.We are aware that what we have been able to contribute towards the explanation of thelibidinal structure of groups leads back to the distinction between the ego and the ego idealand to the double kind of tie which this makes possible—identification, and substitution ofthe object for the ego ideal. The assumption of this kind of differentiating grade [Stufe] inthe ego as a first step in an analysis of the ego must gradually establish its justification inthe most various regions of psychology. In my paper ‘Zur Einführung des Narzissmus’ Ihave put together all the pathological material that could at the moment be used in supportof this separation. But it may be expected that when we penetrate deeper into thepsychology of the psychoses its significance will be discovered to be far greater. Let usreflect that the ego now appears in the relation of an object to the ego ideal which has beendeveloped out of it, and that all the interplay between an outer object and the ego as awhole, with which our study of the neuroses has made us acquainted, may possibly berepeated upon this new scene of action inside the ego.In this place I shall only follow up one of the consequences which seem possible fromthis point of view, thus resuming the discussion of a problem which I was obliged to leaveunsolved elsewhere.[61] Each of the mental differentiations that we have becomeacquainted with represents a fresh aggravation of the difficulties of mental functioning,increases its instability, and may become the starting-point for its breakdown, that is, forthe onset of a disease. Thus, by being born we have made the step from an absolutely selfsufficientnarcissism to the perception of a changing outer world and to the beginnings ofthe discovery of objects. And with this is associated the fact that we cannot endure thenew state of things for long, that we periodically revert from it, in our sleep, to our formercondition of absence of stimulation and avoidance of objects. It is true, however, that inthis we are following a hint from the outer world, which, by means of the periodicalchange of day and night, temporarily withdraws the greater part of the stimuli that affectus. The second example, which is pathologically more important, is not subject to anysuch qualification. In the course of our development we have effected a separation of ourmental existence into a coherent ego and into an unconscious and repressed portion whichis left outside it; and we know that the stability of this new acquisition is exposed toconstant shocks. In dreams and in neuroses what is thus excluded knocks for admission atthe gates, guarded though they are by resistances; and in our waking health we make useof special artifices for allowing what is repressed to circumvent the resistances and forreceiving it temporarily into our ego to the increase of our pleasure. Wit and humour, andto some extent the comic in general, may be regarded in this light. Everyone acquaintedwith the psychology of the neuroses will think of similar examples of less importance; butI hasten on to the application I have in view.It is quite conceivable that the separation of the ego ideal from the ego cannot be bornefor long either, and has to be temporarily undone. In all renunciations and limitationsimposed upon the ego a periodical infringement of the prohibition is the rule; this indeedis shown by the institution of festivals, which in origin are nothing more nor less thanexcesses provided by law and which owe their cheerful character to the release which theybring.[62] The Saturnalia of the Romans and our modern carnival agree in this essentialfeature with the festivals of primitive people, which usually end in debaucheries of everykind and the transgression of what are at other times the most sacred commandments. Butthe ego ideal comprises the sum of all the limitations in which the ego has to acquiesce,and for that reason the abrogation of the ideal would necessarily be a magnificent festivalfor the ego, which might then once again feel satisfied with itself.[63]There is always a feeling of triumph when something in the ego coincides with the egoideal. And the sense of guilt (as well as the sense of inferiority) can also be understood asan expression of tension between the ego and the ego ideal.It is well known that there are people the general colour of whose mood oscillatesperiodically from an excessive depression through some kind of intermediate state to anexalted sense of well-being. These oscillations appear in very different degrees ofamplitude, from what is just noticeable to those extreme instances which, in the shape ofmelancholia and mania, make the most painful or disturbing inroads upon the life of theperson concerned. In typical cases of this cyclical depression outer exciting causes do notseem to play any decisive part; as regards inner motives, nothing more (or nothingdifferent) is to be found in these patients than in all others. It has consequently become thecustom to consider these cases as not being psychogenic. We shall refer later on to thoseother exactly similar cases of cyclical depression which can nevertheless easily be tracedback to mental traumata.Thus the foundation of these spontaneous oscillations of mood is unknown; we arewithout insight into the mechanism of the displacement of a melancholia by a mania. Sowe are free to suppose that these patients are people in whom our conjecture might find anactual application—their ego ideal might be temporarily resolved into their ego afterhaving previously ruled it with especial strictness.Let us keep to what is clear: On the basis of our analysis of the ego it cannot be doubtedthat in cases of mania the ego and the ego ideal have fused together, so that the person, ina mood of triumph and self-satisfaction, disturbed by no self-criticism, can enjoy theabolition of his inhibitions, his feelings of consideration for others, and his selfreproaches.It is not so obvious, but nevertheless very probable, that the misery of themelancholiac is the expression of a sharp conflict between the two faculties of his ego, aconflict in which the ideal, in an excess of sensitiveness, relentlessly exhibits itscondemnation of the ego in delusions of inferiority and in self-depreciation. The onlyquestion is whether we are to look for the causes of these altered relations between the egoand the ego ideal in the periodic rebellions, which we have postulated above, against thenew institution, or whether we are to make other circumstances responsible for them.A change into mania is not an indispensable feature of the symptomatology ofmelancholic depression. There are simple melancholias, some in single and some inrecurring attacks, which never show this development. On the other hand there aremelancholias in which the exciting cause clearly plays an aetiological part. They are thosewhich occur after the loss of a loved object, whether by death or as a result ofcircumstances which have necessitated the withdrawal of the libido from the object. Apsychogenic melancholia of this sort can end in mania, and this cycle can be repeatedseveral times, just as easily as in a case which appears to be spontaneous. Thus the state ofthings is somewhat obscure, especially as only a few forms and cases of melancholia havebeen submitted to psycho-analytical investigation.[64] So far we only understand thosecases in which the object is given up because it has shown itself unworthy of love. It isthen set up again inside the ego, by means of identification, and severely condemned bythe ego ideal. The reproaches and attacks directed towards the object come to light in theshape of melancholic self-reproaches.[65]A melancholia of this kind may also end in a change to mania; so that the possibility ofthis happening represents a feature which is independent of the other characteristics in thesymptomatology.Nevertheless I see no difficulty in assigning to the factor of the periodical rebellion ofthe ego against the ego ideal a share in both kinds of melancholia, the psychogenic as wellas the spontaneous. In the spontaneous kind it may be supposed that the ego ideal isinclined to display a peculiar strictness, which then results automatically in its temporarysuspension. In the psychogenic kind the ego would be incited to rebellion by ill-treatmenton the part of its ideal—an ill-treatment which it encounters when there has beenidentification with a rejected object.XIIPOSTSCRIPTIn the course of the enquiry which has just been brought to a provisional end we cameacross a number of side-paths which we avoided pursuing in the first instance but in whichthere was much that offered us promises of insight. We propose now to take up a few ofthe points that have been left on one side in this way.A. The distinction between identification of the ego with an object and replacement ofthe ego ideal by an object finds an interesting illustration in the two great artificial groupswhich we began by studying, the army and the Christian church.It is obvious that a soldier takes his superior, that is, really, the leader of the army, as hisideal, while he identifies himself with his equals, and derives from this community of theiregos the obligations for giving mutual help and for sharing possessions whichcomradeship implies. But he becomes ridiculous if he tries to identify himself with thegeneral. The soldier in Wallensteins Lager laughs at the sergeant for this very reason:Wie er räuspert und wie er spuckt,Das habt ihr ihm glücklich abgeguckt![66]It is otherwise in the Catholic Church. Every Christian loves Christ as his ideal and feelshimself united with all other Christians by the tie of identification. But the Church requiresmore of him. He has also to identify himself with Christ and love all other Christians asChrist loved them. At both points, therefore, the Church requires that the position of thelibido which is given by a group formation should be supplemented. Identification has tobe added where object-choice has taken place, and object love where there isidentification. This addition evidently goes beyond the constitution of the group. One canbe a good Christian and yet be far from the idea of putting oneself in Christ’s place and ofhaving like him an all-embracing love for mankind. One need not think oneself capable,weak mortal that one is, of the Saviour’s largeness of soul and strength of love. But thisfurther development in the distribution of libido in the group is probably the factor uponwhich Christianity bases its claim to have reached a higher ethical level.B. We have said that it would be possible to specify the point in the mental developmentof man at which the advance from group to individual psychology was also achieved bythe individual members of the group.[67]For this purpose we must return for a moment to the scientific myth of the father of theprimal horde. He was later on exalted into the creator of the world, and with justice, for hehad produced all the sons who composed the first group. He was the ideal of each one ofthem, at once feared and honoured, a fact which led later to the idea of taboo. These manyindividuals eventually banded themselves together, killed him and cut him in pieces. Noneof the group of victors could take his place, or, if one of them did, the battles began afresh,until they understood that they must all renounce their father’s heritage. They then formedthe totemistic community of brothers, all with equal rights and united by the totemprohibitions which were to preserve and to expiate the memory of the murder. But thedissatisfaction with what had been achieved still remained, and it became the source ofnew developments. The persons who were united in this group of brothers gradually cametowards a revival of the old state of things at a new level. Man became once more thechief of a family, and broke down the prerogatives of the gynaecocracy which had becomeestablished during the fatherless period. As a compensation for this he may at that timehave acknowledged the mother deities, whose priests were castrated for the mother’sprotection, after the example that had been given by the father of the primal horde. Andyet the new family was only a shadow of the old one; there were numbers of fathers andeach one was limited by the rights of the others.It was then, perhaps, that some individual, in the exigency of his longing, may have beenmoved to free himself from the group and take over the father’s part. He who did this wasthe first epic poet; and the advance was achieved in his imagination. This poet disguisedthe truth with lies in accordance with his longing. He invented the heroic myth. The herowas a man who by himself had slain the father—the father who still appeared in the mythas a totemistic monster. Just as the father had been the boy’s first ideal, so in the hero whoaspires to the father’s place the poet now created the first ego ideal. The transition to thehero was probably afforded by the youngest son, the mother’s favourite, whom she hadprotected from paternal jealousy, and who, in the era of the primal horde, had been thefather’s successor. In the lying poetic fancies of prehistoric times the woman, who hadbeen the prize of battle and the allurement to murder, was probably turned into the seducerand instigator to the crime.The hero claims to have acted alone in accomplishing the deed, which certainly only thehorde as a whole would have ventured upon. But, as Rank has observed, fairy tales havepreserved clear traces of the facts which were disavowed. For we often find in them thatthe hero who has to carry out some difficult task (usually a youngest son, and notinfrequently one who has represented himself to the father surrogate as being stupid, thatis to say, harmless)—we often find, then, that this hero can carry out his task only by thehelp of a crowd of small animals, such as bees or ants. These would be the brothers in theprimal horde, just as in the same way in dream symbolism insects or vermin signifybrothers and sisters (contemptuously, considered as babies). Moreover every one of thetasks in myths and fairy tales is easily recognisable as a substitute for the heroic deed.The myth, then, is the step by which the individual emerges from group psychology. Thefirst myth was certainly the psychological, the hero myth; the explanatory nature mythmust have followed much later. The poet who had taken this step and had in this way sethimself free from the group in his imagination, is nevertheless able (as Rank has furtherobserved) to find his way back to it in reality. For he goes and relates to the group hishero’s deeds which he has invented. At bottom this hero is no one but himself. Thus helowers himself to the level of reality, and raises his hearers to the level of imagination. Buthis hearers understand the poet, and, in virtue of their having the same relation of longingtowards the primal father, they can identify themselves with the hero.[68]The lie of the heroic myth culminates in the deification of the hero. Perhaps the deifiedhero may have been earlier than the Father God and may have been a precursor to thereturn of the primal father as a deity. The series of gods, then, would run chronologically:Mother Goddess—Hero—Father God. But it is only with the elevation of the neverforgotten primal father that the deity acquires the features that we still recognise in him today.[69]C. A great deal has been said in this paper about directly sexual instincts and those thatare inhibited in their aims, and it may be hoped that this distinction will not meet with toomuch resistance. But a detailed discussion of the question will not be out of place, even ifit only repeats what has to a great extent already been said before.The development of the libido in children has made us acquainted with the first but alsothe best example of sexual instincts which are inhibited in their aims. All the feelingswhich a child has towards its parents and those who look after it pass by an easy transitioninto the wishes which give expression to the child’s sexual tendencies. The child claimsfrom these objects of its love all the signs of affection which it knows of; it wants to kissthem, touch them, and look at them; it is curious to see their genitals, and to be with themwhen they perform their intimate excremental functions; it promises to marry its mother ornurse—whatever it may understand by that; it proposes to itself to bear its father a child,etc. Direct observation, as well as the subsequent analytic investigation of the residue ofchildhood, leave no doubt as to the complete fusion of tender and jealous feelings and ofsexual intentions, and show us in what a fundamental way the child makes the person itloves into the object of all its incompletely centred sexual tendencies.[70]This first configuration of the child’s love, which in typical cases is co-ordinated withthe Oedipus complex, succumbs, as we know, from the beginning of the period of latencyonwards to a wave of repression. Such of it as is left over shows itself as a purely tenderemotional tie, which relates to the same people, but is no longer to be described as‘sexual’. Psycho-analysis, which illuminates the depths of mental life, has no difficulty inshowing that the sexual ties of the earliest years of childhood also persist, thoughrepressed and unconscious. It gives us courage to assert that wherever we come across atender feeling it is the successor to a completely ‘sensual’ object tie with the person inquestion or rather with that person’s prototype (or imago). It cannot indeed disclose to uswithout a special investigation whether in a given case this former complete sexual currentstill exists under repression or whether it has already been exhausted. To put it still moreprecisely: it is quite certain that it is still there as a form and possibility, and can always becharged with cathectic energy and put into activity again by means of regression; the onlyquestion is (and it cannot always be answered) what degree of cathexis and operative forceit still has at the present moment. Equal care must be taken in this connection to avoid twosources of error—the Scylla of under-estimating the importance of the repressedunconscious, and the Charybdis of judging the normal entirely by the standards of thepathological.A psychology which will not or cannot penetrate the depths of what is repressed regardstender emotional ties as being invariably the expression of tendencies which have nosexual aim, even though they are derived from tendencies which have such an aim.[71]We are justified in saying that they have been diverted from these sexual aims, eventhough there is some difficulty in giving a representation of such a diversion of aim whichwill conform to the requirements of metapsychology. Moreover, those instincts which areinhibited in their aims always preserve some few of their original sexual aims; even anaffectionate devotee, even a friend or an admirer, desires the physical proximity and thesight of the person who is now loved only in the ‘Pauline’ sense. If we choose, we mayrecognise in this diversion of aim a beginning of the sublimation of the sexual instincts, oron the other hand we may fix the limits of sublimation at some more distant point. Thosesexual instincts which are inhibited in their aims have a great functional advantage overthose which are uninhibited. Since they are not capable of really complete satisfaction,they are especially adapted to create permanent ties; while those instincts which aredirectly sexual incur a loss of energy each time they are satisfied, and must wait to berenewed by a fresh accumulation of sexual libido, so that meanwhile the object may havebeen changed. The inhibited instincts are capable of any degree of admixture with theuninhibited; they can be transformed back into them, just as they arose out of them. It iswell known how easily erotic wishes develop out of emotional relations of a friendlycharacter, based upon appreciation and admiration, (compare Molière’s ‘Embrassez-moipour l’amour du grec’), between a master and a pupil, between a performer and adelighted listener, and especially in the case of women. In fact the growth of emotionalties of this kind, with their purposeless beginnings, provides a much frequented pathwayto sexual object-choice. Pfister, in his Frömmigkeit des Grafen von Zinzendorf,[72] hasgiven an extremely clear and certainly not an isolated example of how easily even anintense religious tie can revert to ardent sexual excitement. On the other hand it is alsovery usual for directly sexual tendencies, short-lived in themselves, to be transformed intoa lasting and purely tender tie; and the consolidation of a passionate love marriage rests toa large extent upon this process.We shall naturally not be surprised to hear that the sexual tendencies that are inhibited intheir aims arise out of the directly sexual ones when inner or outer obstacles make thesexual aims unattainable. The repression during the period of latency is an inner obstacleof this kind—or rather one which has become inner. We have assumed that the father ofthe primal horde owing to his sexual intolerance compelled all his sons to be abstinent,and thus forced them into ties that were inhibited in their aims, while he reserved forhimself freedom of sexual enjoyment and in this way remained without ties. All the tiesupon which a group depends are of the character of instincts that are inhibited in theiraims. But here we have approached the discussion of a new subject, which deals with therelation between directly sexual instincts and the formation of groups.D. The last two remarks will have prepared us for finding that directly sexual tendenciesare unfavourable to the formation of groups. In the history of the development of thefamily there have also, it is true, been group relations of sexual love (group marriages);but the more important sexual love became for the ego, and the more it developed thecharacteristics of being in love, the more urgently it required to be limited to two people—una cum uno—as is prescribed by the nature of the genital aim. Polygamousinclinations had to be content to find satisfaction in a succession of changing objects.Two people coming together for the purpose of sexual satisfaction, in so far as they seekfor solitude, are making a demonstration against the herd instinct, the group feeling. Themore they are in love, the more completely they suffice for each other. The rejection of thegroup’s influence is manifested in the shape of a sense of shame. The extremely violentfeelings of jealousy are summoned up in order to protect the sexual object-choice frombeing encroached upon by a group tie. It is only when the tender, that is, the personal,factor of a love relation gives place entirely to the sensual one, that it is possible for twopeople to have sexual intercourse in the presence of others or for there to be simultaneoussexual acts in a group as occurs at an orgy. But at that point a regression has taken place toan early stage in sexual relations, at which being in love as yet played no part, and allsexual objects were judged to be of equal value, somewhat in the sense of Bernard Shaw’smalicious aphorism to the effect that being in love means greatly exaggerating thedifference between one woman and another.There are abundant indications that being in love only made its appearance late on in thesexual relations between men and women; so that the opposition between sexual love andgroup ties is also a late development. Now it may seem as though this assumption wereincompatible with our myth of the primal family. For it was after all by their love for theirmothers and sisters that the troop of brothers was, as we have supposed, driven toparricide; and it is difficult to imagine this love as being anything but unbroken andprimitive—that is, as an intimate union of the tender and the sensual. But furtherconsideration resolves this objection into a confirmation. One of the reactions to theparricide was after all the institution of totemistic exogamy; the prohibition of any sexualrelation with those women of the family who had been tenderly loved since childhood. Inthis way a wedge was driven in between a man’s tender and sensual feelings, one stillfirmly fixed in his erotic life to-day.[73] As a result of this exogamy the sensual needs ofmen had to be satisfied with strange and unloved women.In the great artificial groups, the church and the army, there is no room for woman as asexual object. The love relation between men and women remains outside theseorganisations. Even where groups are formed which are composed of both men andwomen the distinction between the sexes plays no part. There is scarcely any sense inasking whether the libido which keeps groups together is of a homosexual or of aheterosexual nature, for it is not differentiated according to the sexes, and particularlyshows a complete disregard for the aims of the genital organisation of the libido.Even in a person who has in other respects become absorbed in a group the directlysexual tendencies preserve a little of his individual activity. If they become too strong theydisintegrate every group formation. The Catholic Church had the best of motives forrecommending its followers to remain unmarried and for imposing celibacy upon itspriests; but falling in love has often driven even priests to leave the church. In the sameway love for women breaks through the group ties of race, of national separation, and ofthe social class system, and it thus produces important effects as a factor in civilization. Itseems certain that homosexual love is far more compatible with group ties, even when ittakes the shape of uninhibited sexual tendencies—a remarkable fact, the explanation ofwhich might carry us far.The psycho-analytic investigation of the psycho-neuroses has taught us that theirsymptoms are to be traced back to directly sexual tendencies which are repressed but stillremain active. We can complete this formula by adding to it: or, to tendencies inhibited intheir aims, whose inhibition has not been entirely successful or has made room for a returnto the repressed sexual aim. It is in accordance with this that a neurosis should make itsvictim asocial and should remove him from the usual group formations. It may be said thata neurosis has the same disintegrating effect upon a group as being in love. On the otherhand it appears that where a powerful impetus has been given to group formation,neuroses may diminish and at all events temporarily disappear. Justifiable attempts havealso been made to turn this antagonism between neuroses and group formation totherapeutic account. Even those who do not regret the disappearance of religious illusionsfrom the civilized world of to-day will admit that so long as they were in force theyoffered those who were bound by them the most powerful protection against the danger ofneurosis. Nor is it hard to discern in all the ties with mystico-religious or philosophicoreligioussects and communities the manifestation of distorted cures of all kinds ofneuroses. All of this is bound up with the contrast between directly sexual tendencies andthose which are inhibited in their aims.If he is left to himself, a neurotic is obliged to replace by his own symptom formationsthe great group formations from which he is excluded. He creates his own world ofimagination for himself, his religion, his own system of delusions, and thus recapitulatesthe institutions of humanity in a distorted way which is clear evidence of the dominatingpart played by the directly sexual tendencies.[74]E. In conclusion, we will add a comparative estimate, from the standpoint of the libidotheory, of the states with which we have been concerned, of being in love, of hypnosis, ofgroup formation, and of the neurosis.Being in love is based upon the simultaneous presence of directly sexual tendencies andof sexual tendencies that are inhibited in their aims, so that the object draws a part of thenarcissistic ego-libido to itself. It is a condition in which there is only room for the egoand the object.Hypnosis resembles being in love in being limited to these two persons, but it is basedentirely upon sexual tendencies that are inhibited in their aims and substitutes the objectfor the ego ideal.The group multiplies this process; it agrees with hypnosis in the nature of the instinctswhich hold it together, and in the replacement of the ego ideal by the object; but to this itadds identification with other individuals, which was perhaps originally made possible bytheir having the same relation to the object.Both states, hypnosis and group formation, are an inherited deposit from thephylogenesis of the human libido—hypnosis in the form of a predisposition, and thegroup, besides this, as a direct survival. The replacement of the directly sexual tendenciesby those that are inhibited in their aims promotes in both states a separation between theego and the ego ideal, a separation with which a beginning has already been made in thestate of being in love.The neurosis stands outside this series. It also is based upon a peculiarity in thedevelopment of the human libido—the twice repeated start made by the directly sexualfunction, with an intervening period of latency. [75] To this extent it resembles hypnosisand group formation in having the character of a regression, which is absent from being inlove. It makes its appearance wherever the advance from directly sexual instincts to thosethat are inhibited in their aims has not been completely successful; and it represents aconflict between those instincts which have been received into the ego after having passedthrough this development and those portions of the same instincts which, like otherinstinctive desires that have been completely repressed, strive, from the repressedunconscious, to attain direct satisfaction. The neurosis is extraordinarily rich in content,for it embraces all possible relations between the ego and the object—both those in whichthe object is retained and others in which it is abandoned or erected inside the ego itself—and also the conflicting relations between the ego and its ego ideal.INDEXAbraham, 62, 108.Affectivity. See under Emotion.Altruism, 57.Ambivalence, 18, 55, 61.Anaclitic type, 60.Archaic inheritance, 10, 99.Army 42-6, 89, 94, 110, 122.Autistic mental acts, 2.Bernheim, 35, 100.Bleuler, 2.Brothers, 43, 114.in Christ, 43.Community of, 90, 112, 122.Brugeilles, 34.Caesar, 44.Cathexis, 18, 20, 28, 117.Object-, 48, 58, 60-1, 71-2, 76.Catholic Church, 42-3, 111, 123.Celibacy of priests, 123.Censorship of dreams, 16, 69.Chieftains, Mana in, 96.Children, 14, 16, 18-19, 30, 67 82, 91.Dread in, 83, 85-6.Parents and, 54, 86, 116.Sexual object of, 72, 116.Unconscious of, 18.Christ, 42-5, 50, 111.Equal love of, 50.Identification with, 111.Church, 42-3, 89, 94, 110-11, 122-3.Commander-in-Chief, 42-5.Conflict, 18, 107, 126.Conscience, 10, 28, 68-9, 75, 79.Social, 88.Contagion, Emotional, 10-13, 27, 34-5, 46-7.Crowd, 1, 3, 26, 92.Danger, Effect on groups, 46-9.Darwin, 90.Delusions:of inferiority, 107.of observation, 69.Devotion to abstract idea, 17, 75.Doubt:absence in groups, 15-16interpretation in dreams, 15-16.Dread:Children’s, 83, 85-6.in a group, 46-8, 50.in an individual, 47-8.Neurotic, 48.of society, 10.Panic, 45-9.Dream, 20, 69, 104.Interpretation of doubt and uncertainty in, 15-16.symbolism, 114.Duty, Sense of, 84, 88, 95.Ego, 10, 18-19, 62-70, 74, 84, 93, 100-9, 120, 125-7.Relations between ego ideal and, 68-70, 103, 105-10.Relations between object and, 62-70, 74-6, 108-10.Ego ideal, 68-70, 74-7, 80, 100-3, 105-10, 113, 126-7.Abrogation of the, 105.Hypnotist in the place of, 77.Object as substitute for, 74-6, 80, 103, 110.Relations between ego and, 68-70, 103, 105-10.Testing reality of things, 77.The first, 113.Egoism, 57.Emotion:Ambivalent, 18, 55.Charge of, 28.Contagion of. See Contagion.Intensification of, in groups, 16, 23, 27-30, 33, 46, 81.Primitive induction of, 27, 34, 46-7.Tender, 72-3, 78, 116-17.Emotional tie, 40, 43, 45, 52-3, 59-60, 64-5, 81, 88, 91, 94, 100, 117-20.Cessation of, 46-9.Empathy, relation to identification, 66, 70.Enthusiasm, in groups, 25.Envy, 87-8.Equality, demand for, 88, 89.Eros, 38-40.Esprit de corps, origin of, 87.Ethical:conduct of a group, 18.level of Christianity, 111.standards of individual, 24-5.Fairy tales, the hero in, 114.Family, 70, 95, 100, 113, 120.a group formation, 95.and Christian community, 43.and social instinct, 3.Primal, 122.Fascination, 11, 13, 21, 75.Father, 43, 92, 98-9.Equal love of, 95.God, 115.Identification with, 60-2.Object tie with, 62.Primal, 92, 94-5, 99-100, 112-13, 115, 120.Deification of, 93, 115.Killing the, 94, 112-13, 122.Surrogate, 43, 114.Federn, P., 50.Felszeghy, Bela v., 48.Ferenczi, 76, 98.Festivals, 105.Folk-lore, 25.Folk-song, 25.French Revolution, 26.Function:for testing reality, 20, 77.(Instanz), 15.Gemeingeist, origin of, 87.Genital organisation, 19.God, 85, 96.Father, 115.Gregariousness, 83-4, 92.Group:Artificial, 41-2, 52, 82, 89, 94, 110, 122.Different kinds of, 26, 41.Disintegration of, 49-51.Dread in, 47.Equality in, 89.feeling, 86-7, 121.Heightened affectivity in. See under Emotion.ideal, 100, 102.Intellectual capacity of, 14, 18, 23, 25, 29, 31, 33, 81.Intensification of emotion in. See under Emotion.Leaders of. See under Leader.Libidinal structure of, 37, 40, 44-5, 47, 51, 53-4, 70, 79-80, 102-3.marriages, 120.Mental change of the individual in, 6-14, 33-4, 45, 56, 81, 102.mind, 3, 5-27, 40, 49, 82.Organisation in, 26, 30-1, 33, 41-2, 80, 82, 90.Primitive, 31, 33, 41, 80.psychological character of, 6-32.psychology, 1-4, 6, 25-6, 33-4, 37, 45, 53, 59, 92-4, 101, 112, 114.Revolutionary, 26.Sexual instincts and, 120.spirit, 37.Stable, 26, 41, 84, 101.Suggestibility of, 11, 13, 35, 84-5.Transient, 25, 41, 84, 101.Guilt, Sense of, 20, 63, 65, 84, 106.Gynaecocracy, 113.Hatred, 53, 56.Hebbel, 49.Herd, 83-5, 89.instinct, 3, 83-6, 105, 121.Hero, 17, 113-15.Homosexuality, 57, 66-7, 94, 123.Horde Primal, 89-95, 99, 113-14, 120.Father of the. See under Father.Hypnosis, 10-13, 20-1, 77-9, 81, 95-100, 125-6.a group of two, 78, 100.and sleep, 79, 98.of terror, 79.Hypnotist, 13, 77, 95-9.Hysteria, Identification in, 63-5.Idealisation, 74.Identification, 59-70, 75-6, 84, 86-9, 94, 101-3, 111, 125.Ambivalent, 61.in hysterical symptom, 63-5.Regression of object-choice to, 64.with a lost or rejected object, 67-8, 108-9.with Christ, 111.with the father, 60-2.with the hero, 115.with the leader, 110-11.Imitation, 34-5, 65, 70.Individual:a member of many groups, 101.Dread in, 47-8.Mental change in a group, 6-14, 33-4, 45, 56, 81, 102.Psychology, 1-2, 92-3, 112, 114.Induction of Emotion, 27, 34, 46-7.Infection, mental, 64-65.Inferiority, Delusions of, 57, 106-7.Inheritance, archaic, 10, 99.Inhibition:Collective, of intellectual functioning, 23, 33.Removal of, 17, 28, 33.Instinct:Herd, 3, 83-6, 105, 121.inhibited in aim, 72-3, 78, 115-26.Life and death, 56.Love, 37, 39, 58.Nutrition, 85.Primary, 84-5.Self-preservative, 34, 85.Sexual, 19, 39, 56, 71-8, 85-5, 94, 115-26.Social, 3.unhibited in aim, 73, 77-8, 94, 115-26.Unconscious, 10.Intellectual ability, lowering of,in groups, 14, 18, 23, 25, 29, 31, 33, 81.Introjection, of object into ego, 65, 67-8, 76.Jealousy, 121.Kings, Mana in, 96.Kraškovič, B. Jnr., 23.Kroeger, 90.Language, 25, 38, 71.Latency, period of, 72, 117, 120, 126.Leader, 20-2, 41, 44-5,78, 82, 85, 89, 92, 99, 110.Abstractions as substitutes for, 53.Equal love of, 93, 95.Identification with, 110-11.Killing the, 90.Loss of, 49.Negative, 53.Prestige of, 21-2.the group ideal, 100, 102, 110.Tie with, 49, 52, 66.Le Bon, 5-25, 29, 34, 82, 84, 100-1.Libidinal:structure of the group, 37, 40, 44-5, 47, 53, 70, 79-80, 102-3.The word, 44.ties, 44, 56-8, 65, 93, 100.in the group, 45, 51, 54.Libido, 33-40, 44, 57, 79, 83, 102, 111, 116, 119, 123, 126.Narcissistic, 58, 74, 93, 104, 125.Oral phase of, 61.theory, 57, 83, 125.Unification of, 19.Withdrawal of, 108.Love, 37-40, 42, 73, 87, 108, 122.a factor of civilisation, 57, 93.and character formation, 94, 118-20.and hatred, 56.Being in, 58, 71-9, 120-1, 124-6.Child’s, 116-17.Christ’s, 43.Equal, 42, 50, 89, 93.Pauline, 118.Self-. See under Narcissism.Sensual, 71-3, 78, 117.Sexual, 37-8, 57, 120-2.Sublimated homosexual, 57.The word, 37-9, 71.Unhappy, 75.Unsensual, 73.McDougall, 1, 26-31, 34-6, 46-7, 49, 84.Magical power of words, 19.Magnetic influence, 11.Magnetism, animal, 96.Mana, 96.Mania, 106-9.Marcuszewicz, 68.Marriage, 54, 120.Melancholia, 68, 106-9.Metapsychology, 63, 118.Moede, Walter, 24.Molière, 119.Morality, Totemism the origin of, 90.Mother deities, 113, 115.Multicellularity, 7, 32, 83.Myth, 113-15.Nachmansohn, 39.Names, Taboo upon, 19.Napoleon, 44.Narcissism, 2, 38, 54-8, 69, 74-5, 93, 94, 104.Nestroy, 49.Neurosis, 18, 20, 37, 44, 58, 63, 103-4, 123-26.Nietzsche, 93.Nutrition, Instinct of, 84.Object, 57-8, 62, 68, 74, 87, 93, 104, 125, 127.cathexis, 48, 58, 60-1, 71-2, 76.Change of, 18, 119, 121.Child’s, 72.-choice, 54, 62, 64, 74, 111, 119, 121.Eating the, 61-62.Hyper-cathexis of, 76.Identification with ego, 108.Less or Renunciation of, 68, 108.-love, 56, 63, 74, 111.Relations with the ego, 65, 67-8, 70, 76.Sexual, 67, 72-3, 116.Substituted for ego ideal, 74, 80, 103, 125.Observation, delusions of, 69.Oedipus complex, 60-61, 63, 66, 117.Inverted, 62.Oral phase of organisation of the libido, 61.Organisation in groups, 26, 30-1, 33, 41-2, 80, 82, 90.Orgy, 121.Panic, 45-9.Pan-sexualism, 39.Paul, Saint, 39, 118.Pfister, 39, 119.Plato, 38.Poet, the first epic, 113-114.Power, 9, 15, 28.of leaders, 21.of words, 19.Prestige, 21-2, 34.Primitive peoples, 14, 18-19, 24, 92, 96, 105.Psycho-Analysis, 4, 7, 14, 18, 36, 38-9, 59-60, 84, 97.Psychology:Group, 1-4, 6, 25-6, 33-4, 37, 45, 53, 59, 92, 94, 101.Group and individual, 1-2, 92-93, 112, 114.Psychoses, 66, 103.Puberty, 67, 72-73.Races, repugnance between related, 55.Rank, Otto, 112, 114.Rapport, 97.Reality:Function for testing, 20, 77.Contrast between Objective and Psychological, 20.Regression, 82, 91, 117, 121, 126.Religion, 51, 90.Wars of, 51.Repressed:Sexual tendencies, 74, 117, 123-4.The, 10, 104, 117-18, 126.Repression, 9, 54, 64-5, 69, 72, 84, 95, 105, 117, 120.Resistance, 84, 104.Responsibility, Sense of, 9-10, 29-30.Richter, Konrad, 36.Sachs, Hanns, 16, 115.Schopenhauer, 54.Self-:consciousness, 30-1.depreciation, 107.love. See under Narcissism.observation, 69.preservation, 15, 34, 84-5.sacrifice, 11, 38, 75.Sex, 39.Sexual:act, 92, 121.aims, 58, 72.Diversion of instinct from, 58.Infantile, 72.Obstacles to, 120.life, 19, 72.over-estimation, 53-5.Tendencies, Inhibited and uninhibited. 72-3, 77-8, 94, 115-16, 125-26.union, 37-8.Shaw, Bernard, 121.Sidis, Boris, 84Sighele, 24-5.Simmel, E., 44.Sleep, 98, 104.and hypnosis, 98.Smith, Robertson, 70.Social:duties, 88, 95.relations, 2-3, 57.Socialistic tie, 51.Society, 24, 26, 28, 90.Dread of, 10.Sociology. See under Group Psychology.Speech, 84.Sublimated:devotion, 17, 75.homosexual love, 57.Sublimation, 118.Suggestibility, 11, 13, 35, 84-5.Suggestion, 12-13, 17, 29, 34-7, 40, 82, 95, 99, 102.Counter-, 35.Definition for, 100.Mutual, 12, 27, 34, 82.Superman, 93.Taboo, 19, 96, 112.Tarde, 34.Totemism, 90, 112-13.Totemistic:clan, 95.community of brothers, 112.exogamy, 122.Tradition, 17, 21.of the group, 31.of the individual, 32.Transference, 97-8.Trotter, 32, 83-5, 89, 105.Uncanniness, 95, 99.Uncertainty, absence in groups, 15-16.interpretation in dreams, 15-16.Unconscious, 8, 10, 12, 14-16, 18, 23-4, 64, 67, 72, 97, 100, 104.Groups led by, 14.instincts, 10.Le Bon’s, 10, 14, 24.of children, 18, 117.of neurotics, 18.Racial, 9.Wallenstein, 44.War neuroses, 44.War, The, 44.Wilson, President, 44.Wishes, Affective cathexis of, 20.Words, magical power of, 19.THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL LIBRARY. Edited by ERNEST JONESNo. 1.ADDRESSES ON PSYCHO-ANALYSIS. BY J.J. Putnam, M.D. EmeritusProfessor of Neurology, Harvard University. With a Preface by Sigm. Freud,M.D., LL.D.No. 2.PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND THE WAR NEUROSES. By Drs. S. Ferenczi(Budapest), Karl Abraham (Berlin), Ernst Simmel (Berlin) and Ernest Jones(London). Introduction by Prof. Sigm. Freud (Vienna).No. 3. THE PSYCHO-ANALYTIC STUDY OF THE FAMILY. By J. C. Flügel, B.A.No. 4. BEYOND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE. By Sigm. Freud M.D., LL.D.Authorized Translation from the second German Edition by C. J. M. Hubback.No. 5. ESSAYS IN APPLIED PSYCHO-ANALYSIS. By Ernest Jones M.D. Presidentof the International Psycho-Analytical Association.No. 6. GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO. By Sigm.Freud M.D., LL.D. Authorized Translation by James Strachey.THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSISDirected by Sigm. FreudOfficial Organ of theINTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATIONEdited by Ernest JonesPresident of the AssociationWith the Assistance of DOUGLAS BRYAN, J. C. FLÜGEL (London)A. A. BRILL, H. W. FRINK, C. P. OBERNDORF (New York)Issued QuarterlySubscription 30s. per Volume of Four Parts (c. 500 pp.)the parts not being sold separately.THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL PRESSPrinted by K. Liebel in Vienna, II.Große Mohrengasse 23FOOTNOTES:[1] [‘Group’ is used throughout this translation as equivalent to the rather more comprehensive German‘Masse‘. The author uses this latter word to render both McDougall’s ‘group’, and also Le Bon’s ‘foule‘, whichwould more naturally be translated ‘crowd’ in English. For the sake of uniformity, however, ‘group’ has beenpreferred in this case as well, and has been substituted for ‘crowd’ even in the extracts from the Englishtranslation of Le Bon.—Translator..][2] The Crowd: a Study of the Popular Mind. Fisher Unwin 12th. Impression, 1920.[3] [See footnote page 1.][4] [References are to the English translation.—Translator.][5] [The German translation of Le Bon, quoted by the author, reads ‘bewusster‘; the English translationhas ‘unconscious’; and the original French text ‘inconscients‘.—Translator.][6] [The English translation reads ‘which we ourselves ignore’—a misunderstanding of the French word‘ignorées‘.—Translator.][7] There is some difference between Le Bon’s view and ours owing to his concept of the unconscious notquite coinciding with the one adopted by psycho-analysis. Le Bon’s unconscious more especially containsthe most deeply buried features of the racial mind, which as a matter of fact lies outside the scope ofpsycho-analysis. We do not fail to recognize, indeed, that the ego’s nucleus, which comprises the ‘archaicinheritance’ of the human mind, is unconscious; but in addition to this we distinguish the ‘unconsciousrepressed’, which arose from a portion of that inheritance. This concept of the repressed is not to be foundin Le Bon.[8] Compare Schiller’s couplet:Jeder, sieht man ihn einzeln, ist leidlich klug und verständig;Sind sie in corpore, gleich wird euch ein Dummkopf daraus.[Everyone, seen by himself, is passably shrewd and discerning;When they’re in corpore, then straightway you’ll find he’s an ass.][9] ‘Unconscious’ is used here correctly by Le Bon in the descriptive sense, where it does not only meanthe ‘repressed’.[10] Compare Totem und Tabu, III., ‘Animismus, Magie, und Allmacht der Gedanken.’ [Totem and Taboo.New York, Moffat, 1918. London, Kegan Paul, 1919.][11] [See footnote p. 69.][12] In the interpretation of dreams, to which, indeed, we owe our best knowledge of unconscious mentallife, we follow a technical rule of disregarding doubt and uncertainty in the narrative of the dream, and oftreating every element of the manifest dream as being quite certain. We attribute doubt and uncertainty tothe influence of the censorship to which the dream-work is subjected, and we assume that the primarydream-thoughts are not acquainted with doubt and uncertainty as critical processes. They may naturally bepresent, like everything else, as part of the content of the day’s residue which leads to the dream. (See DieTraumdeutung, 6. Auflage, 1921, S. 386. [The Interpretation of Dreams. Allen and Unwin, 3rd. Edition,1913, p. 409.])[13] The same extreme and unmeasured intensification of every emotion is also a feature of the affectivelife of children, and it is present as well in dream life. Thanks to the isolation of the single emotions in theunconscious, a slight annoyance during the day will express itself in a dream as a wish for the offendingperson’s death, or a breath of temptation may give the impetus to the portrayal in the dream of a criminalaction. Hanns Sachs has made an appropriate remark on this point: ‘If we try to discover in consciousnessall that the dream has made known to us of its bearing upon the present (upon reality), we need not besurprised that what we saw as a monster under the microscope of analysis now reappears as an infusorium.’(Die Traumdeutung, S. 457. [Translation p. 493.])[14] In young children, for instance, ambivalent emotional attitudes towards those who are nearest to themexist side by side for a long time, without either of them interfering with the expression of the other andcontrary one. If eventually a conflict breaks out between the two, it often settled by the child making achange of object and displacing one of the ambivalent emotions on to a substitute. The history of thedevelopment of a neurosis in an adult will also show that a suppressed emotion may frequently persist for along time in unconscious or even in conscious phantasies, the content of which naturally runs directlycounter to some predominant tendency, and yet that this antagonism does not result in any proceedings onthe part of the ego against what it has repudiated. The phantasy is tolerated for quite a long time, untilsuddenly one day, usually as a result of an increase in the affective cathexis [see footnote page 48] of thephantasy, a conflict breaks out between it and the ego with all the usual consequences. In the process of achild’s development into a mature adult there is a more and more extensive integration of its personality, aco-ordination of the separate instinctive feelings and desires which have grown up in him independently ofone another. The analogous process in the domain of sexual life has long been known to us as the coordinationof all the sexual instincts into a definitive genital organisation. (Drei Abhandlungen zurSexualtheorie, 1905. [Three Contributions to the Sexual Theory. Nervous and Mental Disease MonographSeries, No. 7, 1910.]) Moreover, that the unification of the ego is liable to the same interferences as that ofthe libido is shown by numerous familiar instances, such as that of men of science who have preserved theirfaith in the Bible, and the like.[15] See Totem and Tabu.[16] [See footnote p. 48.][17] B. Kraškovič jun.: Die Psychologie der Kollektivitäten. Translated [into German] from the Croatianby Siegmund von Posavec. Vukovar, 1915. See the body of the work as well as the bibliography.[18] See Walter Moede: ‘Die Massen-und Sozialpsychologie im kritischen Überblick.’ Meumann andScheibner’s Zeitschrift für pädagogische Psychologie und experimentelle Pädagogik. 1915, XVI.[19] Cambridge University Press, 1920.[20] Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War. Fisher Unwin, 1916.[21] Brugeilles: ‘L’essence du phénomèna social: la suggestion.’ Revue philosophique, 1913, XXV.[22] Konrad Richter: ‘Der deutsche S. Christoph.’ Berlin, 1896, Acta Germanica, V, I.[23] [Literally:“Christopher bore Christ; Christ bore the whole world; Say, where did Christopher then puthis foot?’][24] Thus, McDougall: ‘A Note on Suggestion.’ Journal of Neurology and Psychopathology, 1920, Vol. I,No. I.[25] Nachmansohn: ‘Freuds Libidotheorie verglichen mit der Eroslehre Platos’. Internationale Zeitschriftfür Psychoanalyse, 1915, Bd. III; Pfister: ‘Plato als Vorläufer der Psychoanalyse’, ibid., 1921, Bd. VII.[‘Plato: a Fore-Runner of Psycho-Analysis’. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 1922, Vol. III.][26] ‘Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not love, I am become as soundingbrass, or a tinkling cymbal.’[27] [An idiom meaning ‘for their sake’. Literally: ‘for love of them’.—Translator.][28] An objection will justly be raised against this conception of the libidinal [see next foot-note] structureof an army on the ground that no place has been found in it for such ideas as those of one’s country, ofnational glory, etc., which are of such importance in holding an army together. The answer is that that is adifferent instance of a group tie, and no longer such a simple one; for the examples of great generals, likeCaesar, Wallenstein, or Napoleon, show that such ideas are not indispensable to the existence of an army.We shall presently touch upon the possibility of a leading idea being substituted for a leader and upon therelations between the two. The neglect of this libidinal factor in an army, even when it is not the only factoroperative, seems to be not merely a theoretical omission but also a practical danger. Prussian militarism,which was just as unpsychological as German science, may have had to suffer the consequences of this inthe great war. We know that the war neuroses which ravaged the German army have been recognized asbeing a protest of the individual against the part he was expected to play in the army; and according to thecommunication of E. Simmel (Kriegsneurosen and ‘Psychisches Trauma’. Munich, 1918), the hardtreatment of the men by their superiors may be considered as foremost among the motive forces of thedisease. If the importance of the libido’s claims on this score had been better appreciated, the fantasticpromises of the American President’s fourteen points would probably not have been believed so easily, andthe splendid instrument would not have broken in the hands of the German leaders.[29] [Here and elsewhere the German ‘libidinös’ is used simply as an adjectival derivative from thetechnical term ‘Libido‘; ‘libidinal’ is accordingly introduced in the translation in order to avoid the highlycolouredconnotation of the English ‘libidinous’.—Translator.][30] [‘Cathexis’, from the Greek ‘κατἑχω’, ‘I occupy’. The German word ‘Besetzung‘ has become offundamental importance in the exposition of psycho-analytical theory. Any attempt at a short definition ordescription is likely to be misleading, but speaking very loosely, we may say that ‘cathexis’ is used on theanalogy of an electric charge, and that it means the concentration or accumulation of mental energy in someparticular channel. Thus, when we speak of the existence in someone of a libidinal cathexis of an object, or,more shortly, of an object-cathexis, we mean that the libidinal energy is directed towards, or rather infusedinto, the idea (Vorstellung) of some object in the outer world. Readers who desire to obtain a more preciseknowledge of the term are referred to the discussions in ‘Zur Einführung des Narzissmus’ and the essays onmetapsychology in Kleine Schriften zur Neurosenlehre, Vierte Folge.—Translator.][31] See Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse. XXV, 3. Auflage, 1920. [Introductory Lectureson Psycho-Analysis. Lecture XXV. George Allen and Unwin, 1922.][32] Compare Bela v. Felszeghy’s interesting though somewhat fantastic paper ‘Panik und Pankomplex’.Imago, 1920, Bd. VI.[33] Compare the explanation of similar phenomena after the abolition of the paternal authority of thesovereign given in P. Federn’s Die vaterlose Gesellschaft. Vienna, Anzengruber-Verlag, 1919.[34] ‘A company of porcupines crowded themselves very close together one cold winter’s day so as toprofit by one another’s warmth and so save themselves from being frozen to death. But soon they felt oneanother’s quills, which induced them to separate again. And now, when the need for warmth brought themnearer together again, the second evil arose once more. So that they were driven backwards and forwardsfrom one trouble to the other, until they had discovered a mean distance at which they could most tolerablyexist.’ (Parerga und Paralipomena, II. Teil, XXXI., ‘Gleichnisse und Parabeln’.)[35] Perhaps with the solitary exception of the relation of a mother to her son, which is based uponnarcissism, is not disturbed by subsequent rivalry, and is reinforced by a rudimentary attempt at sexualobject-choice.[36] In a recently published study, Jenseits des Lustprinzips (1920) [Beyond the Pleasure Principle,International Psycho-Analytical Library, No. 4], I have attempted to connect the polarity of love and hatredwith a hypothetical opposition between instincts of life and death, and to establish the sexual instincts as thepurest examples of the former, the instincts of life.[37] See ‘Zur Einführung des Narzissmus’, 1914. Kleine Schriften zur Neurosenlehre, Vierte Folge, 1918.[38] [Literally, ‘leaning-up-against type’; from the Greek ‘ἁνακλἱνω’ ‘I lean up against’. In the first phaseof their development the sexual instincts have no independent means of finding satisfaction; they do so bypropping themselves upon or ‘leaning up against’ the self-preservative instincts. The individual’s firstchoice of a sexual object is said to be of the ‘anaclitic type’ when it follows this path; that is, when hechoses as his first sexual object the same person who has satisfied his early non-sexual needs. For a fulldiscussion of the anaclitic and narcissistic types of object-choice compare ‘Zur Einführung des Narzissmus.—Translator.][39] See Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie, and Abraham’s ‘Untersuchungen über die frühesteprägenitale Entwicklungsstufe der Libido’, Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse, 1916, Bd, IV; alsoincluded in his Klinische Beiträge zur Psychoanalyse (Internationale psychoanalytische Bibliothek. Nr. 10,1921).[40] [Kleine Schriften zur Neurosenlehre. Zweite Folge.][41] Marcuszewicz: ‘Beitrag zum autistischen Denken bei Kindern.’ Internationale Zeitschrift fürPsychoanalyse, 1920, Bd. VI.[42] [‘Trauer und Melancholie.’ Kleine Schriften zur Neurosenlehre, Vierte Folge, 1918.][43] [‘Instanz‘—like ‘instance’ in the phrase ‘court of first instance’—was originally a legal term. It isnow used in the sense of one of a hierarchy of authorities or functions.—Translator.][44] ‘Zur Einführung des Narzissmus’, ‘Trauer und Melancholie.’[45] ‘Zur Einführung des Narzissmus.’[46] We are very well aware that we have not exhausted the nature of identification with these samplestaken from pathology, and that we have consequently left part of the riddle of group formations untouched.A far more fundamental and comprehensive psychological analysis would have to intervene at this point. Apath leads from identification by way of imitation to empathy, that is, to the comprehension of themechanism by means of which we are enabled to take up any attitude at all towards another mental life.Moreover there is still much to be explained in the manifestations of existing identifications. These resultamong other things in a person limiting his aggressiveness towards those with whom he has identifiedhimself, and in his sparing them and giving them help. The study of such identifications, like those, forinstance, which lie at the root of clan feeling, led Robertson Smith to the surprising result that they rest uponthe recognition of a common substance (Kinship and Marriage, 1885), and may even therefore be broughtabout by a meal eaten in common. This feature makes it possible to connect this kind of identification withthe early history of the human family which I constructed in Totem und Tabu.[47] Cf. Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie, l.c.[48] ‘Über die allgemeinste Erniedrigung des Liebeslebens.’ Kleine Schriften zur Neurosenlehre, VierteFolge, 1918.[49] Cf. ‘Metapsychologische Ergänzung zur Traumlehre.’ Kleine Schriften zur Neurosenlehre, VierteFolge, 1918.[50] W. Trotter: Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War. Fisher Unwin, 1916.[51] See my essay Jenseits des Lustprinzips.[52] See the remarks upon Dread in Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse. XXV.[53] Totem und Tabu.[54] What we have just described in our general characterisation of mankind must apply especially to theprimal horde. The will of the individual was too weak; he did not venture upon action. No impulseswhatever came into play except collective ones; there was only a common will, there were no single ones.An idea did not dare to turn itself into a volition unless it felt itself reinforced by a perception of its generaldiffusion. This weakness of the idea is to be explained by the strength of the emotional tie which is sharedby all the members of the horde; but the similarity in the circumstances of their life and the absence of anyprivate property assist in determining the uniformity of their individual mental acts. As we may observewith children and soldiers, common activity is not excluded even in the excremental functions. The onegreat exception is provided by the sexual act, in which a third person is at the best superfluous and in theextreme case is condemned to a state of painful expectancy. As to the reaction of the sexual need (forgenital gratification) towards gregariousness, see below.[55] It may perhaps also be assumed that the sons, when they were driven out and separated from theirfather, advanced from identification with one another to homosexual object love, and in this way wonfreedom to kill their father.[56] ‘Das Unheimliche.’ Imago, 1919, Bd. V.[57] See Totem und Tabu and the sources there quoted.[58] This situation, in which the subject’s attitude is unconsciously directed towards the hypnotist, whilehe is consciously occupied with the monotonous and uninteresting perceptions, finds a parallel among theevents of psycho-analytic treatment, which deserves to be mentioned here. At least once in the course ofevery analysis a moment comes when the patient obstinately maintains that just now positively nothingwhatever occurs to his mind. His free associations come to a stop and the usual incentives for putting themin motion fail in their effect. As a result of pressure the patient is at last induced to admit that he is thinkingof the view from the consulting-room window, of the wall-paper that he sees before him, or of the gas-lamphanging from the ceiling. Then one knows at once that he has gone off into the transference and that he isengaged upon what are still unconscious thoughts relating to the physician; and one sees the stoppage in thepatient’s associations disappear, as soon as he has been given this explanation.[59] Ferenczi: ‘Introjektion und Übertragung.’ Jahrbuch der Psychoanalyse, 1909, Bd. I [Contributions toPsycho-Analysis. Boston, Badger, 1916, Chapter II.][60] It seems to me worth emphasizing the fact that the discussions in this section have induced us to giveup Bernheim’s conception of hypnosis and go back to the naïf earlier one. According to Bernheim allhypnotic phenomena are to be traced to the factor of suggestion, which is not itself capable of furtherexplanation. We have come to the conclusion that suggestion is a partial manifestation of the state ofhypnosis, and that hypnosis is solidly founded upon a predisposition which has survived in the unconsciousfrom the early history of the human family.[61] ‘Trauer und Melancholie.’[62] Totem und Tabu.[63] Trotter traces repression back to the herd instinct. It is a translation of this into another form ofexpression rather than a contradiction when I say in my ‘Einführung des Narzissmus’ that on the part of theego the construction of an ideal is the condition of repression.[64] Cf. Abraham: ‘Ansätze zur psychoanalytischen Erforschung und Behandlung des manischdepressivenIrreseins’, 1912, in Klinische Beiträge zur Psychoanalyse, 1921.[65] To speak more accurately, they conceal themselves behind the reproaches directed towards theperson’s own ego, and lend them the fixity, tenacity, and imperativeness which characterize the selfreproachesof a melancholiac.[66] [Literally: ‘How he clears his throat and how he spits, that you have cleverly copied from him.’][67] What follows at this point was written under the influence of an exchange of ideas with Otto Rank.[68] Cf. Hanns Sachs: ‘Gemeinsame Tagträume’, a summary made by the lecturer himself of a paper readat the Sixth Psycho-analytical Congress, held at the Hague in 1920. Internationale Zeitschrift fürPsychoanalyse, 1920, Bd. VI. [‘Day-Dreams in Common’. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 1920,Vol. I.][69] In this brief exposition I have made no attempt to bring forward any of the material existing inlegends, myths, fairy tales, the history of manners, etc., in support of the construction.[70] Cf. Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie.[71] Hostile feelings, which are a little more complicated in their construction, offer no exception to thisrule.[72] [Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde. Heft 8. Vienna, Deuticke, 1910.][73] See ‘Über die allgemeinste Erniedrigung des Liebeslebens.’[74] See Totem und Tabu, towards the end of Part II, ‘Das Tabu und die Ambivalenz’.[75] See Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie, 4. Auflage, 1920, S. 96.

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